State v. Silva

• Decision Date: 28 August 2001
• Citation: 783 A.2d 7,65 Conn. App. 234
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES R. SILVA JAMES R. SILVA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

65 Conn. App. 234

783 A.2d 7

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES R. SILVA

JAMES R. SILVA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 20951), (AC 20317)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 13, 2000.

Officially released August 28, 2001.

Landau, Dranginis and Healey, JS. Deborah G. Stevenson, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant in the first appeal, petitioner in the second appeal).

Lawrence J. Tytla, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin T. Kane, state's attorney, and Paul E. Murray, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state in the first appeal, respondent in the second appeal).

Opinion

DRANGINIS, J.

This case involves the resolution of two appeals by the defendant, James R. Silva.¹ The defendant's direct appeal is from the trial court's judgment of conviction rendered after a plea of guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,² of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.³ The defendant claims that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty plea (1) without substantial compliance with Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20, and (2) because his will was overborne by coercion, thereby violating his right to due process and his privilege against self-incrimination as provided by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut.

The defendant's second appeal is from the judgment rendered after a trial to the habeas court on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he sought, inter alia,⁴ to have his appeal rights reinstated, long after his conviction, and to have his conviction vacated because (1) his guilty plea was made involuntarily and unknowingly, and (2) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. The habeas court reinstated the defendant's right to a direct appeal,⁵ but was unpersuaded by his arguments directed at vacating the judgment of conviction. On appeal, the defendant claims that the habeas court improperly found that his plea was made voluntarily and knowingly, and that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance.

The following factual basis is necessary to resolve these appeals. On April 17, 1994, at approximately 9:30 p.m., New London police responded to a reported shooting. The police investigation led to the arrest of the defendant on April 21, 1994, for the murder of Albert Goss III.⁶ The defendant and the victim knew each other as friends. The defendant went to the victim's home, carrying a loaded semiautomatic pistol, to confront him about a relationship the victim was having with the defendant's girlfriend. The defendant also took with him several friends as backup. When the victim came outside, a verbal argument ensued in front of the victim's home. At some point, the defendant threw his weapon to the ground. The victim returned inside and told his mother that "Jimmy was in the project with a gun and she should call the police." The victim returned outside where the argument continued. The defendant picked up his gun. The defendant told his companions that the victim had a knife. Ultimately, the victim received a gunshot wound to the chest and stumbled back into the apartment, stating, "[H]e shot me ... Jimmy shot me." He died a short time later. The defendant fled the scene, and the gun was never recovered.

Initially, the defendant maintained his innocence and denied that he was the person who shot the victim. On May 17, 1995, the day the case was to come to trial, the defendant pleaded guilty. The court canvassed the defendant and, having found that the defendant's plea was made "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily with full understanding of the crime charged and the possible consequences of the pleas as well as with adequate advice and assistance of counsel," the court accepted his plea. On June 28, 1995, the defendant was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment in accordance with the state's recommended sentence offered pursuant to its plea agreement with the defendant. The defendant's appeals followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary to address the defendant's claims.

I

In his direct appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly accepted his guilty plea under the Alford doctrine. He claims that the court failed (1) to comply with our rules of practice, (2) to state correctly the punishment for the crime, (3) to determine whether the defendant had notice of the true nature of the charge against him, (4) to conduct sufficient colloquy to determine if the plea was voluntary and (5) to conduct sufficient inquiry to determine if the defendant's plea resulted from coercion in light of his precarious mental state. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant concedes, as he must, that he did not preserve his claims for appeal by moving to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing pursuant to Practice Book § 39-27. He seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

Under the Golding doctrine, "a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Id., 239-40.

"In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant's claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances." Id., 240. "The first two prongs of Golding address the reviewability of the claim, and the last two involve the merits of the claim." State v. Brown, 56 Conn. App. 26, 31, 741 A.2d 321 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 927, 746 A.2d 790 (2000).

The defendant's claims that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made are appropriate claims for constitutional review pursuant to the Golding doctrine. State v. Peterson, 51 Conn. App. 645, 654, 725 A.2d 333, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 905, 731 A.2d 310 (1999); State v. Domian, 35 Conn. App. 714, 719, 646 A.2d 940 (1994), affd, 235 Conn. 679, 668 A.2d 1333 (1996). Because the defendant's claims are of constitutional magnitude and the record is adequate for review, we will review each of his claims in turn.

A

The defendant first claims that the trial court failed to comply strictly with Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 3920 during its canvass of him and, therefore, improperly accepted his guilty plea in violation of his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, he claims that the court did not canvass him concerning § 39-19 (3), which provides that the court must determine that the defendant understands "[t]he fact that the statute for the particular offense does not permit the sentence to be suspended...." He also claims that the court did not canvass him as required by Practice Book § 39-19 (5) and that he had the right to the assistance of counsel if he would have proceeded to trial.

"The United States Supreme Court has held that for the acceptance of a guilty plea to comport with due process, the plea must be voluntarily and knowingly entered. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969)." State v. Carter, 243 Conn. 392, 397, 703 A.2d 763 (1997). "We are bound by our Supreme Court's decision in [State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1986)], which requires us to focus our inquiry on whether the federal constitutional principles of [Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 243] were satisfied rather than on meticulous compliance with the provisions of the Practice Book.... Boykin requires that before accepting a defendant's plea, a trial court must inform him of three core constitutional rights: His right to be free of compulsory self-incrimination, and his rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 60 Conn. App. 575, 581, 760 A.2d 948, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 922, 763 A.2d 1043 (2000).

"[T]he determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances [and] the plea may satisfy constitutional requirements even in the absence of literal compliance with the prophylactic safeguards of [Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 44, 751 A.2d 298 (2000).

In this case, the trial court never expressly informed the defendant that his sentence was nonsuspendable. That fact alone, however, is not dispositive of the defendant's claim. See id., 44-45 (trial court's failure to inform defendant of mandatory minimum sentence alone did not render plea involuntary or unknowing). Rather, in light of all the circumstances surrounding the defendant's plea, including the court's repeated references to his plea agreement and statements that he would have to serve a thirty year sentence if his plea was accepted, we conclude that the defendant fully understood the consequences of his plea and that the court's failure to inform him that his sentence was not suspendable did not undermine the voluntariness of his plea. See State v. Gray, 63 Conn. App. 151, 159, 772 A.2d 747 (plea knowingly and voluntarily entered when defendant knew maximum sentence for charged offenses), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 934, 776 A.2d 1151 (2001); State v. Peterson, supra, 51 Conn. App. 658, (plea knowing and voluntary where court advised defe...