State v. Simmons

Decision Date25 October 1967
Citation155 Conn. 502,234 A.2d 835
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Anastasia SIMMONS (Augustus J. Simmons et al., Executors (ESTATE of Anastasia SIMMONS) et al., Substituted Defendants).

Frederick D. Neusner, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Neal H. Jordan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen., for appellant (state).

Thomas P. Byrne, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before ALCORN, Acting C.J., HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ., and COVELLO, Superior Court Judge, concurring.

HOUSE, Associate Justice.

This case arose from the efforts of the Connecticut aeronautics commission to take by eminent domain, pursuant to § 15-79 of the General Statutes, certain property of the defendants in the town of East Granby for the purpose of expanding and improving Bradley International Airport. On an earlier appeal in State v. Simmons, 153 Conn. 351, 216 A.2d 632, we found error in the first trial of the case, set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial. Pending a new trial, the defendants, with the permission of the court, filed an additional special defense claiming that the aeronautics commission had no authority under § 15-79 to take the property of the defendants because approval of the taking had not been obtained from the town of East Granby. The trial court found for the defendants solely on the basis of this special defense, and, because the commission had not obtained the approval of the town of East Granby for the taking, the court rendered judgment for the defendants. Accordingly, the sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court correctly interpreted § 15-79 of the General Statutes to require that, before acquiring property by condemnation for the expansion or improvement of a state airport, the aeronautics commission must obtain the approval of the municipality in which the property is situated.

The relevant portion of § 15-79 provides as follows: 'The state or any municipality, or any two or more municipalities jointly, may establish, maintain and operate an airport at any location within the state approved by the commission and by the municipality or municipalities within which such airport is to be established, and, where such airport is established by a municipality or two or more municipalities jointly, such airport shall also have been approved by such municipality or municipalities in the following manner: Towns, by vote of the town; cities, by vote of the city council; and boroughs, by vote of the borough; and may take any such land or interest therein for such establishment or for the expansion or improvement of an airport when, in the opinion of the commission, public convenience or safety requires, and when the approval of the municipality or municipalities in which such land is located has been legally obtained, upon paying just compensation to the owner of such land or interest therein.'

When, as required by § 1-1 of the General Statutes, § 15-79 is read 'according to the commonly approved usage of the language,' we find no ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36; State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525; 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d Ed.) § 4502. 'Its unequivocal meaning is not subject to modification by way of construction. State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 207, 91 A.2d 773; Swits v. Swits, 81 Conn. 598, 599, 71 A. 782.' General Tires, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corporation, 143 Conn. 191, 195, 120 A.2d 426.

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20 cases
  • State v. Courchesne
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 11, 2003
    ...has eschewed resort to those sources when the meaning of the text appeared to be plain and unambiguous. See, e.g., State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835 (1967); Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 82, 48 A.2d 369 (1946); O'Brien v. Wise & Upson Co., 108 Conn. 309, 3......
  • Phinney v. Rosgen
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1971
    ...subject to modification by way of construction. Little v. United Investors Corporation,157 Conn. 44, 48, 245 A.2d 567; State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835; Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36. Waiver can only be construed according to its commonly approved usage......
  • International Business Machines Corp. v. Brown
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1974
    ...the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is not subject to modification by construction. State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835; Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36. It is not the function of courts to read into clearly expressed legisla......
  • Royce v. Heneage
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • March 23, 1976
    ...81 Conn. 598, 599, 71 A. 782.' General Tires, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corporation, 143 Conn. 191, 195, 120 A.2d 426.' State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835.' See also Meriden v. Board of Tax Review, 161 Conn. 396, 402, 288 A.2d 435. In the absence of special circumstances, the ......
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