State v. Springer
| Citation | 149 Conn. 244,178 A.2d 525 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 06 February 1962 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Frank SPRINGER et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
George D. Stoughton, Asst. State's Atty., Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., Manchester, and J. Read Murphy, Asst. State's Atty., Hartford, for appellant (state).
James D. Cosgrove, Public Defender, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Leighton).
David D. Berdon, Hartford, for appellee (defendant Springer).
Before KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ., and HOUSE, Superior Court judge.
On May 7, 1959, the defendants, Frank Springer and Andrew J. Leighton, Jr., who were then confined in the state prison at Wethersfield, were arrested on a bench warrant which was issued on that day by the Superior Court at the request of the state's attorney for Hartford County based on an information charging the defendants and others with conspiracy to convey narcotics, barbiturates and intoxicating liquors into the prison. The specific allegations of the two counts of conspiracy and other counts not involving the defendants are immaterial. On May 22, 1959, the defendants wrote identical letters, addressed to the state's attorney for Hartford County, in which they requested trial at the earliest possible date. The letters were delivered on May 22, 1959, to the warden of the prison. On May 25, 1959, he forwarded them, along with his own certificates, to the state's attorney by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The state's attorney received the letters and the warden's certificates on May 26, 1959. The defendants were brought to the Superior Court at Hartford on September 23, 1959, for the purpose of being put to plea and tried. Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that he had not, in accordance with General Statutes, §§ 54-139, and 54-140, been brought to trial within 120 days after he caused a written request for final disposition of his case to be delivered. 1 An amendment to § 54-139 by Public Acts 1961, No. 465, does not affect the present question. The court granted both motions and rendered judgment dismissing the information as to the defendants. The state, with the permission of the court, has appealed.
The only question presented is the date from which the 120 days begins to run. The state claims that the beginning date was the date on which the notice came into the possession of the state's attorney. The defendants claim that the period started with the prisoners' delivery of the requests for trial to the warden of the prison. No claim is made that the notice is insufficient by reason of the fact that no attempt was made to give it also to the court. We consider, therefore, only the requirement relating to delivery to the state's attorney.
The answer to the question involves the meaning of the words 'has caused to be delivered' as used in § 54-139. This, in turn, necessitates a consideration of the entire enactment. McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 418, 123 A.2d 182. Where the language is plain and unambiguous, as in this case, the intent of a statute is to be determined from its language. Landry v. Personnel Appeal Board, 138 Conn. 445, 447, 86 A.2d 70. In such a case, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898; Wilson v. Town of West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420. The words used in expressing the legislative intent are to be given their commonly approved meaning. General Statutes, § 1-1; Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 144 Conn. 516, 522, 134 A.2d 351; Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 354, 131 A.2d 834. It must also be presumed that the General Assembly had a purpose for every sentence, clause or phrase in the statute. McAdams v. Barbieri, supra, 143 Conn. 419, 123 A.2d 182.
With these principles in mind, we turn to § 54-139 and find, significantly, that the portion of it which is pertinent to the present question is divided into subsections (a) and (b). Under subsection (a), the prisoner is to be brought to trial within 120 days 'after he has caused to be delivered, to the prosecuting official of the county in which the indictment or information is pending and the appropriate court,' written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for final disposition of his case. The certificate of the official who has the prisoner in custody must accompany the prisoner's request and must recite specified information relative to his confinement. Subsection (b) then specifies how the delivery is to be made, namely, by the prisoner's giving or sending his written notice and request to the warden or other official having custody of him, 'who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.' Thus, the statute does not contemplate a request for a disposition of the case sent directly by the prisoner to the prosecuting official and the court, but rather a request delivered in a particular way through the medium of the custodial official and accompanied of the custodial official supplied by him after his receipt of the request. The prisoner's part in the proceeding is only to 'cause' his request 'to be delivered' in the manner particularized in the statute.
Under § 54-139, the act required to be done in order to start the running of the period of 120 days is the delivery of the prisoner's request, accompanied by his custodian's certificate, to the prosecuting official of the county and the appropriate court. Obviously, a prisoner confined in a penal or correctional institution could not be required to make personal delivery. The General Assembly has therefore provided that the prisoner initiate the request for a trial, has required further that his custodian supply information concerning the prisoner's confinement to the prosecuting official and ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Courchesne
...v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 74, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525 (1962); Evans v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 135 Conn. 120, 124, 61 A.2d 684 (1948); Lee Bros. Furniture Co.......
-
State v. Hughes
...for every sentence, clause or phrase in the statute. McAdams v. Barbieri, supra, 143 Conn. , 419, 123 A.2d 182.' State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525, 527; see Toll Gate Farms, Inc. v. Milk Regulation Board, 148 Conn. 341, 344, 170 A.2d 883; Park Regional Corporation v. Town ......
-
State v. Toste
...§§ 54-82c and 54-82d, we have required strict compliance with the statutory notice procedures. For instance, in State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 178 A.2d 525 (1962), we held that an initial request to the prison official was not sufficient to start the running of the 120-day period. The de......
-
R.A. Civitello Co. v. City of New Haven, 3310
...v. Manson, 168 Conn. 389, 393, 362 A.2d 971 (1975); Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 73, 230 A.2d 36 (1967); State v. Springer, 149 Conn. 244, 248, 178 A.2d 525 (1962)." Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 73, 411 A.2d 28 (1979). Finally, if cons......