State v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 12 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. S90A0144,S90A0144
• Parties: The STATE v. SIMMONS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 43

390 S.E.2d 43

260 Ga. 92

The STATE v. SIMMONS.

No. S90A0144.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 12, 1990.

Edward D. Lukemire, Dist. Atty., Robert E. Turner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Perry, for State.

Herbert L. Wells, Terry Everett, Sonja Calhoun, Perry, for Simmons. Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Andrew S. Ree, amicus curiae.

BELL, Justice.

The state appeals from an order of the trial court suppressing a statement made by the appellee, Dwight L. Simmons. Simmons made the statement at a first-appearance hearing, see Uniform Rules for the Magistrate Courts (URMC) 13.1, at which he was not represented by counsel. The only issue on appeal is whether Simmons had a Sixth-Amendment right to have counsel present at the first-appearance hearing. We find Simmons did not have such a right, and we therefore reverse the trial court's ruling.

Following Simmons' arrest for the murder of his aunt and uncle, he made four statements to the police. After a pre-trial Jackson- Denno hearing, the trial court ruled that the first two statements were admissible, but that the third and fourth statements were not. The state has appealed the ruling suppressing the fourth statement. The first two statements are not relevant here and will not be discussed.

During the course of the custodial interrogation that resulted in Simmons' third statement, Simmons stated that he wanted to see a lawyer. The officers conducting the interrogation stopped questioning Simmons, and about an hour later the officers took Simmons before a magistrate for a first-appearance hearing, URMC 13.1.

URMC 13.1 is entitled "Initial Appearance Hearing," and requires the judicial officer, inter alia, to inform the accused of the charges; inform the accused that he has the right to remain silent; determine whether the accused desires and is in need of an appointed attorney; inform the accused of his right to a pre-indictment probable-cause hearing; schedule a hearing, if authorized and if requested by the defendant; inform the accused that he has a right to grand-jury indictment in felony cases and the right to trial by jury; inform the accused that if he desires to waive these rights and plead guilty, he shall so notify the judge or the law officer having custody; and set the amount of bail or inform the accused that the offense is one bailable only by a superior court judge.

In the instant case, while the magistrate was informing Simmons of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney, Simmons volunteered, "I'm guilty. I'm guilty." After Simmons stated that he was guilty, the magistrate stopped the first-appearance hearing. The form used by the magistrate as a guide during the hearing included the eight items set forth in Rule 13.1.

The trial court ruled the statement made in magistrate court inadmissible, holding that

even though the defendant made a spontaneous statement, it was made in the context of a hearing at which he was without counsel after having requested counsel, and the same should be suppressed.

We disagree that the statement must be suppressed.

The decisive issue is whether Simmons was entitled, under the Sixth Amendment, to be represented by an attorney at the first-appearance hearing. ¹ If he was not so entitled, the statement he made at the hearing should not have been suppressed.

We begin by noting the trial court attached special significance to Simmons' request for counsel. However, the Sixth-Amendment right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, fn. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, fn. 6, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Roper v. State, 258 Ga. 847, 849, fn. 2, 375 S.E.2d 600 (1989). Although a request for counsel is an important fact if questions arise concerning whether a defendant has waived his right to counsel, Michigan v. Jackson, supra, 475 U.S. at 633, fn. 6, 106 S.Ct. at 1409, fn. 6; Roper v State, supra, 258 Ga. at 849, fn. 2, 375 S.E.2d 600, no such issue is present in this case.

We now turn to an analysis of when a defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel based on the Sixth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him--whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Accord U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-189, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2296-98, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). Once judicial proceedings have been initiated, the Sixth Amendment attaches and the accused is entitled to the representation of an attorney at all critical stages thereafter. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-630, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1407-08, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986); LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, § 11.2(b), p. 20 (1984); Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1069-1071(6) (8th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has identified as critical stages those pre-trial procedures that would impair an accused's defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without counsel. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970).

In the instant...