State v. Simpkins

• Decision Date: 28 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 188A19,188A19
• Citation: 373 N.C. 530,838 S.E.2d 439
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffery Martaez SIMPKINS
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

373 N.C. 530

838 S.E.2d 439

STATE of North Carolina

v.Jeffery Martaez SIMPKINS

No. 188A19

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed February 28, 2020

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Alexandra M. Hightower, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Kimberly P. Hoppin, for defendant-appellee.

EARLS, Justice.

On 4 July 2016, Jeffery Martaez Simpkins was arrested and charged with offenses related to his failure to maintain a valid driver's license. He was first tried in the district court of Stanly County, where he was convicted and sentenced to a 30-day suspended period of confinement with 18 months of supervised probation to include 24 hours of community service. He appealed to the Stanly County Superior Court, where he was tried before a jury without counsel and convicted. He was sentenced to two years of supervised probation with two consecutive active terms of 15 days to be served on weekends and holidays, and with two consecutive 60-day suspended sentences of incarceration. Simpkins appealed to the Court of Appeals. On appeal, he argued that the trial court failed to satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 (2019)¹ before allowing Simpkins to proceed pro se. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals majority agreed. The State conceded that Simpkins had not received the required colloquy before waiving counsel and the court concluded that Simpkins had not forfeited his right to counsel, which would have negated the need for the colloquy. State v. Simpkins , ––– N.C.App. ––––, 826 S.E.2d 845, 845 (2019). We affirm. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Simpkins did not forfeit his right to counsel and that the trial court was therefore required to ensure that Simpkins's waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Background

On 4 July 2016, Simpkins was arrested during a traffic stop after a local police officer ran his license plate and discovered that Simpkins had a suspended license and an arrest warrant. Simpkins appeared in Stanly County District Court on 16 August 2016. At some point during the proceedings in district court, the court noted on an unsigned waiver of counsel form that Simpkins refused to respond to the court's inquiry. The record also contains a waiver of counsel form, signed by the trial judge, with a handwritten note indicating that Simpkins refused to sign the form.² He was tried without counsel and convicted of resisting a public officer, failing to carry a registration card, and driving on a revoked license.

Simpkins then appealed to the Stanly County Superior Court for a new trial. There, Simpkins was charged with (1) failure to carry a registration card, (2) resisting a public officer, (3) driving with a revoked license, and (4) failure to exhibit or surrender a driver's license. The proceedings began at 9:41 a.m. on 7 June 2017. Simpkins appeared without counsel and, following a brief exchange during which Simpkins objected to the court's jurisdiction, the trial court examined him regarding his desire to waive his right to an attorney. During the examination, Simpkins stated that he "would like counsel that's not paid for by the State of North Carolina." The trial court interpreted this as a request to hire his own counsel, and the State objected "unless he can obtain counsel in the next 15 minutes." The trial court called in standby counsel, found that Simpkins had waived his right to an attorney, and appointed standby counsel to assist Simpkins in his defense. At 10:00 a.m., the court allowed Simpkins and standby counsel to review the case together. From the beginning of the trial until the time the court determined that Simpkins had waived his right to an attorney and would proceed pro se, fewer than twenty minutes had passed.

As jury selection was beginning, standby counsel requested a bench conference and the court permitted the parties to discuss the possibility of a plea arrangement. The parties returned at 11:04 a.m., and the State reported that they were unable to reach a plea agreement. The trial court then asked Simpkins if he wished to continue with standby counsel, and Simpkins responded that he would waive his rights to standby counsel. The proceedings moved forward from that point with the jury returning at 11:10 a.m. Simpkins was ultimately convicted of failure to exhibit or surrender a license and of resisting a public officer. He was found not responsible for failure to carry a registration card. The charge for driving with a revoked license was dismissed before the jury was instructed on the law.

On appeal, Simpkins argued principally that the trial court erred by not thoroughly inquiring into his decision to proceed pro se. Simpkins , 826 S.E.2d at 846. The inquiry is required both by statute and by the state and federal constitutions to ensure that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Moore , 362 N.C. 319, 322, 661 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2008) (stating requirement and quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 ). The State argued that the inquiry was not required because Simpkins forfeited, rather than waived, his right to counsel. Simpkins , 826 S.E.2d at 846. The Court of Appeals applied its own precedent, which had previously held that a defendant may lose the right to be represented by counsel through voluntary waiver or through forfeiture. Id. Comparing the facts below to prior cases in which the court had found forfeiture, the majority determined that Simpkins did not "engage[ ] in such serious misconduct as to warrant forfeiture of the right to counsel." Id. at 852 (quoting State v. Blakeney , 245 N.C. App. 452, 468, 782 S.E.2d 88, 98 (2016) ) (alteration in original). The State appealed to this Court on the basis of the dissent, which concluded the opposite.

Standard of Review

The right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is protected by both the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ; N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 19, 23. Our review is de novo in cases implicating constitutional rights. See, e.g. , State v. Diaz , 372 N.C. 493, 498, 831 S.E.2d 532, 536 (2019). Accordingly, we review de novo a trial court's determination that a defendant has either waived or forfeited the right to counsel. Cf. Moore , 362 N.C. at 321–26, 661 S.E.2d at 724–27 (reviewing de novo whether defendant was appropriately allowed to proceed without counsel after trial court found waiver of right to counsel); State v. Thomas , 331 N.C. 671, 673–78, 417 S.E.2d 473, 475–78 (1992) (same).³

Analysis

"A cardinal principle of the criminal law is that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that in a serious criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." State v. Hutchins , 303 N.C. 321, 335, 279 S.E.2d 788, 797 (1981) (citations omitted). Even so, a criminal defendant may choose to forgo representation and "conduct his own defense." Id. at 337, 279 S.E.2d at 798. In such a case, the waiver "must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Moore , 362 N.C. at 326, 661 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Thomas , 331 N.C. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 476 ).

In the case below, the trial court determined that Simpkins had waived, rather than forfeited, counsel. When a defendant seeks to waive counsel and proceed pro se, the trial court must satisfy the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242. See State v. Pruitt , 322 N.C. 600, 603, 369 S.E.2d 590, 592 (1988) ; see also Moore , 362 N.C. at 326, 661 S.E.2d at 727 (referencing "the ‘thorough inquiry’ mandated by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242 to ensure the defendant's decision to represent himself was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made"). Given the significant importance of an accused's right to counsel, a defendant must "clearly and unequivocally" express a desire to proceed pro se before we will deem the right to be waived. Thomas , 331 N.C. at 673–74, 417 S.E.2d at 475 (1992) (quoting State v. McGuire , 297 N.C. 69, 81, 254 S.E.2d 165, 173 (1979) ). Upon receiving this clear request, the trial court is required to ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 674, 417 S.E.2d at 476. The court does so by fulfilling the mandates of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242, which requires the court to conduct a "thorough inquiry" and to be satisfied that (1) the defendant was clearly advised of the right to counsel, including the right to assignment of counsel; (2) the defendant "[u]nderstands and appreciates the consequences" of proceeding without counsel; and (3) the defendant understands what is happening in the proceeding as well as "the range of permissible punishments." N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242. The transcript in this case demonstrates that the trial court did not fully comply with the statutory mandate and the State concedes as much. Simpkins , 826 S.E.2d at 846. Therefore, because an effective waiver did not occur, the Court of Appeals in this case decided a further issue, namely whether Mr. Simpkins, by his behavior, forfeited his right to counsel. Id. at 851.⁴

The dissent briefly states and then completely ignores the fact that the trial court found Mr. Simpkins had waived his right to counsel. In fact, the dissent states that the waiver requirements are "inapplicable here." However, in order to find that Simpkins waived his right to counsel, the trial court needed to conduct the inquiry required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1242. The only reason this case is before us is that the State argues, contrary to the finding of the trial court, that Mr. Simpkins actually forfeited, rather than waived, his right to counsel. The decision in this case does not threaten the trial court's "discretion to ensure that legal proceedings are respected by all." Nor does it prevent the trial court from "provid[ing] orderly and just proceedings for all." Instead, it does two things. First, it reinforces the longstanding principle that a waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent,...