State v. Singleton
| Decision Date | 06 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2016-002079,Opinion No. 5722 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Herbie Val SINGLETON, Jr., Appellant. |
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston; all for Respondent.
Herbie V. Singleton, Jr., appeals his conviction for obstruction of justice, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict after the State failed to present any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence that Singleton prevented, hindered, impeded, or obstructed the administration of justice. We affirm.
In October 2014, Dontaviha Patterson received a laptop and other electronics from his friend Bubba. Patterson and Lamont Gregg—who knew each other through Singleton—decided to pawn the laptop and split the money; Patterson's mother drove them to the pawn shop.
On November 19, 2014, Gregg was arrested for pawning a stolen laptop and charged with obtaining goods by false pretenses. When questioned by Sergeant Dan English of the Charleston Police Department (CPD), Gregg stated Patterson gave him the laptop to pawn because Patterson was too young to pawn it himself. Patterson saw Gregg several times after Gregg was released from jail. During one of these encounters, Gregg, who was with Singleton at the time, threatened to "lay [Patterson] out" the next time he saw him.
Later that November, Patterson and Singleton began exchanging heated messages on Facebook, some of which were threatening. On the morning of December 18, 2014, Patterson told Singleton where he was because he heard Singleton was looking for him. When Singleton responded, he told Patterson that Gregg had been messaging Patterson from Singleton's account.
On the afternoon of December 18th, Singleton was driving Kevin Corley and Elijah Green to play basketball when Gregg flagged down the car. Gregg asked Singleton to drive him to Acacia Street to see Patterson. As Singleton approached Patterson's house, Gregg fired a revolver out of the car window towards Patterson, who was sitting outside with his girlfriend. One of the bullets struck and injured Patterson.
Patterson's mother recognized the car as Singleton's and informed the police; Singleton was arrested shortly thereafter. Although Singleton initially denied any involvement in the incident, he eventually admitted to driving the car from which the shots were fired. During his police interview with CPD Detectives Thomas Bailey and Paul Krasowski, Singleton identified three passengers—Corley in the front passenger seat and Green in the rear passenger seat. As to the third person in the car, Singleton falsely identified Antonio Barrett, who had no involvement with the incident, as the shooter.1 When asked about Gregg,2 Singleton referred to Gregg as his "homeboy" but neither identified him as a passenger in his car nor as the shooter.
On December 23, 2014, Barrett's mother's fiancé called CPD to report that a neighbor could provide an alibi for Barrett. Detective Bailey asked for the individual to come to the station to provide a formal statement, but no one did so. Barrett remained in jail until he bonded out on February 13, 2015.
Green, Corley, and Barrett were indicted for attempted murder; however, the State dropped Barrett's charges on August 24, 2015, after Corley and Green had both made proffer agreements. Police arrested Gregg in connection with the shooting, and Gregg admitted he fired the gun. In January 2016, a Charleston County grand jury indicted Singleton for attempted murder and obstruction of justice.
Singleton moved to quash the obstruction of justice indictment, arguing his lies to the police constituted misprision of a felony rather than obstruction of justice. Singleton contended the State chose to indict him for obstruction of justice because he could not be charged as both a primary actor in the attempted murder and with misprision of a felony. Singleton further argued a common law obstruction of justice charge was not applicable against a private citizen but rather required a violation by "someone [who] takes an oath to administer justice." The circuit court denied Singleton's motion to quash the indictment, and the case proceeded to trial.
At the close of the State's case, Singleton moved for a directed verdict on obstruction of justice, arguing his false accusation of Barrett did not obstruct or impede the administration of justice because "[t]he correct shooter pled guilty" eventually, so he did not "prevent it." In making his directed verdict argument, Singleton incorporated his pretrial arguments and renewed his motion to quash the obstruction of justice indictment. The circuit court denied Singleton's motions.
The jury found Singleton not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of obstruction of justice. The circuit court sentenced Singleton under the Youthful Offender Act to a term of imprisonment not to exceed six years.
"On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State." State v. Bennett , 415 S.C. 232, 235, 781 S.E.2d 352, 353 (2016) (quoting State v. Butler , 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) ). "The Court's review is limited to considering the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight." Id . "If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the Court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury." State v. Harris , 413 S.C. 454, 457, 776 S.E.2d 365, 366 (2015) (quoting State v. Brandt , 393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2011) ).
Singleton argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to present direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence to establish Singleton's actions hindered, prevented, impeded, or otherwise obstructed the administration of justice. Further, Singleton asserts that absent the obstruction of a judicial proceeding,3 "a private citizen's actions that hinder law enforcement's initial investigation into a crime, without more, cannot constitute obstruction of justice."
Relying on State v. Cogdell , 273 S.C. 563, 257 S.E.2d 748 (1979), Singleton argued to the circuit court:
[T]here must be an intentional failure to perform a duty which would constitute obstruction of justice. And I would argue that that duty is when someone takes an oath to administer justice, whether it is a lawyer, whether it's a judge, whether it's a magistrate, whether—it is someone who is a part of the administration of justice, a public official, appointed or elected. It, it—I would argue the constitution does not provide that there is a duty on the ordinary citizen to come forward when they are charged with a crime and give a truthful statement.
Codgell holds that "[a]t common law it is an offense to do any act which prevents, obstructs, impedes, or hinders the administration of justice."
Id. at 567, 257 S.E.2d at 750 (citing 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 2 - 3 ). Although Codgell addressed whether common law obstruction of justice had been statutorily preempted in the case of a mayor's failure to report certain traffic violations (the court found no preemption), it did not address the question of against whom an obstruction of justice charge might properly lie.
Most South Carolina obstruction of justice cases have involved public officials; however, this does not preclude a private citizen from being charged with the offense. For example, in State v. Needs , our supreme court recognized the existence of probable cause for an obstruction of justice charge brought against a private citizen after she lied to police and at a pretrial hearing by providing a false alibi for her boyfriend. 333 S.C. 134, 146, 508 S.E.2d 857, 863 (1998).
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