State v. Singleton
Decision Date | 28 July 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 17795.,17795. |
Citation | 292 Conn. 734,974 A.2d 679 |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Ronald M. SINGLETON. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Toni M. Smith-Rosario, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and James G. Clark, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).
Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).
NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The state appeals, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction of the defendant, Ronald M. Singleton, of manslaughter in the first degree.1 The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on self-defense by removing from its consideration the disputed factual issue of whether the defendant had used deadly or nondeadly physical force during an altercation with the victim, Leonard Cobbs, that resulted in the victim's death. On appeal to this court, the state claims that the trial court correctly instructed that the defendant had used deadly physical force in defending himself against the victim because his claim of self-defense required a jury determination as to whether he was justified in killing the victim with a knife, thus making his theoretical use of nondeadly force during the preceding struggle irrelevant. The defendant responds that the instructions were improper because the use of deadly or nondeadly physical force during the struggle was a disputed factual issue for the jury to decide. The defendant alternatively2 contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the "initial aggressor" exception to the law of self-defense and on the offense of manslaughter in the first degree. We agree with the state that the court's instructions on self-defense were proper and reject the defendant's alternative grounds for affirmance. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "The defendant and the victim ... had used illegal drugs together. The victim purchased these drugs with the defendant's money. The defendant was angry that the victim had failed to reimburse him for his share of the drugs. On December 18, 2002, the defendant attempted to find the victim to collect this debt and traveled to both West Haven and New Haven in order to locate him. He eventually found the victim in the Newhall area of West Haven.
6 State v. Singleton, 97 Conn.App. 679, 680-82, 905 A.2d 725 (2006).
Both parties requested jury instructions on self-defense. In the state's request to charge, it proposed instructions referring to "deadly physical force" that were based on language in General Statutes § 53a-19 (a)7 and the instructions given in State v. Clark, 264 Conn. 723, 732, 826 A.2d 128 (2003), State v. Prioleau, 235 Conn. 274, 286-87, 664 A.2d 743 (1995), and State v. Skelly, 78 Conn.App. 513, 516-17, 827 A.2d 759, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 910, 832 A.2d 74 (2003), in which the victims had been fatally shot or stabbed.8 The defendant proposed instructions that did not refer to "deadly physical force" but, rather, to "reasonable physical force" and the use of "a dangerous instrumentality...."9 The trial court followed the state's approach and instructed the jury to consider whether the defendant's use of "deadly physical force" was justified under a theory of self-defense.10 It did not instruct on the use of nondeadly physical force, nor did it instruct that the jury was required to decide the degree of force that the defendant had used. The jury subsequently rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense and found him guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment, sentencing the defendant to a term of twenty years incarceration.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court's instructions were improper because the trial court had failed to submit to the jury the factual question of whether the defendant had used deadly or nondeadly force during his struggle with the victim prior to the stabbing. State v. Singleton, supra, 97 Conn.App. at 687, 905 A.2d 725. The Appellate Court agreed, concluding that (Citation omitted.) Id., at 696, 905 A.2d 725. The Appellate Court further observed that, Id., at 697, 905 A.2d 725. The Appellate Court also concluded that the evidence was not "so overwhelming as to render the improper instruction[s] harmless" and ordered a new trial. Id., at 698, 905 A.2d 725. This appeal followed.
The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that the jury should have been instructed to consider the issue of nondeadly force. The state contends that there was no dispute that the defendant inflicted the fatal stab wound with the knife and that, once the jury determined that he had done so intentionally, all that was left to decide regarding his claim of self-defense was whether his actions were justified, thereby rendering irrelevant the issue of whether he had used deadly or nondeadly force during the struggle that preceded the stabbing. The defendant responds that the only intentional force he used was when he fought with the victim over the knife and that the actual stabbing was an unintended consequence of the altercation. Accordingly, he argues that the jury, in considering his claim of self-defense, was required to resolve the factual question of whether he used deadly or nondeadly force during the struggle. The defendant contends that the resolution of this factual question was crucial because it affected the state's burden of disproving his claim of self-defense by making it easier to refute a claim of...
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...quotation marks omitted.) Id., 832-33. Under our Penal Code, self-defense is not an affirmative defense. See State v. Singleton, 292 Conn. 734, 747, 974 A.2d 679 (2009); see also State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762, 778, A.3d (2014). The state acknowledges that the defendant met his burden of pr......
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...the defense was applicable to manslaughter in the second degree." Id., at 589, 569 A.2d 534.15 The defendant cites State v. Singleton , 292 Conn. 734, 763, 974 A.2d 679 (2009), for the proposition that he could not be the initial aggressor by his act of hitting Medina. In Singleton , our Su......
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