State v. Clark
Decision Date | 22 July 2003 |
Docket Number | (SC 16713) |
Citation | 826 A.2d 128,264 Conn. 723 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STEVIE CLARK. |
Borden, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.
Karen T. Staib, special public defender, with whom was Sheila A. Huddleston, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and John F. Fahey, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant appeals, following our grant of certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a.2 The defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that he had failed to establish a constitutional violation in the trial court's instructions on the law of self-defense. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, albeit on somewhat different reasoning than that employed by the Appellate Court.
The defendant, Stevie Clark, was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a in connection with the shooting death of the victim, John Bazemore. At trial, the defendant presented a defense of self-defense.3 The jury found the defendant not guilty of murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of § 53a-55a. The trial court rendered judgment of conviction on the verdict. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, contending that the trial court improperly had instructed the jury on the elements of self-defense.4 The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that it was not reasonably possible that the jury had been misled by the trial court's charge. State v. Clark, 68 Conn. App. 19, 30, 789 A.2d 549 (2002). This certified appeal followed.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts as set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "On June 25, 1996, New Britain police officers were dispatched to 66 Richard Street to investigate a shooting. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers found the victim ... on the ground, bleeding from his head and chest.5 A canvass of the area led the police to suspect that the defendant was the perpetrator. On the basis of the information that they obtained, the police went to the defendant's residence to question him, but he was not present. A police canine traced the defendant's scent to a nearby tree, where the police found the defendant. While descending from the tree, the defendant reportedly stated, Subsequently, the police arrested the defendant and informed him of his Miranda6 rights. The defendant waived his Miranda rights and cooperated with the police for approximately forty-five minutes until his counsel informed the officers that the conversation was to cease until he arrived.
7
The following procedural history, as set forth by the Appellate Court, is relevant to the defendant's claim on appeal that the trial court misled the jury when the court instructed the jury on the elements of self-defense. "During the initial charge to the jury, the [trial] court stated: `If you find proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim ... was not using or about to use deadly physical force as I have defined that term for you or not inflicting or about to inflict bodily harm upon the defendant ... and if you further find proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had no reasonable belief that the victim ... was using or about to use deadly physical force or inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm upon the defendant, then the defendant would not be justified in using deadly physical force upon the victim.'
"In response to the defendant's objection to the jury charge, the [trial] court reinstructed the jury on the issue of self-defense. After [repeating] the contested language [to] the jury, the court stated: `I wish to further clarify that by pointing out to you and instructing you that the issue, the question in such regard is not whether the victim ... intended to use deadly physical force or intended to inflict great bodily harm, but rather, the issue is whether the defendant ... under the circumstances, reasonably believed that [the victim] intended to use deadly force or inflict great bodily harm.'
The Appellate Court concluded that it was "not reasonably possible that the jurors were misled when the [trial] court instructed them on the subjective-objective test of self-defense." Id., 30. The Appellate Court reasoned that the text of General Statutes § 53a-19 (a) had been read twice to the jury and, in addition, that the trial court sufficiently had explained and emphasized that the jury must focus on two aspects of the self-defense statute — one subjective and one objective. Id. Accordingly, the Appellate Court held that the defendant had failed to establish a constitutional violation in the trial court's instructions on the law of self-defense. Id.
On appeal to this court, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court's judgment was improper because the trial court improperly had instructed the jury on his claim of self-defense by misstating the subjective-objective elements of the self-defense charge. More specifically, the defendant argues that the charge suggested to the jury that the defendant's subjective perception of danger would not have been reasonable unless the victim had in fact been using or was about to use deadly force or inflict serious bodily injury. We disagree.
We first note the standard of review that governs this case. The defendant concedes that he did not properly preserve his claim at trial, and that the Appellate Court appropriately evaluated it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). State v. Clark, supra, 68 Conn. App. 27 n.8. Under Golding, "a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Golding, supra, 239-40. We conclude that, although the trial court's instructions improperly injected a particular irrelevant factual element into the law of self-defense, no constitutional violation existed because the portion of the instruction that was improper was detrimental to the state, and not to the defendant.
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§ 18.01 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
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TABLE OF CASES
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