State v. Singleton

• Decision Date: 16 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1723--I,1723--I
• Citation: 511 P.2d 1396,9 Wn.App. 327
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. George SINGLETON, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 327

9 Wn.App. 327

511 P.2d 1396

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. George SINGLETON, Jr., Appellant.

No. 1723--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, Panel Two.

July 16, 1973.

Warner, Pierce & Peden; B. Gray Warner (of counsel), Seattle, for appellant.

Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Edward L. Douglas, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

HOROWITZ, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict convicting him of unlawful possession of cocaine. Of the issues raised, the one controlling the disposition of the appeal here made concerns the validity of the impoundment of the motor vehicle belonging to the arrested defendant.

At approximately 3:30 a.m. on January 25, 1971, Seattle police officers Buckland and Ballard, while driving in their police car at the corner of 20th Avenue and East Madison Street, Seattle, Washington, recognized defendant, then driving his car, and stopped him. Officer Buckland asked defendant if the latter had taken care of a traffic arrest warrant previously issued against him. Defendant answered he had not. The officer then directed defendant to pull over and leave his car. The defendant parked his car in the 1900 block of East Madison Street, exited his vehicle, and was placed under arrest. The outstanding warrant involved a minor traffic charge calling for a $25 bail deposit. The officer then asked to see defendant's driver's license. Defendant showed him an expired temporary Washington State driver's license. Defendant asked that his car be turned over to his car passenger. The officers, upon checking, found the passenger had no identification and refused to turn the car over to him.

Officer Buckland then determined to impound the car and called for a tow car. While waiting for the tow car to arrive, Officer Ballard pursuant to usual police procedure, commenced inventorying the contents of defendant's car. The officer had not proceeded very far with the inventory when Officer Buckland informed him that, according to a police radio report just received, an informant had said that there were narcotics in the key case of defendant's car. The officer would have examined the key case in the course of inventory search. Officer Buckland immediately examined the key case. He found it contained a small tinfoil wrapper with about .08 grams of a white powdery substance later found to be cocaine. Meanwhile, two other police officers drove by and took defendant to the city jail for booking. Officers Buckland and Ballard continued their inventory, but had not completed it when the tow car arrived. The tow car then took defendant's car to the impoundment garage, with the police officers following in their car. The officers there completed their inventory, but found no other contraband.

Meanwhile, defendant had arrived at the police station. The court found that within 20 minutes thereafter Officer Buckland arrived and, while escorting defendant from the holding area to the booking area, he showed defendant the traffic arrest warrant on which the latter had been arrested. Defendant was later charged and then convicted for unlawful possession of the cocaine found in the key case in his car. Defendant appeals.

He first claims the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest and illegal search of his car. He claims his arrest was illegal because the arresting officer failed to comply with RCW 10.31.030. The part pertinent here reads:

The officer making an arrest must inform the defendant that he acts under authority of a warrant, and must also show the warrant: Provided, That if the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of arrest he shall declare that the warrant does presently exist and will be shown to the defendant as soon as possible on arrival at the place of intended confinement: . . .

Officer Buckland, in arresting defendant, did not state 'the warrant does presently exist and will be shown to the defendant as soon as possible on arrival at the place of intended confinement.' RCW 10.31.030. Nevertheless, defendant knew from the conversation preceding the formal arrest that the reason for his arrest was his failure to take care of the outstanding traffic arrest warrant. The warrant was shown to defendant within 20 minutes after he was taken to the city jail. We believe the arresting officer substantially complied with the statute and such compliance is sufficient. See People v. Rios, 46 Cal.2d 297, 294 P.2d 39 (1956); People v. Jaurequi, 142 Cal.App.2d 555, 298 P.2d 896 (1956); Ford v. State, 21 A.D.2d 437, 250 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964). See also State v. Bowman, 8 Wash.App. 148, 504 P.2d 1148 (1972).

Defendant alternatively contends the inventory search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the so-called inventory search was a mere pretext for a warrantless illegal exploratory search. The burden is on the prosecution to justify a warrantless search by showing the search falls within one of the exceptions to Fourth Amendment search warrant requirements. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); United States v. Castaldi, 453 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash.App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973). There are various such exceptions: (1) the warrantless search incident to an arrest, subject to the limitations of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); (2) the warrantless search based on probable cause to believe that the motor vehicle contains contraband (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, Supra; Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970 ); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925); State v. Lehman, 8 Wash.App. 408, 506 P.2d 1316 (1973)); (3) the other less common exceptions discussed in 1 C. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law § 2:12 (1969); J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Pretrial Rights § 49 (1972); and (4) the warrantless search conducted with defendant's consent. In re McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash.2d 530, 398 P.2d 732 (1965); J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Pretrial Rights § 50 (1972).

Some cases hold the so-called warrantless inventory search of a motor vehicle following lawful impoundment is not a genuine exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. People v. Miller, 7 Cal.3d 219, 101 Cal.Rptr. 860, 496 P.2d 1228 (1972); Mozzetti v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84 (1971); People v. Landa, 30 Cal.App.3d 487, 106 Cal.Rptr. 329 (1973). ¹ Washington, however, following the majority view, recognizes the validity of a warrantless inventory search if the car is lawfully impounded. State v. Montague, 73 Wash.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Olsen, 43 Wash.2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953); State v. Patterson, 8 Wash.App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973); State v. Jones, 2 Wash.App. 627, 472 P.2d 402 (1970); State v. Potts, 1 Wash.App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969).

An impoundment is lawful if authorized by statute or ordinance. RCW 46.32.060; RCW 46.52.110; RCW 46.61.565; RCW 69.50.505; 14 D.Blashfield, Automobile Law & Practice § 470.11, at 247 (3d Ed. 1969). In the absence of statute or ordinance, there must be reasonable cause for the impoundment. State v. Montague, Supra; State v. Olsen, Supra; State v. Jones, Supra; State v. Potts, Supra. In State v. Montague, Supra, the court reviewed the principles governing warrantless searches of impounded cars. The court said:

What is now frequently referred to as the inventory rule will not apply, however, and evidence of crime discovered during the taking of the inventory will be suppressed as evidence, unless there first be a lawful arrest. Miller v. State, 137 So.2d 21 (Fla.App.1962). Also, in Williams v. United States, 170 A.2d 233 (D.C.Mun.App.1961), the court refused to permit evidence of crime discovered during the taking of the inventory to be used in evidence following a valid arrest, where the court could find no reasonable grounds for the impoundment of the vehicle. Neither would this court have any hesitancy in suppressing evidence of crime found during the taking of the inventory, if we found that either the arrest or the impoundment of the vehicle was resorted to as a device and pretext for making a general exploratory search of the car without a search warrant. State v. Michaels, 60 Wash.2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); People v. Garrison, 189 Cal.App.2d 549, 11 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1961).

When, however, the facts indicate a lawful arrest, followed by an inventory of the contents of the automobile preparatory to or following the impoundment of the car, and there is found to be reasonable and proper justification for such impoundment, and where the search is not made as a general exploratory search for the purpose of finding evidence of crime but is made for the justifiable purpose of finding, listing, and securing from loss, during the arrested person's detention, property belonging to him, then we have no hesitancy in declaring such inventory reasonable and lawful, and evidence of crime found will not be suppressed.

73 Wash.2d at 384--385, 438 P.2d at 574.

A number of out-of-state decisions, including those cited in the margin, ² have also discussed the circumstances under which an impoundment may be lawful or unlawful.

Reasonable cause for impoundment may, for example, include the necessity for removing (1) an unattended-to car illegally parked or otherwise illegally obstructing traffic; (2) an unattended-to car from the scene of an accident when the driver is physically or mentally incapable of deciding upon steps to be taken to deal with his property, as in the case of the intoxicated, mentally incapacitated or seriously injured driver; (3) a car that has been stolen or used in the commission of a crime when its retention as evidence is necessary; (4) an abandoned...