State v. Six Mile Ranch Co.

Decision Date16 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 20040868-CA.,20040868-CA.
Citation2006 UT App 104,132 P.3d 687
CourtUtah Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Utah, by and through the DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. SIX MILE RANCH COMPANY, a Utah corporation; Craig S. Bleazard, an individual; Mark C. Bleazard, an individual; John D. Bleazard, an individual; Tooele County; and American Oil Company, a Maryland corporation, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-appellees.

Brent A. Bohman, Morgan, for Appellants and Cross-appellees.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., Stephen G. Schwendiman, Alison D. Garner, and Jonathan G. Jemming, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Appellee and Cross-appellant.

Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., DAVIS and McHUGH, JJ.

OPINION

McHUGH, Judge:

¶ 1 Six Mile Ranch Company, Craig S. Bleazard, Mark C. Bleazard, and John D. Bleazard (collectively, the Bleazards) appeal the portion of the trial court's ruling in favor of the State of Utah (the State), and the State cross-appeals the portion in favor of the Bleazards. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The Bleazards own property on Stansbury Island (the Island) in Tooele County (the County), Utah. The West Stansbury Road runs from the southern end of the Island to the northern end and terminates at the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. The Pass Canyon Road, the Cable Gate Road, and the South Side Road (collectively, the Side Roads) are essentially perpendicular to and accessed by way of the West Stansbury Road. The Side Roads provide access to parts of the Island located east of the West Stansbury Road. The West Stansbury Road, the Pass Canyon Road, and the Cable Gate Road all cross private property, including property owned by the Bleazards.

¶ 3 In 1993, the Bleazards petitioned the County to abandon any interest it had in the West Stansbury Road. The County agreed to do so and, in accordance with Utah Code section 27-12-102.4, see Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp.1993),1 mailed written notice of its intent to abandon its interest in the West Stansbury Road to all owners of property abutting the road, with the exception of the State. Thereafter, the County adopted Tooele County Ordinance 93-9 (Ordinance 93-9) to officially abandon any interest it had in the West Stansbury Road. After Ordinance 93-9 was adopted, the Bleazards placed a locked gate across the West Stansbury Road at the point it initially crossed their property on the south end of the Island.

¶ 4 The State then filed suit against the Bleazards, the County, and American Oil Company,2 challenging the validity of Ordinance 93-9 and seeking an order declaring that the West Stansbury Road had been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) (2001).3 The State alleged that Ordinance 93-9 was invalid because the County had failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements of section 27-12-102.4. The trial court ruled that the County had complied with the requirements of section 27-12-102.4 and entered summary judgment in favor of the County and the Bleazards.

¶ 5 The State appealed, and the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 27-12-102.4. See State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8,¶ 26, 44 P.3d 680. The Tooele County court held that the State was entitled to written notice under section 27-12-102.4, but only if its land abuts the West Stansbury Road. See id. at ¶¶ 23-24. Because this was a disputed issue of material fact, the supreme court held that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and remanded for the resolution of that issue. See id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 6 On remand, the Bleazards and the County conceded that the West Stansbury Road abuts the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, which marks the boundary of State sovereign land. Accordingly, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the State, declaring Ordinance 93-9 invalid. The trial court rejected the Bleazards' contention that Tooele County required it to determine on remand not just whether State land abuts the West Stansbury Road, but also whether the West Stansbury Road had been dedicated to the public all the way to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. The trial court was similarly unpersuaded by the Bleazards' argument that the County was excused from any requirement to send written notice to the State under section 27-12-102.4 because the State allegedly had actual notice of the County's intent to abandon its interest in the West Stansbury Road.

¶ 7 After the entry of summary judgment in favor of the State on the invalidity of Ordinance 93-9, the only issue remaining for trial was whether the West Stansbury Road and the Side Roads had been dedicated to the public pursuant to section 72-5-104(1).4 After a three-day trial, the trial court ruled that the West Stansbury Road had been dedicated to the public, but that the Side Roads had not. The Bleazards appeal the trial court's ruling that the West Stansbury Road is a public road by dedication, and the State cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that the Pass Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road (collectively, the Pass and Cable Roads) are not public roads by dedication.5

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Both parties challenge the trial court's holdings under Utah Code section 72-5-104(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). The Bleazards argue that the trial court erred by ruling that the West Stansbury Road is public by dedication. In the alternative, the Bleazards contend that even if a portion of the West Stansbury Road is public, the trial court erred by concluding that the portion of the West Stansbury Road north of the Cable Gate Road is a public road by dedication. In its cross-appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by concluding that the Pass and Cable Roads are not public roads by dedication.

¶ 9 The trial court's ultimate conclusion that the facts of this case either satisfy or do not satisfy the requirements of section 72-5-104(1) is a mixed question of fact and law, which we review for correctness. See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). However,

[h]istorically, we have given trial courts a fair degree of latitude in determining the legal consequences under section [72-5-104(1)] of facts found by the court. . . . Granting discretion to the trial court is appropriate under that section, as its legal requirements, other than the ten-year requirement, are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. The issues presented under section [72-5-104(1)], therefore, do not lend themselves well to close review by this court, as we would be hard-pressed to establish a coherent and consistent statement of the law on a fact-intensive, case-by-case review of trial court rulings. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under section [72-5-104(1)], we review the decision for correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its application of the facts to the statute. Finally, we require[] proof of dedication by clear and convincing evidence.

Id. at 309-10 (final alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 940) (quotations and other citations omitted).

¶ 10 The Bleazards also argue that the trial court erred by declaring Ordinance 93-9 invalid based upon its interpretation of State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680. Finally, the Bleazards invite us to adopt an actual notice exception to the notice requirement of Utah Code section 27-12-102.4. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.4 (Supp.1993). "Whether a trial court correctly interpreted a prior judicial opinion is a question of law that we review for correctness." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶ 56, 82 P.3d 1076. Similarly, interpretation of a statute "presents a question of law which we review for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court." Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12, ¶ 7, 114 P.3d 546.

ANALYSIS
I. Public Dedication

¶ 11 Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides that "[a] highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1). "Thus, for a road to become a public highway by dedication under section [72-5-104(1)], there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period of ten years." Simpson, 942 P.2d at 310.

A. West Stansbury Road

¶ 12 The Bleazards argue that the trial court erred by determining that the West Stansbury Road is a public road by dedication. The Bleazards contend that the following elements have not been satisfied in this case: (1) continuous use and (2) use as a public thoroughfare. We will address each of these elements in turn.

1. Continuous Use

¶ 13 The Bleazards assert that the trial court erred by determining that the public's use of the West Stansbury Road was continuous. For purposes of section 72-5-104(1), "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has determined that continuous use of a road exists when `the public, even though not consisting of a great many persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use' not necessarily every day, but `as often as they found it convenient or necessary.'" AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, ¶ 11, 112 P.3d 1228 (quoting Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958)). Further, "`use may be continuous though not constant[,] provided it occurred as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption.'" Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977)).

¶ 14 The Bleazards contend that the following findings of fact made by the trial court are...

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