State v. Skiggn
| Decision Date | 20 August 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 23941-4-I,s. 23941-4-I |
| Citation | 795 P.2d 169,58 Wn.App. 831 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Randy Paul SKIGGN, Appellant. ; 23942-2-I; 23943-1-I; 23944-9-I. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Peter Goldman, King County Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
Randy Skiggn appeals his sentence for first degree theft. We affirm.
On November 22, 1988, Skiggn was charged by single information with the crimes of first degree theft, taking a motor vehicle without permission, escape in the second degree, and escape in the third degree. As to the theft count, the information specifically alleged:
That the defendant Randy Paul Skiggn in King County, Washington, on or about November 2, 1988, with intent to deprive another of property, to-wit: a purse and its contents, did wrongfully obtain such property by taking it from the person of Bridgette Garrett[.]
On December 15, 1988, Skiggn pleaded guilty to theft in the first degree and taking and riding a motor vehicle.
At the December 15, 1988 plea hearing, Peter Goldman represented the State and Joe Scalone represented Skiggn. Prior to his guilty plea on the theft and taking and riding charges, Skiggn pleaded guilty to several other current offenses charged in different informations. Goldman statedthat the State's sentencing recommendation would be "24 [months] across the board it looks like."
The handwritten agreement, given to Skiggn at the time he signed his plea, stated that:
I have been informed and fully understand that the Prosecuting Attorney will make the following recommendations to the court: Dismiss count III & IV; [t]wenty four months (24) on the theft; [f]ourteen months (14) on the taking and riding ... Prosecutor agrees not to file any other charges arising from the facts in the discovery from these incidents. 1
The statement on plea of guilty also stated that:
The standard sentence range for the crime is at least 22 and no more than 29 months on Count I; 14-18 on Count II; based upon my criminal history which I understand the Prosecutor says to be: See attached ... Criminal history attached as Appendix B and incorporated by reference.
However, according to the sentencing guideline scoring form, based on his prior criminal convictions, Skiggn had an offender score of 11 and an accompanying standard sentence range of 43-57 months for first degree theft and 22-29 months for the taking of a motor vehicle.
On January 24, 1989, at the first sentencing hearing, a different prosecutor drew the court's attention to the conflicting information with regard to the standard range for the theft count. Her calculation showed a standard range of 43-57 months as opposed to the range of 22-29 months in the plea agreement. She informed the sentencing judge On February 3, 1989, at the second sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that because of the misunderstanding or confusion "between the standard range and forms attached to the plea agreement" Skiggn should either plead guilty with the appropriate standard range or withdraw the plea.
that "the prosecutor who okayed the plea form didn't go over it carefully enough." Because Scalone was not present to represent Skiggn, the trial court continued the matter for a week. Skiggn, nonetheless, stated that he wished to proceed
Skiggn's counsel agreed that there was an error in the initial calculation of the standard range for first degree theft, though he did not know who made the error originally. He stated that at the time of negotiating the plea, there was an understanding that the range was substantially smaller than what the prosecutor had submitted for sentencing in the presentence report. He also stated that the attachments cited by the State are not customarily attached to the plea when it is signed at omnibus.
The court gave Skiggn the opportunity to withdraw his plea, but Skiggn declined. The court then continued the sentencing hearing, giving the prosecutor time to prove the existence of Skiggn's priors to support its calculation of the standard range.
The final sentencing hearing was on February 21, 1989. Following the State's presentation, the court ruled that there was no meeting of the minds and, thus, no valid plea agreement. The court continued, stating, "Without a recommendation, my sentence will be based not on a plea range but on what it is my determination to be the appropriate standard range and the appropriate sentence within that."
The court found the standard range to be 43-57 months on the theft count. "[G]iven the circumstances of the confusion about the plea agreement," the court sentenced Skiggn to 43 months, the low end of the range. This appeal timely followed.
On February 5, 1990 Commissioner Hudgins granted the State's motion to take additional evidence on review pursuant to RAP 9.11. On February 16, 1990, an "Additional Finding of Fact" was entered, stating that "the defendant's attorney completed the plea form at the time the defendant pled guilty."
Skiggn first argues that the information is constitutionally defective because it omits intent to permanently deprive another of property, which is an essential element of the crime of theft in the first degree.
Skiggn's argument fails because the Washington Supreme Court recently held that in a prosecution for theft by taking, the State does not have to prove the defendant intended to permanently deprive the victim of the property. State v. Komok, 113 Wash.2d 810, 783 P.2d 1061 (1989).
The next issue is whether Skiggn is entitled to specific performance of the prosecutor's agreement to a standard range of 22-29 months and a sentence of 24 months on Skiggn's theft conviction.
Skiggn argues that he was denied his due process rights because the prosecutor failed to make the promised sentencing recommendation pursuant to the plea bargain, the trial court entered a sentence exceeding the promised recommendation, and the State made no recommendation at the sentencing hearing. Skiggn also argues that the sentencing court erred by invalidating the plea agreement which had been accepted by the plea court.
A plea agreement, once accepted by the court, is binding on the prosecutor. State v. Schaupp, 111 Wash.2d 34, 38, 757 P.2d 970 (1988). A defendant must understand the sentencing consequences for a guilty plea to be valid. State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 531, 756 P.2d 122 (1988).
The Washington Supreme Court has recognized two possible remedies where a defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement based on misinformation or At issue in Miller was whether the interests of justice made the plea bargain binding. Miller argued that the court was statutorily constrained from enforcing the terms of the plea agreement which allowed Miller to argue for a sentence less than the 20-year mandatory minimum of RCW 9.94A.120(4), a statute within the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). Miller argued the plea agreement was not legal and therefore unenforceable; the only appropriate remedy for the mutual mistake underlying the agreement was to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Miller, supra at 532, 756 P.2d 122. The Washington State Supreme Court did not accept this analysis, holding that where fundamental principles of due process so dictate, the specific terms of a plea agreement based on a mistake as to sentencing consequences may be enforced despite the explicit terms of a statute. State v. Miller, supra at 532, 756 P.2d 122 (citing State v. Cosner, 85 Wash.2d 45, 530 P.2d 317 (1975)).
where the prosecutor refuses to abide by the terms of the agreement. State v. Miller, supra. The defendant must be given the initial choice of a remedy to specifically enforce the agreement or withdraw the plea. The prosecutor bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant's choice of remedy is unjust. State v. Miller, supra, 110 Wash.2d at 536, 756 P.2d 122
In Cosner, defendants pleaded guilty after being informed that the mandatory minimum would be 5 years. They were not advised that because of a prior felony conviction, the special finding they were armed with deadly weapons would result in 7 1/2-year and 8 1/2-year mandatory minimum terms, respectively. State v. Cosner, supra t 49-50, 530 P.2d 317. On appeal, the court stated:
[Defendants], while advised of the involvement of a mandatory...
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State v. Bisson
...application of that principle to the interpretation of a plea agreement (albeit against the defendant), Bisson cites State v. Skiggn, 58 Wash.App. 831, 795 P.2d 169 (1990). Resp. to Pet. for Review at 12. The Skiggn court held that "it would be unfair to the State and, indeed, unjust to now......
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Nelson v. McGoldrick
...about which McGoldrick appropriately complains. See State v. Krall, 125 Wn.2d 146, 149, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994); State v. Skiggn, 58 Wn.App. 831, 839, 795 P.2d 169 (1990). The Court of Appeals' holding that the contract is not unconscionable is reversed and this matter is remanded for proceedi......
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State v. Holcomb, No. 32228-5-II (Wash. App. 5/31/2006), 32228-5-II
...The mutual mistake cases typically arise where the defendant pleads before the parties realize the mistake. See State v. Skiggn, 58 Wn. App. 831, 833, 795 P.2d 169 (1990) (State figured out that defendant's offender score created a higher standard range sentence after defendant entered the ......
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State v. Dukes, No. 51180-7-I (Wash. App. 3/1/2004), 51180-7-I
...State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001) (citing State v. Miller, 110 Wn.2d 528, 531, 756 P.2d 122 (1988); State v. Skiggn, 58 Wn. App. 831, 795 P.2d 169 (1990)); McDermond, 112 Wn. App. at 243-48; State v. Paul, 103 Wn. App. 487, 494-95, 12 P.3d 1036 (2000) (citing CrR 4.2(d); St......