State v. Sledge
| Decision Date | 11 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64921-9,64921-9 |
| Citation | 947 P.2d 1199,133 Wn.2d 828 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Nicholas SLEDGE, Petitioner. |
Dave Needy, Skagit County Prosecutor, Hilary A. Thomas, Deputy, Mount Vernon, for Respondent.
Despite a plea agreement for a standard range disposition of 21 to 28 weeks on a charge of taking a motor vehicle without permission, a juvenile court imposed an exceptional disposition of 103 weeks' confinement on Nicholas Sledge. The court's rationale was that Sledge should remain in custody until his 18th birthday, and assumed, in arriving at the disposition, Sledge would receive earned early release time.
Although the prosecutor adhered to the recommended disposition from the plea agreement, she insisted on a disposition hearing where she called and vigorously examined a probation counselor and a parole officer on aggravating factors supporting an exceptional disposition based on manifest injustice. She then gave a summation detailing the aggravating factors.
We reverse the exceptional disposition based on manifest injustice because the prosecutor's conduct undercut the plea agreement and the trial court erred in considering possible earned early release time in sentencing Sledge. We remand the case to the trial court where Sledge may choose to withdraw his plea or have a new disposition hearing before a different judge.
1. Did the State breach the plea agreement by the conduct of the prosecuting attorney in the JuCR 7.12 disposition hearing?
2. Did the trial court base an exceptional disposition for manifest injustice on improper considerations when it assumed the juvenile would receive earned early release time?
The State (Skagit County Prosecutor) charged Nicholas Sledge with Taking a Motor Vehicle Without Permission, a felony (RCW 9A.56.070(1)). In a plea agreement, in return for Sledge's guilty plea on that felony charge, the State agreed to recommend a standard range confinement time of 21 to 28 weeks and not to file other charges against him. The juvenile court entered the agreed Statement of Child on Plea of Guilty.
The JuCR 7.12 disposition hearing occurred two weeks later, on October 31, 1995, before Skagit County Commissioner Susan K. Cook. Although Sledge stipulated in the Statement on Plea of Guilty to the use of the Manifest Injustice Report at the disposition hearing, the prosecutor insisted on a hearing with live witnesses. At the hearing, the State informed the trial court it was recommending the standard range confinement of 21 to 28 weeks, pursuant to the plea agreement:
The State and defense are recommending the standard range. If I can explain the State's position somewhat, prior to taking the testimony with respect to the manifest injustice [report], while Mr. Sledge has a significant amount of criminal history over the course of his lifetime, and including fairly recent criminal history, most of his recent criminal history does not--but for a possession of stolen property in Snohomish County in August of this year, none of it is felony level criminal history.
Furthermore, your Honor, it's the State's position that--and I have conveyed this to Mr. Ochs, Mr. Sledge's counsel, that once Mr. Sledge is released from JRA [Juvenile Rehabilitation If he were to be sentenced to the standard range, I believe he would turn 17 before the time he was released, and it is the State's position that that's the best means of dealing with Mr. Sledge's situation at this time. The State feels strongly that Mr. Sledge does not warrant or merit any additional juvenile funds.... I don't think that the State should waste any more special funding on Mr. Sledge. That's the State's position, that's the reason why we're recommending the standard range, in addition to the fact that Mr. Sledge has agreed to plead guilty.
Administration], [947 P.2d 1201] if he commits another offense in this county, the State will be moving to decline him into adult court.
Report of Proceedings at 2-3. The State also informed the court the probation department had submitted a Manifest Injustice Report, recommending 103 weeks' confinement, with 44 days off for time served in detention. 1
The Manifest Injustice Report, prepared by Sledge's probation officer, Mary June Curtis, revealed a life of unremitting criminality. 2 Nicholas Sledge has led a tragic life of parental neglect as a "street kid." His father is in prison in Oregon for bank robbery. He has had no contact with his mother, a topless dancer, since he was 11. He usually lives with his married brother. Now more than 18 years old, he first came into contact with law enforcement authorities when he was 9.
His official criminal history in the report lists 18 juvenile dispositions between the ages of 9 and 16, 5 of them resulting in sentences to detention. His conduct included At the hearing, the State called Curtis to testify about her report, although Sledge had not indicated any objection to trial court consideration of the report. Sledge did not object to Curtis' testifying. She detailed Sledge's long criminal history and gave her reasons for recommending an exceptional sentence:
escapes, institutional misconduct, and numerous parole revocations. Fifteen additional criminal referrals or contacts are listed, all except the present case, either dismissed or closed. In reaching her conclusion recommending an exceptional disposition, Curtis listed only one mitigating factor--Sledge's "conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury." Clerk's Papers at 11. She also listed 3 statutory aggravating factors, and 16 additional aggravating factors. Based on these factors, she recommended a disposition of 103 weeks' confinement
Q. And you're recommending 103 weeks to JRA?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Can you tell us why 103 weeks?
A. That will allow Nick to be placed at JRA until he's 18.
Q. Any other reasons, aside from the fact that's when he turns 18?
A. That was how I came up with the figure.
Report of Proceedings at 22. On cross-examination, Curtis explained in more detail:
Q. Okay, thank you. Now, how did you come to 103 weeks?
A. That is the time that--when the maximum term in the range is greater than one year, the minimum term in the range may be no less than 80 percent of the maximum term in that range. 3 So actually, his minimum would be I believe it's like 82 weeks. So if he did his minimum, he Q. The law is once you give somebody a manifest injustice, [JRA] administratively determines that he would get 80 percent of that unless there's some circumstances exist based on his behavior.
would be out on his 18th [947 P.2d 1202] birthday, he wouldn't actually spend a lot of time. 4
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That warrant [sic] more than 80 percent of the range, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's how you came up with it?
A. Yes.
Q. You decided how can I give him 82 weeks, and go to 103, calculate backwards, is that right?
A. Correct.
Q. Your concern was just holding him into detention until he's 18--or DJR [Department of Juvenile Rehabilitation] until he's 18.
A. My plan was to hold him in DJR until he was 18 years old, yes.
Q. Why? Why did you come up with 18? Does that bear a rational relationship to any of the rehabilitative needs that you see, what programs in DJR would be available to you?
A. I don't think we're just talking about rehabilitation, we're talking about community safety. And you yourself said if he goes to adult, he will have less time to serve. 5 I believe Report of Proceedings at 31-33.
Nick needs a longer length of time, you know, to have some structure, maybe to have some programs. I'm hoping that will happen for him.
In the direct examination, the State walked Curtis through her written report, step by step, getting Curtis to recite for the trial court the bases for all the aggravating factors Curtis had employed to reach her recommendation of an exceptional sentence. Finally, Sledge objected: Report of Proceedings at 15-16. The trial court nevertheless permitted further examination.
After the testimony of probation officer Curtis, the State called Bradley D. Garner, one of Sledge's parole officers. There is no written report by Garner in the record. Sledge did not object to Garner's testifying. The State elicited testimony from Garner, largely directed toward Sledge's institutional problems. Many of the State's questions to Garner exemplify the tenor of the direct examination:
Q. Do you have any information about Nicholas's success or lack thereof, whichever, during his last commit to JRA?
...
Q. He was paroled on March 29th. How did he do on parole until the time that he committed this offense on the 17th of June? [There ensued a nearly 4-page monologue from the witness about Sledge's difficult family life and his criminal brothers, almost none of which was responsive to the question, all without objection from Sledge's attorney.]
Q. Were there any other violations of his parole while he was on parole?
...
Q. Do you have anything to add about the proposed aggravating factor of [sic] that he has a delinquent peer group?
...
Q. Do you have any recommendation of the Court for how long you think Nick or Mike, as you know him, should be sentenced to?
...
Q. Is it fair to say that you think that the prior commits, or that a commit of six months or seven months [apparently referring to the State's standard range recommendation of 21-28 weeks] would be insufficient for Nicholas?
...
Q. And you said that you wouldn't fault the probation department's...
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