State v. Sloboda

• Decision Date: 11 August 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Yor-19-280
• Citation: 237 A.3d 848
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Emanuel J. SLOBODA
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

237 A.3d 848

STATE of Maine

v.Emanuel J. SLOBODA

Docket: Yor-19-280

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 11, 2020

Decided: August 11, 2020

Harry Center, Esq. (orally), Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellant Emanuel J. Sloboda

Kathryn Loftus Slattery, District Attorney, and Andrew E. Berggren, Esq. (orally), Prosecutorial District #1, Alfred, for appellee State of Maine

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Laura A. Yustak, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for amicus curiae Office of the Maine Attorney General

Jeff Goldman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for amicus curiae AEquitas

Lawrence C. Winger, amicus curiae pro se

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ., and HJELM, A.R.J.

Majority: MEAD, GORMAN, and HUMPHREY, JJ., and HJELM, A.R.J.

Dissent: HORTON, JABAR, and CONNORS, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶1] Emanuel J. Sloboda appeals from a judgment of conviction for violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B) (2020), entered by the trial court (York County, Douglas, J. ) after a jury-waived trial. Sloboda contends that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his prosecution because the violation at issue occurred in New Hampshire.¹ We agree, vacate the conviction, and remand for dismissal of the indictment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] In 2019, Sloboda was indicted for violating a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B), to which he pleaded not guilty.² During a one-day jury-waived trial on the indictment, Sloboda challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction based on the fact that his alleged violation occurred outside Maine, in New Hampshire. Among its findings and conclusions rendered at the end of the trial, the court determined that it had jurisdiction.

[¶3] The court also found, based on competent record evidence, that Sloboda was on preconviction bail, a condition of which was that he have no direct or indirect contact with a particular individual, when, on November 25, 2018, he violated that condition by having contact with that individual at a store in Rochester, New Hampshire. Based on these facts, the court found Sloboda guilty of the offense and sentenced him to serve six months in jail.³ Sloboda timely appeals. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶4] Sloboda contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the court found that he violated the condition of release in New Hampshire. We review de novo the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction by interpreting the criminal jurisdiction statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 7 (2020). See State v. McLaughlin , 2018 ME 97, ¶ 9, 189 A.3d 262 ; State v. St. Onge , 2011 ME 73, ¶ 13, 21 A.3d 1028 ; see also M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) ; State v. Liberty , 2004 ME 88, ¶ 7, 853 A.2d 760 (stating that the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceeding). We first interpret the provision in accordance with its unambiguous meaning based on the plain language of the statute. See McLaughlin , 2018 ME 97, ¶ 9, 189 A.3d 262.

[¶5] A trial court's "[t]erritorial" criminal jurisdiction is limited to the seven bases for which 17-A M.R.S. § 7(1) provides:

1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under the laws of this State for any crime committed by the person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable only if:

A. Either the conduct that is an element of the crime or the result that is such an element occurs within this State or has a territorial relationship to this State;

B. Conduct occurring outside this State constitutes an attempt to commit a crime under the laws of this State and the intent is that the crime take place within this State;

C. Conduct occurring outside this State would constitute a criminal conspiracy under the laws of this State, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this State or has a territorial relationship to this State, and the object of the conspiracy is that a crime take place within this State;

D. Conduct occurring within this State or having a territorial relationship to this State would constitute complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit an offense in another jurisdiction that is also a crime under the law of this State;

E. The crime consists of the omission to perform a duty imposed on a person by the law of this State, regardless of where that person is when the omission occurs;

F. The crime is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the person knows or should know that the person's conduct affects an interest of the State protected by that statute; or

G. Jurisdiction is otherwise provided by law.

See Ginn v. Penobscot Co. , 342 A.2d 270, 274 (Me. 1975) ("The court is created by statute, and has that jurisdiction only which the statute has conferred upon it, and that is a limited jurisdiction. It has no other authority." (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Baldwin , 305 A.2d 555, 559 (Me. 1973) ("It is elementary law that the statutes of a state have no extra-territorial force, nor do its courts have any jurisdiction of offenses committed in other states or foreign countries." (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶6] Viewed most simply, section 7(1)(A) sets out four alternatives by which a Maine court has subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal matter: when (1) conduct that is an element of the crime has a territorial relationship to Maine, (2) the result that is an element of the crime has a territorial relationship to Maine, (3) conduct that is an element of the crime occurred in Maine, or (4) the result that is an element of the crime occurred in Maine. The court found jurisdiction in this matter based specifically on one of the territorial relationship alternatives; it determined that Maine had a sufficient nexus to the crime because the relevant bail condition that Sloboda was alleged to have violated was issued in Maine as to an underlying crime committed in Maine. As 17-A M.R.S. § 7(4) states, however, territorial relationship jurisdiction exists only when it is impossible to determine where the conduct occurred in relation to the state boundary line:

4. Conduct or a result has a territorial relationship to this State if it is not possible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it occurred inside or outside of this State, because a boundary cannot be precisely located or the location of any person cannot be precisely established in relation to a boundary, and if the court determines that this State has a substantial interest in prohibiting the conduct or result. In determining whether this State has a substantial interest, the court shall consider the following factors:

A. The relationship to this State of the actor or actors and of persons affected by the conduct or result, whether as citizens, residents or visitors;

B. The location of the actor or actors and persons affected by the conduct or result prior to and after the conduct or result;

C. The place in which other crimes, if any, in the same criminal episode were committed; and

D. The place in which the intent to commit the crime was formed.

Because, based on the court's supported findings, it is possible to determine precisely where Sloboda's conduct occurred, the territorial relationship of Sloboda's crime to Maine provides no basis for jurisdiction. See State v. Collin , 1997 ME 6, ¶ 10, 687 A.2d 962 (vacating the trial court's employment of territorial relationship jurisdiction because there was no "reasonable doubt about the location of a boundary or the location of a person in relation to the boundary" and noting that "[t]he state's substantial interest in prohibiting the conduct is not sufficient by itself to support a finding of a territorial relationship"). The court's reliance on territorial relationship jurisdiction was therefore error.

[¶7] The State argues that, despite this error, we should affirm the conviction because the court had jurisdiction pursuant to one of the other two alternatives in section 7(1)(A) based on where the conduct or result element occurred. We therefore consider what constitutes a conduct element or a result element.

[¶8] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 32 (2020) organizes the elements of a crime into four categories: "the forbidden conduct; the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime; the intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence as may be required; and any required result."⁴ A state-of-mind element is statutorily defined with reference to the mental processes of the defendant—i.e., the defendant's awareness of a risk or whether the defendant has a "conscious object." 17-A M.R.S. § 35 (2020) (defining "[i]ntentionally," "[k]nowingly," "[r]ecklessly," and "[c]riminal negligence"). This is distinguished from the "conduct" category of elements, which is the only one among the four in section 32 that could reasonably be read to refer to the defendant's physical actions. See Model Penal Code § 1.13(5) (Am. Law Inst. 1962) (defining "conduct" as "an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions"); Conduct , New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (stating that "conduct" means "the manner in which a person behaves"); see also State v. Lindell , 2020 ME 49, ¶ 19, 229 A.3d 791 (concluding that "the jury was entitled to interpret [‘conduct’] within its common meaning"); State v. Gladu , 2014 ME 23, ¶ 9, 86 A.3d 1182 (stating that, "as a general rule, words and phrases that are not expressly defined in a statute must be given their plain and natural meaning and should be construed according to their natural import in common and approved usage," including according to dictionary definitions (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶9] Attendant circumstances...