Convery v. Town of Wells

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: Docket: Yor-21-351
• Citation: 276 A.3d 504,2022 ME 35
• Parties: Timothy M. CONVERY et al. v. TOWN OF WELLS
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

276 A.3d 504

2022 ME 35

Timothy M. CONVERY et al.

v.TOWN OF WELLS

Docket: Yor-21-351

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 9, 2022

Decided: June 21, 2022

John J. Wall, III, Esq. (orally), Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland, for appellant Town of Wells

Taylor A. Asen, Esq. (orally), Gideon Asen LLC, New Gloucester, for appellees Timothy M. Convery and Kelli A. Gustafson

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.^*

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] The Town of Wells appeals from an order of the Superior Court (York County, Douglas, J. ) denying its motion for summary judgment in a personal injury suit brought by Timothy M. Convery and Kelli A. Gustafson. The Town contends that the court erred in determining that it was not immune from liability pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101 - 8118 (2022). A provision in the MTCA waives the immunity of governmental entities "for an employee's negligent operation of [a] motor vehicle resulting in a collision." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-B(3). The question on appeal is whether that provision only applies when a negligently operated government vehicle directly collides with another vehicle or a person. Because the plain language of the MTCA does not limit the waiver of immunity in this fashion, we affirm the court's denial of the Town's summary judgment motion.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are undisputed. See McDonald v. City of Portland , 2020 ME 119, ¶¶ 1-2, 239 A.3d 662. On the morning of May 30, 2020, Joshua Burton stole a vehicle from Mr. Mike's Convenience Store in York and drove north on Route 1. Wells police officers were alerted, took a position on Route 1, and waited for Burton to pass. When they attempted to stop Burton, he sped away, and they followed in pursuit. Burton attempted to evade the police officers and drove erratically and traveled at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour for portions of the chase. With traffic increasing as the chase proceeded from York into Kennebunk, the police officers contemplated calling off the chase, but they ultimately decided to continue in pursuit.

[¶3] Unfortunately, Convery and Gustafson, who were in Convery's vehicle, were also traveling north on Route 1 that morning. While the police officers were still pursuing Burton at a high rate of speed, Burton rear-ended Convery's vehicle, causing it to roll over several times and land in a ditch. At the time of the incident, the Town did not have applicable insurance coverage. See 14 M.R.S. § 8116.

[¶4] As a result of the collision, Convery and Gustafson filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the police officers initiated an unnecessary, dangerous, and high-speed chase that the officers failed to terminate despite Burton's erratic and dangerous driving, and that these negligent acts were a direct and proximate cause of their injuries.¹ The Town filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that section 8104-B(3) —which provides governmental entities immunity for discretionary functions—applied to the claim by Convery and Gustafson alleging negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the police officers. The Town further argued that the exception to immunity contained within section 8104-B(3) for "an employee's negligent operation of [a] motor vehicle resulting in a collision" did not apply because the police officers’ vehicle did not directly collide with another vehicle or a person during the police chase. Convery and Gustafson opposed the motion, arguing that their claim plainly fell within the exception to immunity contained in section 8104-B(3). On October 6, 2021, the court entered an order denying the Town's motion for summary judgment, concluding that section 8104-B(3) does not require that a government vehicle be directly involved in a collision for the exception to immunity to apply. The Town timely appealed.² See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2022) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶5] On appeal, the Town argues that the court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. The Town contends that the police officers’ pursuit was a discretionary function and that Convery and Gustafson's alleged injuries did not arise out of a collision between Convery's vehicle and one of the Town's vehicles. The Town asserts that for those reasons, section 8104-B(3) ’s exception to immunity does not apply to Convery and Gustafson's claim and therefore it is immune from suit.

[¶6] Governmental immunity is the sole subject of the MTCA. The MTCA expressly provides that, as a general rule, a governmental entity is immune from suit on all tort claims seeking recovery of damages. See Reid v. Town of Mount Vernon , 2007 ME 125, ¶ 20, 932 A.2d 539 ; 14 M.R.S. § 8103(1). We have consistently required the strict construction of exceptions to immunity in the MTCA. See Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston , 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8, 997 A.2d 84 ; Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh , 2004 ME 73, ¶ 11, 850 A.2d 325 ; Thompson v. Dep't of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife , 2002 ME 78, ¶ 5, 796 A.2d 674 ; New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep't of Transp. , 1999 ME 67, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 673 ; see also Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr. , 2014 ME 60, ¶ 49, 91 A.3d 567 ("We must strictly construe the MTCA because it was enacted in derogation of common law.").

[¶7] Title 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A contains "a cautious waiver of sovereign immunity by the Legislature in certain carefully circumscribed circumstances." Searle v. Town of Bucksport , 2010 ME 89, ¶ 27, 3 A.3d 390. This includes claims arising from a governmental entity's "negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance or use of any ... [m]otor vehicle." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(A). In Norton v. Hall , we held that the immunity for discretionary functions provided by section 8104-B(3), as it read at the time, shielded police officers and law enforcement agencies from liability arising out of the decision to engage in a high-speed response to an emergency and the manner in which the response is conducted, despite the motor vehicle exception in section 8104-A(1)(A). 2003 ME 118, ¶¶ 9, 11-13, 834 A.2d 928. At the time of Norton , section 8104-B(3) read,

[A] governmental entity is not liable for any claim which results from ... [p]erforming or failing to perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused and whether or not any statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution or policy under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or invalid.

14 M.R.S.A. § 8104-B(3) (2003).

[¶8] About two years after our decision in Norton , the Legislature amended section 8104-B(3). P.L. 2005, ch. 448, § 1 (effective Sept. 17, 2005) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 8104-B(3) (2022) ). As amended, it provides,

[A] governmental entity is not liable for any claim which results from ... [p]erforming or failing to perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused and whether or not any statute, charter, ordinance, order, resolution or policy under which the discretionary function or duty is performed is valid or invalid, except that if the discretionary function involves the operation of a motor vehicle, as defined in Title 29-A, section 101, subsection 42, this section does not provide immunity for the governmental entity for an employee's negligent operation of the motor vehicle resulting in a collision, regardless of whether the employee has immunity under this chapter.

14 M.R.S. § 8104-B(3) (emphasis added).³

[¶9] The narrow question presented here is whether the Legislature's 2005 amendment abrogates Norton such that the Town may be held liable in the present case. 2003 ME 118, ¶¶ 11-13, 834 A.2d 928. Our analysis is therefore focused on the phrase "resulting in a collision." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-B(3). The Town argues that the phrase "resulting in a collision," when construed narrowly in favor of immunity, should be read as "directly involved in a collision," requiring a direct collision between a negligently operated government vehicle⁴ and another vehicle or a person. Convery and Gustafson contend that "resulting in a collision" does not require a direct collision involving a government vehicle, but rather requires only that a negligently operated government vehicle cause a collision.

[¶10] Although we have not previously addressed this precise question, the applicable principles of statutory construction are familiar. "Our main objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the will of the Legislature. In determining the Legislature's intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute."

Klein v. Univ. of Me. Sys. , 2022 ME 17, ¶ 7, 271 A.3d 777 (citation omitted). In reviewing the plain language of a statute, we examine the statute in the context of the entire statutory scheme and will construe it so as "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results." Urrutia v. Interstate Brands Int'l , 2018 ME 24, ¶ 12, 179 A.3d 312 (quotation marks omitted). Only if the meaning of a statute is ambiguous will we look beyond the words of the statute to examine other potential indicia of the Legislature's intent, such as the legislative history. State v. Legassie , 2017 ME 202, ¶ 13, 171 A.3d 589.

[¶11] Because we have not yet had occasion to interpret the phrase "resulting in a collision," as that phrase is used in section 8104-B(3), it is appropriate to turn to dictionary definitions to help uncover its plain meaning. See Searle , 2010 ME 89, ¶ 31, 3 A.3d 390. The New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) defines "result" as "a consequence, effect, or outcome of something." See State v. Sloboda , 2020 ME 103, ¶ 10, 237 A.3d 848 (citing the definition of "result" in the New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) for the conclusion that "a result element is one that requires the defendant to have caused some specified harm or other outcome"); Result , Webster's New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2016) (defining "result" as "to happen or issue as a consequence or...