State v. Smith

• Citation: 384 A.2d 347,174 Conn. 118
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Roosevelt SMITH.
• Decision Date: 27 December 1977
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 347

384 A.2d 347

174 Conn. 118

STATE of Connecticut v. Roosevelt SMITH.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 13, 1977.

Decided Dec. 27, 1977.

Prescott W. May, Seymour, for appellant (defendant).

Ernest J. Diette, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and John R. Redway, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

On a trial to a jury, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of misconduct with a motor vehicle, in violation of § 53a-57 of the General Statutes, in causing the death of Nicholas Diglio by his criminal negligence and intoxication while operating a motor vehicle. From the judgment rendered on the verdict, he has taken the present appeal. He has briefed and argued three claims of error in evidential rulings: that the court erred in admitting into evidence testimony relating to admissions made by the defendant when he had not been given the Miranda warning (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), in admitting testimony of the arresting officer as to the attitude of the defendant at the accident scene, and in admitting into evidence photographs of the decedent taken at the scene of the accident.

The conviction of the defendant arose out of a collision which occurred at about 12:30 a. m. on July 31, 1974, at the intersection of routes 34 and 152 in Orange. Two motor vehicles heading easterly on route 34 had stopped for a red traffic light. Nicholas Diglio, the driver of the first car, got out of his car and went back to tell the driver of the second car, Janet McKernan, that he had noticed that the muffler on her car was hanging. While he was standing beside her car, it was struck in the left rear by the car driven by the defendant. Diglio was hit and his body was found more than 200 feet down route 34 at a point beyond where the defendant's car came to a stop against a utility pole.

Officer Russell Smith of the Orange police department arrived at the scene within minutes of the collision, called for an ambulance, and began an investigation. He first checked the body of Diglio and found no signs of life. He then spoke to the defendant who was standing near his car. Concluding that the defendant had no serious injuries, the officer went to take care of Mrs. McKernan and then undertook an investigation to determine what had happened. He went back to see the defendant who was walking around the intersection. He observed that the defendant was walking unsteadily and his breath had a strong odor of alcohol. At trial and over the objections of the defendant, the officer was permitted to testify that in response to his inquiry as to what had happened the defendant replied: "I don't know." To the officer's inquiry as to whether the defendant had been drinking, the defendant stated: "No." When the officer stated to the defendant that he detected a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath, the defendant stated: "Okay, I had been drinking. I had only three or four drinks." The officer further testified at trial that the defendant's speech was "mumbled" and "thick-tongued" and that his attitude was "carefree, indifferent."

Through the same officer, eight photographs of the accident scene were introduced into evidence for the jury's consideration. The officer testified that those photographs accurately represented the scene as he had observed it.

We find no error in any of the court's evidential rulings.

As to the statements of the defendant made to the police officer at a time when he had not been given the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the court concluded that they were made by the defendant to the officer during the latter's investigation of the accident and in a noncustodial situation.

It is now well settled that incriminating statements made by a defendant are admissible in evidence whether or not the Miranda warning has been given when the statements were not made during a "custodial interrogation." The United States Supreme Court defined that term in Miranda (p. 444, 86 S.Ct. p. 1612): "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." This principle has repeatedly been affirmed by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, most recently in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714; and Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1; by decisions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals; see United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411; United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540; and by our own decisions; see State v. Bennett, 171 Conn. 47, 368 A.2d 184; State v. Schaffer, 168 Conn. 309, 314, 362 A.2d 893; and State v. Szabo, 166 Conn. 289, 348 A.2d 588; see also...