State v. Smith
Decision Date | 20 March 1998 |
Docket Number | CR-97-0169 |
Citation | 715 So.2d 925 |
Parties | STATE v. Shana Brooke SMITH. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellant.
Teresa Camille Harris, Montgomery; and Paul R. Cooper, Montgomery, for appellee.
Shana Brooke Smith was indicted for theft of property in the second degree, a violation of § 13A-8-4, Ala.Code 1975, and for illegal possession of, or fraudulent use of, a credit card, a violation of § 13A-9-14, Ala.Code 1975. Smith filed a motion to suppress evidence of statements she made to Detective R.E. Parker at the Montgomery police station on February 18, 1997, and at her place of employment on March 28, 1997. Smith contended that these statements were obtained in violation of her Miranda 1 rights. The circuit court granted Smith's motion to suppress the statement she gave on February 18, 1997, and the state appeals from that order. 2
The state contends that the trial court erred in suppressing Smith's statement because, it argues, she was not in custody when she gave her statement. We agree.
The following evidence was presented at the suppression hearing:
Anita Beasley Moore testified that on February 4, 1997, her wallet, which contained various credit cards and currency, was stolen from her office. The following day, Ms. Moore called the companies that had issued her credit cards to report that the theft of her cards. During a telephone call with one of the companies, she was informed by a company representative that the card they had issued to her had been used twice on the evening of February 4. Ms. Moore was further informed by the representative that the card had been used at a gasoline service station in the Capitol Heights area of Montgomery. Ms. Moore, through her own investigative efforts, located the service station where the card had been used and spoke to the clerk who was on duty on the evening of February 4. She presented a group photograph of several of her coworkers, one of whom was Shana Smith, to the clerk because she suspected that a coworker had stolen her wallet. The clerk identified Smith as the individual who had used Ms. Moore's credit card. Ms. Moore provided this information to Detective R.E. Parker.
Detective Parker testified that upon receiving this information from Ms. Moore, he telephoned Smith and asked her if she would come to the police station to answer questions about the theft. Smith agreed to do so, and on February 18, Smith drove to the police station in her vehicle and met with Detective Parker. She again told Detective Parker that she was willing to answer any questions. Detective Parker testified that he did not handcuff or detain Smith in any way, and that she was free to leave at any time. The interrogation lasted approximately 19 minutes, after which Smith left. Detective Parker did not advise Smith of her Miranda rights during this interrogation.
Smith did not testify at the suppression hearing.
The trial court entered an order granting Smith's motion to suppress her February 18 statement. Although the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law in its order, it was clear from the suppression hearing that the issue before the court was whether a Miranda warning was required before Smith was questioned on February 18.
A Miranda warning is not required unless the person the police are questioning is under arrest or is subjected to custodial interrogation. "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. Miranda is not implicated when a police interrogation is merely investigative rather than accusative; thus, a distinction must be made between general police interrogation and custodial interrogation. The court must examine the surrounding circumstances of each case before making this distinction.
Smolder v. State, 671 So.2d 757, 760 (Ala.Cr.App.1995) (quoting Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329, 347-48 (Ala.Cr.App.1987)).
Johnson v. State, 673 So.2d 796, 798 (Ala.Cr.App.1995).
The facts in this case are very similar to the facts presented in State v. Jude, 686 So.2d 528 (Ala.Cr.App.), ...
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