State v. Smith
| Decision Date | 13 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 56597-0,56597-0 |
| Citation | 801 P.2d 975,115 Wn.2d 775 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Lesley Wayne SMITH, Respondent. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Cynthia S.C. Gannett, Sr. Appellate Atty., Barbara B. Linde, Sr. Deputy, Theresa L. Fricke, Sr. Deputy, Seattle, for petitioner.
Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Julie A. Kesler, Seattle, for respondent.
The State appeals the decision in State v. Smith, 54 Wash.App. 467, 774 P.2d 519 (1989), which overturned Smith's conviction of attempted first degree murder. The State contends that it produced sufficient evidence at trial to support a prima facie showing of the corpus delicti. We agree with the State and reverse the Court of Appeals. Hence, we reach the following issues which were raised by Smith, but not decided by the Court of Appeals: (1) whether the prearrest search of the vehicle's passenger compartment was unreasonable; (2) whether Smith was illegally arrested pursuant to an unconstitutional ordinance; and (3) whether items found in the vehicle's trunk should have been suppressed. We affirm the trial court's finding that Smith was guilty of attempted first degree murder.
On December 6, 1986, shortly after 1 a.m., an officer of the Bellevue Police Department heard a report of a stolen taxi. The stolen taxi's last known location was near the site where the officer was patrolling. Shortly after hearing the stolen vehicle report, the officer observed headlights in Robinswood Park. Because the park was closed, the officer suspected that this vehicle was the stolen taxi and that it had been abandoned in the park.
The officer approached the vehicle on foot. After recognizing that the vehicle was not the stolen taxi, he decided to contact the vehicle's occupants because their presence in the park violated park rules. The officer saw three men in the car. Lesley Wayne Smith was in the front passenger seat and Steven Brown and Ural Daniels were in the back seat. No one was in the driver's seat. The officer saw Smith attempt to hide a beer bottle under his coat (alcoholic beverages are not allowed in the park). He twice asked Daniels to roll down his window and Daniels refused each time. Brown, however, got out of the vehicle.
The officer asked Brown for identification and asked why they were in the park. Brown explained that Daniels had to use a restroom. While Brown was searching for his identification, the officer noticed that Brown had a concealed weapons permit. Upon questioning, Brown answered that he had a weapon under the front seat of the car. Concerned for his safety, the officer called for a backup unit.
In a few minutes, a second officer responded to the request for assistance. Brown, Daniels, and Smith were each removed from the car and searched for weapons. A knife was found strapped to Smith's leg. No weapons were initially found on Brown or Daniels. Later, it was determined that Brown was carrying a pair of handcuffs.
The second officer then entered the vehicle's passenger compartment to search for Brown's weapon. He found a loaded .41 magnum revolver between the right front seat and the console. He also found two knives, a box of .41 magnum ammunition, and a loaded magazine for a 9 mm. weapon. The first officer initially believed that the 9 mm. magazine was for an illegal automatic weapon and called for additional units. At this point, Smith, Brown, and Daniels were advised of their Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
Additional backup units were requested, including a K-9 unit to find a possible fourth person. The second officer asked Brown where the weapon that belonged with the 9 mm. magazine clip was located. Brown stated that the weapon was in his backpack in the back seat. Indeed, in the backpack was a 9 mm. semiautomatic pistol.
Brown, Daniels, and Smith were each placed in a different police vehicle. Daniels, appearing nervous and agitated, was the only one who resisted and had to be subdued. At this time, all three men were arrested for violating park rules.
The second officer asked Smith who had rented the vehicle and for permission to search the vehicle. Smith queried what would happen if he denied the search and the officer replied that the vehicle would be impounded and a search warrant sought. Smith consented to the search, signing a written consent form.
A search of the car's trunk revealed the following items: clothes, a new shovel, a pick, a compound bow and arrows, rope, tarps, rain gear, a 100 pound bag of lime (the officers thought it was cement), and a large ammunition box. The ammunition box contained several survival knives, a disassembled shotgun, a CO2 pellet pistol, a wooden stick with a spiked ball at the end of a chain, and several sexually explicit magazines.
Following the search of the trunk, a third officer went to Smith and asked him if he had been read his rights. Smith stated that he had and that he understood those rights. This officer stated that the items found in the vehicle did not appear to conform to Smith's prior statement of what the three men were doing. He also stated that it appeared that they were intending to commit a murder and that the shovel and "concrete" were to bury the body. Smith responded that the officer was close. Smith said that he had an item in his pocket that would explain what was happening. In Smith's pocket were 15 $100 bills. Smith explained that Brown had paid him to kill Daniels.
In a taped statement, Smith detailed the murder plot. On the previous Wednesday, Brown had asked Smith if he wanted some quick cash for "knocking off' and "burying" a guy. On Thursday, Smith selected a site on Snoqualmie Pass where he planned to lie in wait, and then, when Brown brought Daniels to the spot, Smith would kill Daniels, dig a grave, and bury him. On Friday, Brown and Smith went back to the location where Brown was going to leave Smith. However, campers were at the predetermined area so Smith and Brown drove back to Seattle and picked up Daniels. In Bellevue, Daniels "freaked out" and said he had to go to the bathroom, so they pulled into the park. Smith confessed that he and Daniels had a fight at the park. Smith pulled out a knife and "was going to stick him" when Smith looked over his shoulder and noticed a police officer coming up from behind.
Smith was charged with and convicted of attempted first degree murder. Neither Brown nor Daniels testified during Smith's trial.
circumstantial evidence of corpus delicti
insufficient to admit Smith's confession?
The State contends that the circumstantial proof of the corpus delicti of attempted first degree murder was sufficient to admit Smith's confession. We agree.
In Washington, a confession, standing alone, is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of a crime. The "corpus delicti rule" is described as follows:
The confession of a person charged with the commission of a crime is not sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, but if there is independent proof thereof, such confession may then be considered in connection therewith and the corpus delicti established by a combination of the independent proof and the confession.
The independent evidence need not be of such a character as would establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the proof. It is sufficient if it prima facie establishes the corpus delicti.
(Some italics ours.) Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 574-75, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986) (quoting State v. Meyer, 37 Wash.2d 759, 763-64, 226 P.2d 204 (1951)). In this context, "prima facie" means that there is "evidence of sufficient circumstances which would support a logical and reasonable inference" of the facts sought to be proven. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d at 578-79, 723 P.2d 1135. The State was required to produce evidence that supported a logical and reasonable deduction of the elements of the corpus delicti of attempted first degree murder. "The independent evidence need not [have been] sufficient to support a conviction or even to send the case to the jury." Corbett, at 578, 723 P.2d 1135.
Corpus delicti is usually proven by the following two elements: "(1) an injury or loss (e.g., death or missing property) and (2) someone's criminal act as the cause thereof." Corbett, at 573-74, 723 P.2d 1135. However, crimes such as attempt, conspiracy, perjury, and reckless or drunken driving do not require the first corpus delicti element, injury or loss. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, at 18 (2d ed. 1986). In these cases, many courts and commentators have found that the more appropriate application of corpus delicti is to prove that the crime charged has been committed by a particular person. See Corbett, at 578, 723 P.2d 1135 (); LaFave, at 18 ().
The crime in this case was attempted first degree murder. To convict Smith of attempted murder, the State was required to prove that Smith: State v. Smith, 54 Wash.App. 467, 472, 774 P.2d 519 (1989). The Court of Appeals further stated that the proof of corpus delicti of attempted first degree murder was that a substantial step was taken to criminally end someone's life. Smith, at 472, 774 P.2d 519. Neither the State nor Smith challenges this definition of corpus delicti. Unlike the Court of Appeals, however, we find that the State...
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