State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 10 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17309.,17309.
• Citation: 907 A.2d 73,280 Conn. 285
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Carleton SMITH.

907 A.2d 73

280 Conn. 285

STATE of Connecticut v. Carleton SMITH.

No. 17309.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 8, 2006.

Decided October 10, 2006.

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Proloy K. Das, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Kimberley N. Perrelli, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

James B. Streeto, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and ZARELLA, Js.^*

BORDEN, J.

The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that certain evidence proffered by the defendant was inadmissible under General Statutes § 54-86f, commonly known as the rape shield statute.¹ The state appeals, following our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court convicting the defendant, Carleton Smith, of three counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, two counts each of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree as an accessory and sexual assault in the second degree, and one count each of the crimes of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the first degree and failure to appear in the first degree.² The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court only as to the conviction of failure to appear in the first degree;³ the Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the conviction of all the other charges and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial as to those charges only. State v. Smith, 85 Conn.App. 96, 115, 856 A.2d 466 (2004).

The state claims that the Appellate Court improperly: (1) reversed the judgment of conviction based on the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 54-86f; (2) concluded that § 54-86f requires that a defendant be permitted to introduce evidence of any semen that is found on the victim; and (3) concluded that a defendant whose defense is misidentification must be permitted to present evidence of semen from a third party without first having to show the relevance of that semen to the sexual assault. Because we agree with the Appellate Court that the trial court improperly precluded the semen evidence offered by the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

As part of a twelve count information, the defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-70a (a)(4) and 53a-70 (a)(1), sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a)(1), two counts of sexual assault in the first degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) and 53a-70 (a)(1), one count each of conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-70 (a)(1), and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) and 53a-70 (a)(1), two counts each of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a)(1) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21(2), and one count each of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-21(1) and failure to appear in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172 (a)(1). Prior to trial, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 54-86f. The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty on all but the attempt and conspiracy charges, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The defendant received a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years imprisonment and was required for life to register with the sex offender registry. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment only as to the conviction for failure to appear and reversed the judgment as to the conviction of all the other charges. State v. Smith, supra, 85 Conn.App. at 115, 856 A.2d 466. This certified appeal followed.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedure. "The complaining witness, a thirteen year old runaway girl, T,⁴ testified that she was walking on a Hartford street when she was asked if she `wanted to chill' with three men in a car, driven by a man she later identified as the defendant. She did not know any of them, but got into the car. The defendant drove to a package store where the men bought liquor. All of them, including the minor, smoked marijuana and drank as the defendant drove. Eventually, they went to the Travelers Inn in East Hartford where the driver rented a room and all of them went into it.

"T further testified that the driver of the car pushed her onto the bed and removed her clothing. He had vaginal sexual intercourse with her while the other two men held her arms. Each man in turn had vaginal sexual intercourse with her and later each had vaginal sexual intercourse from behind her while she was forced to lie on her stomach. T also testified that the defendant tried to make her perform fellatio on him. After the trio had ended their sexual assaults, she was driven to a park. One of the men, not the defendant, got out of the car with her, put a gun to her head and said he would kill her if she told anyone about what had happened. She called the police from a nearby Laundromat, however, and originally stated that one man had raped her in a park. She later told the police of her encounter with the three men.

"T identified the motel at which the assaults had occurred, and the police, after investigation, discovered that the defendant had rented a room there on the same day as that of the assaults described by T. She identified that room to the police as one of four possible rooms that were the site of the assaults. At first, T failed to identify the defendant as one of her assailants from a photographic array, but a few days later did identify him from the array. Later, T made positive photographic identifications of her other two assailants, after the defendant had identified the other two men to the police as having been with him on the day in question. T, in prior statements to the police, stated that she had had sexual intercourse with others during the days immediately preceding the events of this case.

"The defendant, having been read his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), told a detective that he had picked up a girl when he was driving around Hartford with two other men he identified and that he had gone to the Travelers Inn and rented a room. He and the unidentified girl entered the room where he had consensual sexual intercourse with the girl, during which he used a condom. He then left and remained outside the room while the other two men then entered the room. He did not admit that the girl was T and was not provided with T's name, nor was he asked to identify a photograph of her." State v. Smith, supra, 85 Conn.App. at 100-101, 856 A.2d 466.

The additional procedural history is relevant to the resolution of this appeal. In his April 11, 2002 amended motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 54-86f, the defendant stated that he sought the hearing in order to obtain a determination regarding the admissibility of evidence of T's prior sexual conduct. Prior to trial, on April 23, 2002, during argument before the trial court on the motion, the defendant clarified that he sought the hearing to determine, among other things, the admissibility of a DNA report that had been prepared by the Connecticut department of public safety forensic science laboratory based on its analysis of semen samples taken from T as part of the rape kit that was collected on the night of the assault. At that time, the defendant contended only that the report was relevant to impeach the credibility of T by showing that she had had sexual encounters with persons other than the defendant in the days prior to the rape. The trial court stated that it would rule on the defendant's motion on May 1, 2002, the first day of trial.

On May 1, 2002, before beginning to hear evidence, the court denied the defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 54-86f. The court gave the parties copies of its memorandum of decision detailing its ruling and explained orally to the parties that it had denied the defendant's motion based on its conclusion that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of showing that the proffered evidence was relevant to the case. In part, the trial court relied on the state's expressed intention not to present any semen evidence in its case against the defendant. Upon hearing the court's decision on the motion, the defendant orally moved for reconsideration, arguing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 54-86f (1) because the DNA evidence "clearly shows that all three of the alleged assailants were excluded by the state's forensic evidence," and that the evidence was "extremely relevant to the question as to whether or not [the defendant] was involved in sexually assaulting this young woman." The court orally denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration, remarking that it did not view this contention by the defendant to constitute a new argument beyond those that the defendant already had advanced in his motion in limine and in argument on the motion on April 23, 2002.

On May 7, 2002, after the state rested its case, the defendant sought to have admitted the testimony of Michael Adamowicz, a criminalist with the Connecticut department of public safety forensic science laboratory, who conducted the tests on the material in the rape kit collected from T on the night of the assault, namely, anal swabs taken from T and cuttings from one of her socks worn on the night of the assault. In his offer of...