State v. Dalton
Decision Date | 22 January 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 02-1649.,02-1649. |
Citation | 674 N.W.2d 111 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Melvin Ray DALTON, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and
Susan Cox and Dan Voogt, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
While a passenger in a moving pickup truck, Melvin Dalton repeatedly punched and kicked a man until he fell from the truck to his death. Dalton alleges there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for vehicular homicide. Dalton also claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge (1) alleged defects in the trial information and the minutes of testimony and (2) Iowa Code section 707.6A(2) (2001) as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Because we find there was substantial evidence to support Dalton's conviction for vehicular homicide, we reject his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. We also determine Dalton's trial counsel did not fail to perform an essential duty, and conclude Dalton was not denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm his conviction.
Terry Dalton drove his brother Melvin Dalton in a pickup truck to Gerald Peek's house in Des Moines. Melvin Dalton got out of the truck and spoke with Peek on his front porch.
Dalton and Peek went back to the truck, and Dalton got in on the passenger side. The passenger door remained open while Peek stood next to the truck. Peek suddenly yelled The truck sped away, with Peek lodged half-inside the passenger side of the truck's cab. As Peek clung to the truck for dear life, Melvin Dalton repeatedly kicked and punched him. The driver, Terry Dalton, also punched Peek. As the truck accelerated to speeds of approximately thirty-five to forty miles per hour, Peek pleaded for help, his feet dragging along the pavement.
One of Peek's acquaintances, Tim Burnsworth, got in his car and gave chase. Burnsworth's car and the truck came into contact.
Melvin Dalton continued to kick and punch Peek until Peek fell from the truck. Witnesses found Peek on the ground approximately two blocks away from his house. He had suffered severe head injuries and was bleeding profusely. He later died as a result of the fall.
Dalton subsequently waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the minutes of testimony. The district court adjudged Dalton guilty, finding
Dalton is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide by vehicle by aiding and abetting in the conduct that resulted in the death of Gerald Peek. Even though he was not operating the vehicle at the time in question, his conduct was sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting in that he was involved in the actions that resulted in Mr. Peek's separation from the vehicle while it was being operated under circumstances that the Court has and would conclude were willful and wanton and therefore reckless.
Dalton appeals, alleging there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for vehicular homicide and he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. We now consider each of these arguments, in turn.
In support of his argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of vehicular homicide, Dalton points out he did not drive the vehicle, nor did he aid and abet in the driving of the vehicle. He also claims there is insufficient proof he was the proximate cause of Peek's death; Burnsworth's actions, he alleges, intervened and broke the causal chain.
Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is for errors at law. State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 2003).
The district court's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless we find there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding. In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993)). In reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "we must consider all the record evidence, not just the evidence supporting guilt." Id.
The so-called "reckless driving alternative" of Iowa's vehicular homicide law states:
Iowa Code § 707.6A(2)(a); see Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110
(. ) Iowa Code section 321.277, in turn, states "Any person who drives any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving[, a simple misdemeanor]." Iowa Code § 321.277.
As these two provisions of the Iowa Code and our cases clearly indicate, recklessness, not ordinary negligence, must be proven in order to sustain a conviction for vehicular homicide under section 707.6A(2)(a). See Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110-112
(. ) That is, "the State must prove the defendant engaged in conduct `fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it." Id. at 112 (quoting Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681).
Of course, Melvin Dalton was not the driver of the truck, but a passenger. The State thus pled an aiding and abetting theory, upon which the district court relied in finding Dalton guilty.1 In order to sustain his conviction for vehicular homicide on an aiding and abetting theory, there must be substantial evidence Melvin Dalton "assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission." Id. (citations omitted).
Where a passenger, convicted of aiding and abetting vehicular homicide, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we follow a two-step analysis. See id. at 112-13 ( ). First, we must determine whether the driver of the vehicle committed the underlying offense; that is, the driver must have violated Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a). See id. Second, there must be sufficient evidence to show the passenger aided and abetted the driver in the commission of the crime; the State must prove "the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission." See id. at 112 (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Iowa 2000)).
On appeal, Dalton does not challenge the recklessness of the driver, nor should he; driving a truck with a man partially hanging out of its cab, let alone accelerating the truck to a velocity of thirty-five to forty miles per hour, is surely "`fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it." Id. (quoting Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681); see, e.g., State v. Begey, 672 N.W.2d 747, 749-50 (Iowa 2003)
(. ) The legislature has, for good reasons, outlawed such behavior, which a civilized society cannot tolerate, no matter how ubiquitous it may appear in movies and on television.
Dalton claims, however, that there is not substantial evidence to show he aided and abetted the reckless driving which resulted in Peek's unintentional death. Dalton maintains there is no proof he aided and abetted his brother in the driving of the vehicle; driving, he alleges, is an element of the crime for which he was convicted.
The crime at issue, however, is aiding and abetting vehicular homicide, not driving. Therefore, the State need only prove Dalton "assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act [vehicular homicide] either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission." Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 112. We have explicitly approved of vicarious liability for vehicular homicide. State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 842-45 (Iowa 1994). We have also held that one need not drive a vehicle or physically assist the driver in doing so in order to actively participate or encourage a crime which requires operating a motor vehicle at the time of its commission. See, e.g., State v. Storms, 233 Iowa 655, 657, 10 N.W.2d 53, 54 (1943) ( ).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we think a rational juror could find Dalton "actively participat[ed] or by...
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