State v. Smith

• Decision Date: 11 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. S-9546.,S-9546.
• Citation: 38 P.3d 1149
• Parties: STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Ruple Marx SMITH, Respondent.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

38 P.3d 1149

STATE of Alaska, Petitioner, v. Ruple Marx SMITH, Respondent.

No. S-9546.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

January 11, 2002.

Eric A. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner.

Michael D. Dieni, Assistant Public Defender, Anchorage, and Barbara K. Brink, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent.

Before: FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, and CARPENETI, Justices.

OPINION

CARPENETI, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

During the investigation of a forcible rape, the police published an artist's sketch of the suspect. Ruple Marx Smith called the police, gave his name, and said that he looked like the police sketch of the suspect but was innocent. An officer visited Smith the next day and, during the course of an interview, Smith confessed. Contending that the interrogation was custodial, Smith moved to suppress his confession because the police failed to inform him of his Miranda¹ rights. The trial court denied his motion, and a jury convicted him. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Smith was in custody. Our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that a reasonable person in Smith's position would have felt free to break off the interview and leave. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and reinstate Smith's conviction.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On July 26, 1994 K.S. was raped by an unknown man. At the crime scene, the police found shoe prints and bicycle tire tracks near the spot K.S. had been attacked. The police determined that the bicycle "had different tires on the front and rear, both being very distinctive." Both were narrow street tires, but the tread on the front tire was wider and deeper than the rear tire.

K.S. was able to give a detailed description of her attacker, and a police artist prepared a composite sketch. K.S. also noticed that the man had been riding a blue ten-speed bike. K.S. ultimately picked Ruple Marx Smith out of two six-photo lineups.²

On July 28 the police published the composite sketch in a local newspaper. Around mid-morning, Smith called the police. He identified himself, indicated that two friends had told him that the sketch in the paper looked like him, and asked for a description of the suspect. Smith denied responsibility for the crime and claimed to have an alibi. The police officer taking the call thought it was suspicious and reported it to his supervisor.

The next day postal carrier Mike Wiles told Trooper Robert Clark that he thought a person resembling the sketch lived at the home of Larry and Margaret Dean. Trooper Clark visited the Dean residence and met Smith, who Clark thought looked like the sketch. Smith asked Clark if Clark thought that he looked like the sketch. Hoping not to alert him to what he was doing, Trooper Clark said no. Trooper Clark was also suspicious about Smith's "over-friendly" manner.

Smith owned a blue ten-speed bicycle. Trooper Clark examined the tires and noticed the front and back tire treads differed from each other.

Trooper Clark reported his findings to Sergeant Robert Barnes. Later that same day, Sergeant Barnes and Trooper Clark went back to Smith's residence in separate patrol cars. Both were in uniform and armed. Barnes asked to speak to Smith about the incidents of July 26. Smith was friendly and, as found by the trial court, "more than willing" to talk to Barnes. Barnes told Smith it was easier to talk in his patrol car, and Smith agreed. The day was rather hot, and the air conditioning in Barnes's patrol car was on. Smith entered the front passenger side of the patrol car; Barnes sat next to him on the driver's side. The doors were not locked.

Barnes's tape recording of the interview began at 1:49 p.m. Barnes first told Smith that he was not under arrest and was free to leave. Smith indicated that he understood.

Barnes began the questioning by asking why Smith had called the police the day before. Smith initially claimed that he was with friends the morning of K.S.'s attack. Barnes's questioning became more accusatory. When Barnes first confronted Smith with the evidence that the bicycle tire tracks at the crime scene matched his bicycle tires and that the victim identified him from a photo lineup, Smith denied any connection. After Smith denied Barnes's accusation a second time, Smith's friend, Dave, walked up outside the car, and Smith called loudly to greet him. Barnes mentioned the evidence against Smith a third time, adding comments like "tell me the truth," "and I'm not gonna arrest you," and "it's kinda obvious that you were involved." Smith became less responsive. After Barnes repeated the allegations a fourth time, Smith made incriminating responses.

After this point of the interview, Smith apparently asked for an attorney.³ Barnes said that he would not arrest Smith. Smith left the patrol car and talked to his friends, Larry Dean and Dave Smith, who were standing nearby in the driveway. The entire interview in the police car lasted thirty minutes.

Barnes stayed on the scene until around 3:00 p.m. He taped an additional short exchange between himself and Smith in which Smith offered to get the clothes that he wore on the day of the crime. Smith indicated that he was very tired and wanted to get back to bed as soon as he could.⁴

Trooper Clark remained on the premises with Smith. He did not restrain or control Smith; Smith went into both his apartment and the Deans's house. Barnes returned less than two hours later and arrested Smith.

Smith filed a motion to suppress his statements made in the interview, alleging that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by Barnes's failure to give him Miranda warnings before his custodial interrogation. Superior Court Judge Charles K. Cranston denied Smith's motion and issued findings of fact to support his ruling. At trial, a jury convicted Smith of kidnaping, sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a minor.

Smith appealed. A divided court of appeals⁵ found that Smith had been in Miranda custody from the time that Sergeant Barnes told Smith, "And what I need to do is, is, have you tell me the truth. And I'm not gonna arrest you." The court of appeals remanded for the trial court to determine whether the introduction of Smith's confession was harmless error. On remand, the trial court found that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed Smith's convictions. The state appeals on the sole issue of whether Smith was in Miranda custody during his questioning in Sergeant Barnes's patrol car.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Thompson v. Keohane, the United States Supreme Court held that whether the facts as determined by the trial court lead to the conclusion that the defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes "presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review."⁶ While the Supreme Court's decision was made in the context of habeas corpus review, its rationale is applicable here. The Court reasoned that policies of providing guidance on legal principles, unifying precedent, and stabilizing the law supported de novo review.⁷ The United States Supreme Court adopted the same approach in Ornelas v. United States, holding that de novo was the proper standard of review for a determination whether the facts found by the trial court constitute probable cause.⁸ We previously found this reasoning persuasive in ruling that de novo review was proper for a determination of probable cause in a child-in-need-of-aid case.⁹ In this parallel situation, we likewise adopt Thompson's rationale and apply de novo review to the ultimate Miranda custody determination on direct appeal.

We accept the trial court's factual findings except when clearly erroneous.¹⁰ In the absence of findings as to disputed factual issues, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing at the trial level—here, the state.¹¹

IV. DISCUSSION

The state argues on appeal that the court of appeals erred in two ways: (1) by failing to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the absence of findings as to disputed issues, and (2) by determining that Smith was in custody for Miranda purposes.

A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Viewed Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Prevailing Party in the Absence of Findings as to Disputed Factual Issues.

The state contends that the court of appeals erred by failing to view evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party "in the absence of findings as to disputed issues." Smith notes that the state misquoted the standard of review—the appellate court must view evidence most favorable to the prevailing party in the absence of "findings as to disputed factual issues."

Possibly because of the quotation error, the state interprets appellate deference to the trial court too broadly. The state specifically argues that the court of appeals should have adopted an interpretation of what Sergeant Barnes said that was most favorable to the state.

The state fails to distinguish between the fact itself and the application of the law to the fact. In the absence of express findings, the appellate court must resolve disputed factual issues in favor of the prevailing party, but it is under no such requirement when applying the law to the facts. For example, what Barnes actually said in the interview is a fact. Although the superior court made no express finding, an appellate court should accept the transcript of the interview as an accurate record of what was actually said, unless clearly erroneous. How a reasonable person would interpret a statement in that transcript, however, is a mixed question of law and fact—an application of the law to the fact of what was said.¹² It is not simply a disputed fact that must be construed in the state's favor. Thus, the court of appeals correctly applied its independent judgment to determine how a reasonable person...