State v. Sneed

• Decision Date: 01 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 62,62
• Citation: 201 S.E.2d 867,284 N.C. 606
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. James Henry SNEED.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 867

201 S.E.2d 867

284 N.C. 606

STATE of North Carolina v. James Henry SNEED.

No. 62.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 1, 1974.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan by William W. Melvin and William B. Ray, Asst. Attys. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Clayton & Ballance by Frank W. Ballance, Jr., Warrenton, for defendant appellant.

BRANCH, Justice.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina.

Defendant contends that the testimony of State's witnesses Levy Lowe and James Dennis Mack and certain other related evidence offered by the State became available solely through statements procured from defendant as a result of Constitutionally inadequate representation by his court-appointed counsel. Defendant contends this testimony and other related evidence was, therefore, inadmissible.

The right to assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and by Article I, Sections 19 and 23 of the Constitution of North Carolina. The Sixth Amendment guarantee is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 60 S.Ct. 321, 84 L.Ed. 377. This right is not intended to be an empty formality but is intended to guarantee effective assistance of counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158; State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 53 S.E.2d 294.

The case before us is unusual in that it arises on the trial judge's ruling on an objection to the admission of evidence. Our research discloses that the majority of the decisions relating to the alleged failure of counsel to render effective representation arises out of post-conviction proceedings. Nevertheless, we see no distinction in the application of the rules of law solely because of the manner in which the question is presented.

Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor this Court, has fashioned a rule to guide us in determining whether an accused was denied his Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel due to counsel's negligence, incompetency, conflicting loyalties or other similar reasons. However, there are numerous decisions from other jurisdictions and other federal courts which bear upon decision of the question here presented. A review of these decisions indicates the general rule to be that the incompetency (or one of its many synonyms) of counsel for the defendant in a criminal prosecution is not a Constitutional denial of his right to effective counsel unless the attorney's representation is so lacking that the trial has become a farce and a mockery of justice. Snead v. Smyth, 4th Cir., 273 F.2d 838; Doss v. State of North Carolina, D.C., 252 F.Supp. 298; Edgerton v. State of North Carolina, D.C., 230 F.Supp. 264; DuBoise v. State of North Carolina, D.C., 225 F.Supp. 51; Jones v. Balkcom, 210 Ga. 262, 79 S.E.2d 1, cert. den. 347 U.S. 956, 74 S.Ct. 682, 98 L.Ed. 1101. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390 (1960), Conviction--Incompetency of Counsel.

Consistent with the above stated general rule, it has been held that the question of Constitutional inadequacy of representation cannot be determined solely upon the amount of time counsel spends with the accused or upon the intensiveness of his investigation. O'Neal v. Smith, 5th Cir., 431 F.2d 646; Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70; United States ex rel. Hardy v. McMann, D.C., 292 F.Supp. 191. Neither does the Sixth Amendment guarantee the best available counsel errorless counsel, or satisfactory results for the accused. United States ex rel. Weber v. Ragen, 7th Cir., 176 F.2d 579; Palmer v. Adams, 162 Conn. 316, 294 A.2d 297; Kinney v. United States, 10th Cir., 177 F.2d 895. Nevertheless, counsel cannot assume the role of Amicus curiae, Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060, but must function in the active role of an advocate. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 87 S.Ct. 1402, 18 L.Ed.2d 501. Nor can counsel be hobbled by divided loyalties. People v. Stoval, 40 Ill.2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441; State v. Crockett, 419 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.1967).

The Courts rarely grant relief on the grounds here asserted, and have consistently required a stringent standard of proof on the question of whether an accused has been denied Constitutionally effective representation. We think such a standard is necessary, since every practicing attorney knows that a 'hindsight' combing of a criminal record will in nearly every case reveal some possible error in judgment or disclose at least one trial tactic more attractive than those employed at trial. To impose a less stringent rule would be to encourage convicted defendants to assert frivolous claims which could result in unwarranted trial of their counsels. In Diggs v. Welch, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 148 F.2d 667, Arnold, J., aptly stated: 'The opportunity to try his former lawyer has its undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner.'

It is evident that there can be no precise or 'yardstick' approach in applying the recognized rules of law in this area. Thus, each case must be approached upon an Ad hoc basis, viewing circumstances as a whole, in order to determine whether an accused has been deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Walker v. Caldwell, 5th Cir., 476 F.2d 213; Hegwood v. Swenson, 344 F.Supp. 226; Timmons v. Peyton, D.C., 240 F.Supp. 749 (Reversed on other grounds 4th Cir., 360 F.2d 327); Palmer v. Adams, Supra.

In instant case, the Clerk of Superior Court appointed Mr. Charles Hubbard, a member of a respected law firm who had been engaged in the practice of criminal law for a period of approximately six years, to represent defendant. We note that Mr. Hubbard had previously represented defendant in a criminal matter as his privately retained counsel. Upon notification of his appointment, Mr. Hubbard promptly interviewed defendant. At that time defendant related facts to him which, if true, could have been an absolute defense to the homicide charge. The gist of defendant's statement was that another person or persons forced him at gunpoint to carry them into Person County, and there without any complicity on the part of defendant, shot and killed Patrolman Joe Wright.

Defendant takes the anomalous position that although he told his attorney a falsehood, his attorney should have known better than to believe him. We think that the attorney-client relationship is such that when a client gives his attorney facts constituting a defense, the attorney may rely on the statement given unless it is patently false. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable...