State v. Snider, 93-1129
| Decision Date | 19 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1129,93-1129 |
| Citation | 522 N.W.2d 815 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Scott Thomas SNIDER, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
David Scieszinski, Wilton, for appellant.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Thomas G. Fisher, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard R. Phillips, County Atty., and Christine A. Dalton, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.
Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
The issue here is whether a municipal police officer has the authority to arrest a person for state traffic violations occurring outside of the territorial limits of the municipality that employs the officer. Based on several statutes, the district court ruled the officer does--in certain instances--have such jurisdiction. We agree and affirm the district court's ruling that denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered by the arresting officer who was outside his territorial jurisdiction at the time of the arrest.
Officer Mark S. Kopf is a police officer for the city of Atalissa. He is a graduate of the Iowa law enforcement academy. On February 5, 1993, Kopf was monitoring traffic on Highway 6. The center line of Highway 6 is the southern corporate line for Atalissa. Traffic heading west on Highway 6 is within Atalissa's city limits. Traffic heading east is not.
About 9:30 p.m., Kopf saw a car traveling east on Highway 6 that appeared to be speeding. Kopf's radar unit showed the vehicle to be traveling at fifty-eight miles per hour in a forty-five mile per hour zone. Because the car was traveling east, it was outside Atalissa's city limits. The defendant, Scott Thomas Snider, was driving. Kopf followed Snider and pulled him over.
Kopf smelled alcohol on Snider's breath. After Snider failed field sobriety tests, Kopf issued him a speeding citation and arrested him for operating while intoxicated (OWI). Kopf then invoked the implied consent procedures. A preliminary breath test yielded a blood alcohol content of 0.14.
Before trial, Snider moved to suppress all evidence gathered pursuant to the implied consent procedures. Snider based his motion on the ground that Kopf had no authority to arrest him outside Atalissa or to invoke the implied consent procedures.
Based on several statutes, the district court overruled the motion. The case went to trial. Snider was convicted of OWI and after that he appealed.
On appeal, Snider urges the same grounds as he did in his motion to suppress. Our review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4.
Generally, a governing body like a municipality can directly exercise its police powers only within its jurisdictional boundaries unless a statute broadens those powers. So municipal police officers can normally exercise the powers inhering in their office only within the confines of the jurisdiction that employs them. State v. O'Donnell, 192 N.J.Super. 128, 129, 469 A.2d 38, 39 (1983) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Like the district court, we think several statutory provisions broaden municipal police officers' authority to arrest--in certain instances--outside the territorial limits of the municipality that employs them. .
We begin our analysis with Iowa Code section 801.4(7)(b) (1991), which defines " 'peace officers,' sometimes designated 'law enforcement officers'," to include "marshals and police officers of cities." Iowa Code section 321.485 allows a peace officer to arrest a person or issue a written citation or memorandum if the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person has violated any provision of Chapter 321 punishable as a simple, serious or aggravated misdemeanor. A written citation in lieu of arrest is simply a procedure police may use to avoid taking a suspect of a minor violation into custody. Lloyd, 513 N.W.2d at 743; see also Iowa Code § 805.1(1).
So clearly with state traffic offenses, a municipal police officer has authority to arrest anywhere in the state. This authority, however, arises only if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed such a traffic offense. Cf. O...
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