State v. Snipes, 56553
Decision Date | 22 February 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 56553,56553,1 |
Citation | 478 S.W.2d 299 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Roy Edward SNIPES, Appellant |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Wieler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
Edward Snipes, in pro per.
Defendant was charged with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. See § 564.440. 1 He was convicted on a trial in the magistrate court and appealed to the circuit court. At a trial in that court he was again found guilty and the jury fixed his punishment at a fine of $100 and imprisonment in the county jail for a period of 30 days. He has appealed to this court. We have appellate jurisdiction of this misdemeanor appeal because one of defendant's contentions involves the construction of the 'due process' provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions. See Art. V, § 3, and Art. I, § 10, Mo.Const.1945, Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.Const., and Richman v. Richman, Mo.Sup., 350 S.W.2d 733. We affirm.
The point raised require only a brief statement of facts. On July 5, 1970, defendant's car was stopped on Highway 70 near Columbia, by Highway Patrol officers operating a radar unit which had indicated that the car was being driven at a speed of 81 m.p.h. After the officers had observed defendant he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. He was taken to the Columbia police headquarters for an intoximeter test, which is a breath test to calculate the alcohol content of the blood. He refused to take that test and requested that a blood sample be drawn. Defendant was taken to Boone County Hospital where that was done and the blood was sent to the Highway Patrol Laboratory to be analyzed.
There was an abundance of evidence to support the submission. Three officers testified that from their observation of defendant they were of the opinion that he was intoxicated. The patrol chemist testified that the blood sample tested .158 percent alcohol by weight, and that from his observation of many tests upon various persons it was his opinion that a person with such an alcohol blood content would be intoxicated. Dr. Jackson, a psychiatrist called by defendant, testified that intoxication could be measured by physical reactions as well as by chemical methods, and that the body builds a tolerance for alcohol. He stated, however, that in his opinion a person with .15 percent alcohol blood content would be intoxicated and that a person would never build a tolerance so that he would not be intoxicated at that point.
Defendant testified that he had drunk five 'beers' but that he was confident he was not intoxicated. He testified further that His testimony further indicates that he requested to be taken to the University Medical Center for the examination, and that after the blood sample was taken and he was returned to the sheriff's office he attempted to again make the request but was told to keep quiet.
Defendant, a layman, tried the case without the assistance of an attorney. Prior to trial he filed a motion to suppress based upon the contention that he had been denied due process because he was not permitted to have a physical examination by a person of his own choosing at his own expense. The court heard evidence and subsequently overruled the motion. While we think a motion to dismiss or quash would have been more appropriate we rule that the defendant's motion was sufficient to call the point to the attention of the trial court.
Defendant's first point on this appeal is that he was denied due process by the refusal of the police to assist him in obtaining evidence to be used in his defense by not permitting him to have the examination heretofore mentioned. In addition to the constitutional provisions, he has cited (but has not developed) § 564.441 which provides that after the breath test is taken, It is our view that that section will not aid defendant. He refused the breath test and the blood test was then taken at his request. That was a substantial compliance with the privilege granted by the statute. Moreover, the statute provides that the failure to obtain the additional test shall not preclude admission of evidence relating to the test taken. If defendant is to prevail on his contention it must be upon general constitutional due process grounds.
The question presented is one of first impression in this state. However, the basic principle has been discussed and decided in a number of cases in other states. In In re Martin, 58 Cal.2d 509, 24 Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801, the petitioner had been arrested for driving while intoxicated. At...
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