State v. Snowden
| Decision Date | 30 January 1933 |
| Docket Number | 30155 |
| Citation | 164 Miss. 613,145 So. 622 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. SNOWDEN et al |
1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
Formal and technical words of statute defining offense are dispensable in indictment.
2. INDICTMENT AND INFOBMATION.
Indictment if charging offense certainly and substantially in language equivalent in meaning to statutory language defining offense is sufficient.
3. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Allegations of indictment for robbery held sufficient, though not following statutory form (Code 1930, section 1126).
Indictment alleged in substance that defendant "unlawfully and feloniously" made assault with pistol on complaining witness, put him "in fear of bodily harm and of immediate injury to his person," and took about six dollars in lawful money of the United States from him, and "in the presence of and against the will of" the complaining witness took money, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.
4 ROBBERY.
Indictment charging robbery "of about six dollars lawful and legal money and tender of the United States of America of the value unknown" held sufficient allegation of amount (Code 1930, section 1126).
5 ROBBERY.
Allegation in indictment for robbery that money was feloniously taken, stolen, and carried away by putting owner in fear held sufficient to charge intent to steal (Code 1930, section 1126).
APPEAL from circuit court of Lauderdale county, HON. J. D. FATHEREE, Judge.
Criminal prosecution by the state against Laval Snowden and others. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the indictment, the state appeals. Reversed and cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
W. D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
It will be noted, by reference to section 1126, of the Code of 1930, that robbery is defined as the felonious taking of the personal property of another in his presence or from his person and against his will by violence to his person, or by putting such person in fear of some immediate injury to his person. The indictment in this case charges that appellee and others feloniously assaulted R. W. Johnson with a deadly weapon and put him in fear of bodily harm and of immediate injury to his person and took from him certain money in his presence and against his will and then and there feloniously, unlawfully and violently, did take, steal and carry away, etc. The indictment appears to me, not only not susceptible to the construction placed upon it by appellee, but that it charges a robbery under the provisions of the statute above referred to.
Considering this indictment in the light of State v. Presley, 91 Miss. 377, 44 So. 827, it appears that the indictment here is in all respects good and valid as charging a robbery under the provisions of section 1126 of the Code of 1930.
The indictment set out in the opinion of this court in the case of Webster v. State, 146 Miss. 682, 11 So. 749, is almost identical with the indictment in this case and the court held that indictment good.
M. V. B. Miller and J. V. Gipson, both of Meridan, for appellee.
The basic principle of English and American jurisprudence is that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; and notice of the charge or claim against him, not only sufficient to inform him that there is a charge or claim, but so distinct and specific as clearly to advise him what he has to meet, and to give him a fair and reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense, is an indispensable element of that process.
Fontana v. United States, 262 F. 283; State v. Traylor, 56 So. 524.
The proper way to describe property charged to be stolen in a robbery and to identify the same is shown by a reference to Bishop on Directions and Forms (1 Ed.), 513 and 514 and see 1 Wharton on Precedents of Indictments, and Pleas, p. 410.
This court is definitely committed to the proposition that the gist of robbery is the felonious taking as in larceny, and that there can be no robbery without the indictment charging larceny with that degree of certainty required in a larceny indictment.
Jones v. State, 95 Miss. 121, 48 So. 407.
An omission in an indictment for a felony going to the very essence of the offense renders it void and subject to attack at any time.
Intent to steal must be alleged and proven.
Jones v. State, 95 Miss. 121, 48 So. 407, 21 Ann. Cas. 1137.
In the case of Rains v. State, 36. Me. 532, it was held "A charge of larceny is always included in a charge of robbery. The indictment therefore, should contain all the allegations essential in larceny, with the added matter that makes the larceny robbery.
3 Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, p. 1865.
The indictment should describe the property taken by robbery substantially the same as in larceny. An information describing the money as "twenty-five dollars in money, the property of John Bond;" without any excuse for not giving a better description, is fatally defective. An indictment describing the property taken as (certain money and one silver watch chain) is sufficient.
Section 775, page 217, Criminal Law and Procedure by Hughes.
Robbery is a common-law crime and in an indictment for same all elements must be specifically set out.
A defective indictment cannot be cured by intendment or presumptions.
Cook Case, 72 Miss. 519, 520, 521; Riggs v. State, 26 Miss. 51.
In quite a number of cases this court is committed to the proposition that unless the property, as well as the owner of the same, is clearly described in the indictment for embezzlement, false pretenses, larceny and burglary that the indictment is fatally defective, and of course the same would hold true in an indictment for robbery.
Hughes v. State, 20 So. 838, 74 Miss. 369; State v. Ellis, 59 So. 841, 102 Miss. 541.
In burglary the ownership of the building burglarized must be alleged and it is not sufficient to charge the ownership in a partnership name unless the indictment sets forth the names of the several partners....
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