State v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 23 September 2004
• Citation: 337 Or. 410,97 P.3d 1181
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Marshall Lovejoy SNYDER, Respondent on Review.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

97 P.3d 1181

337 Or. 410

STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. Marshall Lovejoy SNYDER, Respondent on Review.

(D9801146T; CA A111712; SC S50672).

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2004.

Decided September 23, 2004.

Daniel J. Casey, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. With him on the opening and reply briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General. With them on the supplemental reply brief was Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General.

Ernest G. Lannet, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs were Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public Defense Services, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender.

BALMER, J.

This case presents two issues for review. The first is whether the state may petition this court for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals when the state obtained the disposition that it sought in that court, but challenges one of the court's holdings. The second issue, which arises only if the state prevails on the first, is whether, during defendant's trial for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), the trial court erred in admitting results of a blood alcohol test into evidence under ORS 813.320(2)(a) when the state failed to meet the requirements of ORS 813.160(1)(a).¹ The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should not have admitted the results of defendant's blood alcohol test under ORS 813.320(2)(a),² but affirmed defendant's DUII conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. State v. Snyder, 187 Or.App. 648, 656-57, 69 P.3d 802 (2003).

For the reasons that we discuss below, we hold that the state was aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, that ORS 2.520³ therefore authorizes the state to seek review of that decision in this court, and that this dispute continues to present a justiciable controversy. We also hold that ORS 813.320(2)(a) creates an exception to the specifications for blood alcohol tests otherwise required by ORS 813.160 (1999), amended by Oregon Laws 2003, chapter 19, section 1.⁴ Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

The material facts of the case are not in dispute, and we take them from the Court of Appeals opinion and the record. Defendant was charged with DUII after being involved in a single-car accident. The arresting officer, McLeod, found defendant lying injured a short distance from his car. Defendant was taken to a hospital emergency room where his injuries were treated and his blood was drawn for the purpose of performing a chemical analysis. Officer McLeod also was present at the emergency room, and he observed defendant's behavior there.

Before trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude the results of the chemical analysis performed at the hospital on the ground that the state had not provided the foundation for that evidence that ORS 813.160 requires. Specifically, defendant argued that the state had not provided a witness to testify that the person who had administered the test was qualified to administer such a test or that the blood test had been administered in accordance with Health Division methodology, both of which are required by ORS 813.160.

Defendant further argued that, because ORS 813.160 is not a provision of the implied consent law, the blood test evidence did not fall within the exception in ORS 813.320(2)(a) that "provisions of the implied consent law shall not be construed * * * to limit the introduction of otherwise competent, relevant evidence" in a DUII prosecution. Finally, defendant asserted that, because the court had no way to ascertain whether the person who had administered the chemical analysis and had analyzed its results was qualified to do so or what the hospital's printout of those results actually indicated about the level of alcohol in defendant's blood, the results of his chemical blood analysis were inadmissible due to a lack of foundation.

The state responded that ORS 813.160 is a provision of the implied consent law and, therefore, under ORS 813.320(2)(a), cannot be construed to limit the introduction of "otherwise competent, relevant evidence" of the amount of alcohol in a defendant's blood if the "evidence results from a test of [the defendant's blood] while the defendant was hospitalized."

The trial court denied defendant's motion and, at defendant's trial, allowed the state to introduce a certified copy of the hospital records that had been authenticated by the affidavit of the records custodian. Officer McLeod then read the hospital record into the trial court record and stated that the chemical analysis results correlated to a .17 percent blood alcohol content. The state did not present evidence as to who had tested defendant's blood sample or whether that person had followed testing methods approved by the Health Division. Defendant testified in his own defense and, on direct examination, stated "I—obviously, I was drunk. I'm not saying that I was not drunk."⁵

A jury convicted defendant of DUII, ORS 813.010. Defendant appealed, asserting that the trial court had erred in admitting the evidence of the chemical analysis of his blood because the state had failed to lay the foundation for that evidence that ORS 813.160(1)(a) requires.⁶ Before the Court of Appeals, the state argued that its failure to show compliance with ORS 813.160(1)(a) did not require the results of defendant's chemical blood analysis to be excluded because those results qualified for admissibility as "otherwise competent, relevant evidence" under ORS 813.320(2)(a). In the alternative, the state argued that, if the trial court had erred by admitting those results, that error was harmless in light of defendant's admission that he had been intoxicated at the time of the accident.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had erred in admitting the results of defendant's chemical analysis because the state did not show that the analysis was administered in compliance with ORS 813.160. Snyder, 187 Or.App. at 652-56, 69 P.3d 802. However, the court affirmed defendant's conviction based on its conclusion that the error was harmless because defendant had testified voluntarily at trial that he was drunk. Id. at 657, 69 P.3d 802.⁷

ORS 2.520 AND JUSTICIABILITY

Defendant has raised a threshold issue that we must consider before we may reach the statutory interpretation question. Defendant argues that we lack jurisdiction over this case as both a statutory and constitutional matter. He claims that (1) the state is not an "aggrieved party" that may petition for review under ORS 2.520; and (2) because this case no longer presents a justiciable controversy, this court lacks the constitutional authority to decide this case.

We consider the parties' statutory arguments first. State v. Hancock, 317 Or. 5, 9, 854 P.2d 926 (1993). In Oregon, the right to appeal is wholly statutory and is subject to any limitations imposed by the statute conferring the right. State v. Adams, 315 Or. 359, 364, 847 P.2d 397 (1993) (citing Logsdon v. State and Dell, 234 Or. 66, 70, 380 P.2d 111 (1963)); Ragnone v. Portland School District No. 1J, 289 Or. 339, 341 n. 1, 613 P.2d 1052 (1980). ORS 2.520 confers jurisdiction on this court following a decision by the Court of Appeals and provides that "any party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals may petition" this court for review. The question before us, then, is one of statutory interpretation: Is the state in this case "aggrieved" under the meaning of that term in the statute?

Defendant contends that, because the state prevailed on the merits in the Court of Appeals, it is not "aggrieved" under ORS 2.520 and, for that reason, this court lacks jurisdiction over this proceeding. The state argues that this court's decision in Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or. 352, 867 P.2d 1368 (1994), dealt with an identical situation. In that case, this court held that the state was "aggrieved" under ORS 2.520 because the Court of Appeals had ruled against the state on the threshold issue whether the petitioner was permitted to assert the claim that he did, even though the state prevailed on the merits:

"The state does not challenge the Court of Appeals' disposition of the case, but rather challenges that court's rationale for its disposition of petitioner's second claim for relief. ORS 2.520 provides that `[a]ny party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for review.' (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the state is `aggrieved' by the conclusion of law reached by the Court of Appeals that is discussed in this opinion because, if incorrect, the rationale of the lead opinion in the Court of Appeals will force the state to defend the merits of many future claims for post-conviction relief that it should not be required to defend."

Palmer, 318 Or. at 355 n. 5, 867 P.2d 1368 (emphasis in original). Here, we similarly conclude that the state was "aggrieved" and take the opportunity to explain that result.

When interpreting a statute, we must attempt to discern the intent of the legislature, and, in doing so, we are guided by the methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). Pursuant to that methodology, we first consider the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. We also consider, at the first level of analysis, prior case law from this court that interprets the same statutory wording. Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or. 178, 184, 11 P.3d 1286 (2000).

The text of ORS 2.520 requires that a party must be "aggrieved" by a decision of the Court of Appeals to petition this court for review. As noted above, in Palmer this court interpreted ORS 2.520 to permit a party to petition this...