State v. Snyder, 54944
Decision Date | 20 December 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 54944,54944 |
Citation | 203 N.W.2d 280 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Dale LeRoy SNYDER, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Paul D. Strand, Decorah, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Robert D. Jacobson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas C. Lynch, County Atty., for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ.
This is an appeal by Dale LeRoy Snyder from judgment entered on a jury verdict convicting him of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage contrary to section 321.281, The Code. He was sentenced to be confined in the Winneshiek County jail for three months and fined $300. The three-month jail sentence was suspended during defendant's good behavior and he was placed on probation for a period of one year. The court directed that in default of payment of the fine imposed defendant should be confined in the county jail until such fine was paid at the rate of $5.00 per day.
November 23, 1970, a Decorah police officer observed defendant's vehicle stopped at the traffic light at a Decorah intersection. Defendant made no attempt to proceed through the intersection even though the traffic lights were green. A line of traffic approximately one and a half blocks long had formed behind defendant's automobile. After observing defendant slumped over the steering wheel of his automobile, the officer parked the patrol car, returned to defendant's automobile, and found the motor running. After some investigation, the officer drove Snyder's car to the police station.
At the police station the officer administered the 'road test' of sobriety, namely, placing one's fingertips together with arms outstretched and eyes closed, walking in a straight line heel to toe, and picking up an object off the floor. Snyder was only successful in touching his fingertips, after several attempts.
Snyder then agreed to submit to a blood test to determine his condition, and the police radio operator called 'Medical Associates' and requested a doctor for the taking of a blood sample.
Frank Riha, a medical technologist at the Winneshiek County Memorial Hospital, arrived at the station a short time later. He then withdrew a sample of blood from the defendant from the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of Snyder's blood.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred: (1) in admitting results of defendant's blood test into evidence; (2) in imposing a sentence calling for incarceration for nonpayment of fine; and (3) in ordering a $5.00 per day credit on the unpaid fine for each day of confinement.
I. Minutes of evidence filed with the county attorney's information in this matter notified defendant Frank Riha would testify he was a medical technologist and had withdrawn a sample of blood from defendant.
At trial, Riha testified he was a medical technologist employed at the Winneshiek County Memorial Hospital and that he had withdrawn a sample of blood from defendant. Riha stated his formal education involved a two-year period of training and a six-month internship at the Medical Institute of Minnesota; that upon completion of this training, he received a degree R.M.T., Registered Medical Technologist. After serving his internship he was drafted by the army, sent to a technician school and sent to Brooks General Hospital in San Antonio, Texas, where he served as a medical technician for eight months. He testified he was licensed in Iowa as a registered medical technologist.
Riha was not affiliated with American Society of Clinical Pathologists which gives an A.S.C.P. degree after satisfactory completion of three years of regular college and a year of internship.
Defendant made timely objection to Riha's testimony and admission of the results of the blood test on the ground Riha was not a medical technologist, one of the specified persons authorized by section 321B.4, The Code, to withdraw body substances for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of a person's blood.
This section provides in part:
It is pointed out in the record that Mr. Riha was requested by Doctor Dynes, a licensed physician practicing in Decorah, to withdraw the specimen of blood from defendant at the police station.
As we understood defendant's argument he maintains that only a person meeting the academic requirements for an A.S.C.P. degree (American Society of Clinical Pathologists), that is, a person with three years of collegiate education and one year of internship can qualify as a medical technologist who is authorized to take blood specimens under the provisions of section 321B.4.
In support of this contention defendant offered testimony of a medical technologist at the Winneshiek County Memorial Hospital who had a degree from the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. This lady had three years of college and one year of internship. She received a four-year degree from Gustavus Augustus College. She expressed familiarity with the term 'medical technicians' and acquaintance with their qualifications as distinguished from her own. The witness stated that a person having an A.S.C.P. degree has a much broader education than those termed 'medical technicians' at the hospital and had been certified by the board of the American Society of Clinical Pathologists.
On cross-examination the witnes was asked, 'She answered, 'Just the 'A.S.C.P."
In rebuttal, Doctor Conrad E. Larson, a pathologist on the staff of the Winneshiek County Memorial Hospital, testified he was a member of the American Society of Clinical Pathologists. As a pathologist he was in charge of all laboratory procedures conducted at the hospital. On cross-examination he was asked for his definition of a 'medical technologist' and whether in his opinion there was a difference between a 'medical technician' and a 'medical technologist.' The doctor expressed the opinion that 'in common parlance' the terms are synonymous. He explained that
A computer search for references to the terms 'medical technician' and 'medical technologist' reveals that these terms appear in eleven sections and eight chapters of the Code. These sections are: 749A.2, 496C.2, 218.8, 204A.2, 153.32, 148A.3 and chapters 135B which includes the act relating to pathology and radiology services in hospitals (sections 135B.19 through 135B.32) and 321B.
Section 135B.20(3) provides: "Technician' shall mean technologist as well.'
Section 135B.22 has this provision:
* * *.'
Section 135B.24 contains this statement:
Section 135B.25 provides:
The term 'technologist' appears only in that portion of section 321B.4 set out, supra, the statute involved in this litigation, and is not defined in chapter 321B which was enacted in 1963 by the Regular Session of the Sixtieth General Assembly as chapter 114. That section became effective six years after the Regular Session of the Fifty-seventh General Assembly had enacted what is now code section 135B.20, supra, declaring that as used in the division of chapter 135B dealing with pathology and radiology services in hospital law, 'technician' shall mean 'technologist' as well.
Doctor Larson testified he relied on Dorlan's Medical Dictionary in defining the word 'technologist' as 'technician' and 'technician' as a person trained in and expert in the performance of technical procedures.
However, under the record there can be no doubt the educational requirements for certification as a medical technologist by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists are more exacting than those required for Riha's certificate or degree.
The...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Com. v. Gomes
...v. State, 439 So.2d 725, 726 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Matter of Collins, 108 Ariz. 310, 312, 497 P.2d 523 (1972) (en banc); State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280, 290 (Iowa 1972); State v. Davis, 544 So.2d 20, 21 (La.App.1989); Smith v. State, 301 Minn. 455, 459-460, 223 N.W.2d 775 (1974); Cassibry v......
-
State v. Milliken, 55606
...commitment. If the former it must still be condemned, but if the latter it was patently impermissible. See State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280, 286--292 (Iowa 1972). In any event, it is assumed the matter of defendant's indigency will play no wrongful or improper part in any phase of the senten......
-
Smith v. State
...and later case service for compilation of state and Federal cases.4 See, Frazier v. Jordan, 457 F.2d 726 (5 Cir. 1972); State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972); Spurlock v. Noe, 467 S.W.2d 320 (Ky.1971); State v. Tackett, 52 Haw. 601, 483 P.2d 191 (1971); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, ......
- State v. Watson