State v. Solomon

• Decision Date: 02 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 25-69,25-69
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Morris SOLOMON.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Page 377

260 A.2d 377

128 Vt. 197

STATE of Vermont v. Morris SOLOMON.

No. 25-69.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

Dec. 2, 1969.

Joseph E. McNeil, Burlington City Grand Juror, for the State.

Paul, Frank & Collins, Burlington, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

KEYSER, Justice.

This appeal brings here for consideration a challenge to the constitutionality of an act of our legislature, 23 V.S.A. § 1256, effective March 5, 1968, which provides:

No person may operate or ride upon a motorcycle upon a highway unless he wears upon his head protective headgear reflectorized in part and of a type approved by the commissioner. The headgear shall be equipped with either a neck or chin strap.

The respondent was found guilty after a jury waived hearing by the Vermont District Court (Chittenden Circuit, Unit 2) of failure to wear a protective headgear while operating a motorcycle on College Street in the City of Burlington. Respondent's appeal is from the findings and judgment of guilty entered by the court below and is 'for the sole purpose of testing the constitutional validity of the statutory requirement that motorcyclists wear protective headgear.'

There is no dispute as to the facts, the respondent admitting by his testimony that he was operating a motorcycle while bareheaded at the time and place alleged. The findings of fact made by the trial court establish the commission of the offense charged.

The respondent claims that the purpose of the act is essentially to reduce the risk of motorcyclists inflicting injury upon themselves and that compulsory helmet use exceeds the scope of the police power; also, that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that no state shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.'

The rule relating to the exercise of police power is succinctly stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Leggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 49 S.Ct. 57, 59, 73 L.Ed. 204, 208:

'The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation where otherwise the effect may be to invade rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment only when such legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.'

To the same effect, Sowma v. Parker, Atty. Gen., 112 Vt. 241, 250, 22 A.2d 513.

In passing upon the constitutional question involved, this Court must assume that the acts of the General Assembly are constitutional and within its legislative power until and unless the contrary clearly appears by irrefragable proof. Vermont Woolen Corp. v. Wackerman, 122 Vt. 219, 223, 167 A.2d 533; State v. Auclair, 110 Vt. 147, 156, 4 A.2d 107.

It lies within the power of the legislature to adopt reasonable measures for the promotion of safety upon our public highways in the interests of motorists and motorcyclists and others who may use them. Valcour v. Village of Morrisville, 108 Vt. 242, 248, 184 A. 881. The highways belong to the state, and are subject to the police power of the state. State v. Gamelin, 111 Vt. 245, 250, 13 A.2d 204. It is fundamental that an act of the legislature commands judicial approval if on any reasonable view such act is designed and intended to protect the public health, safety and morals.

The defendant contends that the purpose of the statute is essentially to reduce the risk of motorcyclists inflicting injury upon themselves.

State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, R.I.1968, considers the relationship of the statute requiring the wearing of crash helmets to highways safety and the exercise of valid police power. The court said at page 627:

'(T)he requirement of protective headgear for the exposed operator bears a reasonable relationship to highway safety generally. It does not tax the intellect to comprehend that loose stones on the highways kicked up by passing vehicles, or fallen objects such as withblown tree branches, against which the operator of a closed vehicle has some protection, could so affect the operator of a motorcycle as to cause him momentarily to lose control and thus become a menace to other vehicles on the highway.'

The court further said: 'Even if this (respondent's contention) were so, we are not persuaded that the legislature is powerless to prohibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which could conceivably result in their becoming public charges.'

Statutes similar to the one in question here have been tested in other jurisdictions. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Howie, (Mass.) 238 N.E.2d 373, the court held at page 374: 'The act of the Legislature bears a real and substantial relation to the public health and general welfare and is thus a valid exercise of the police power.' In accord, State v. Odegaard, (N.D.) 165 N.W.2d 677; Connecticut v. Burzycki, (Conn.) 252 A.2d 312; State v. Anderson, 3 N.C.App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48, and Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So.2d 400; Ex parte Smith, (Tex.Ct. of Crim.Appeals) 441 S.W.2d 544. A similar statute in New York requiring motorcyclists and their passengers to wear crash helmets was held to constitute a valid exercise of the State's police power in Krafft v. New York (N.Y.Cty.Ct....