State v. Anderson, 6818SC345

• Decision Date: 20 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 6818SC345,6818SC345
• Citation: 3 N.C.App. 124,164 S.E.2d 48
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Kenneth Calvin ANDERSON.

Page 48

164 S.E.2d 48

3 N.C.App. 124

STATE of North Carolina v. Kenneth Calvin ANDERSON.

No. 6818SC345.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Nov. 20, 1968.

Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton, Asst. Atty. Gen. William W. Melvin and Staff Atty. T. Buie Costen, Raleigh, for the State.

Douglas, Ravenel, Hardy & Crihfield, by G. S. Crihfield, Greensboro, for defendant appellant.

FRANK M. PARKER, Judge.

The sole question presented by this appeal is the constitutionality of that portion of G.S. § 20--140.2(b), enacted as part of Sec. 1, Chap. 674 of the 1967 Session Laws, which reads as follows:

'No motorcycle shall be operated upon the streets and highways of this State unless the operator and all passengers thereon wear safety helmets of a type approved by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.'

Defendant raises no question as to the beneficial effect and intended good purpose of this legislation. He contends, however, that it exceeds constitutional limits imposed by Art. 1, Sec. 17, of the North Carolina Constitution and by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution on the State's police power in that the statute makes it a criminal offense for a person to fail to do an act the only result of which, so defendant argues, is to reduce possible injuries to himself, when this cannot be shown to be for the benefit of the public at large. We do not agree that the beneficial effects of the statute are so limited.

At the outset, it must be recognized that as stated by Parker, J. (now C.J.) in State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768, 90 A.L.R.2d 804:

'The Legislature, unless it is limited by constitutional provisions imposed by the State and Federal Constitutions, has the inherent power to define and punish any act as a crime, because it is indisputedly a part of the police power of the State. The expediency of making any such enactment is a matter of which the Legislature is the proper judge. However, the act of the Legislature declaring what shall constitute a crime must have some substantial relation to the ends sought to be accomplished.'

Furthermore there is a presumption that any Act passed by the Legislature is constitutional and all reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of the lawful exercise of their powers by the representatives of the people. The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways is a common right, but it is clearly within the State's police power to regulate and control the manner of exercise of that right in the interest of public safety and welfare. Honeycutt v. Scheidt, 254 N.C. 607, 119 S.E.2d 777; Fox v. Scheidt, 241 N.C. 31, 84 S.E.2d 259. In the case before us we are called upon to decide, therefore, only whether the statute here under attack bears a substantial relation to the promotion of the welfare and safety of the general public as distinguished from the welfare solely of the individual riders of motorcycles who are most directly affected. We hold that it does.

Death on the highway can no longer be considered as a personal and individual tragedy alone. The mounting carnage has long since reached proportions of a public disaster. Legislation reasonably designed to reduce the toll may for that reason alone be sufficiently imbued with the public interests to meet the constitutional test required for a valid exercise of the State's police power. However, it is not necessary to invoke so broad a premise in order to find the statute here attacked to be constitutional.

Approximately 30 states presently have statutes similar to the statute here attacked. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in holding constitutional the statute of that State, said:

'(I)t is our unqualified judgment that the purpose sought to be achieved by requiring cyclists to wear protective headgear clearly qualified as a proper subject for legislation.

'The defendant's contention to the contrary presupposes that protection for the motorcycle operator was the sole motivation for the general assembly's action. Even if this were so, we are not persuaded that the legislature is powerless to prohibit individuals from pursuing a course of conduct which could conceivably result in their becoming public charges. Be that as it may, however, the requirement of protective headgear for the exposed operator bears a reasonable relationship to highway safety generally. It does not tax the intellect to comprehend that loose stones on the highway kicked up by passing vehicles, or fallen objects such as windblown tree branches, against which the operator of a closed vehicle has some protection, could so affect the operator of a motorcycle as to cause him momentarily to lose control and thus become a menace to other vehicles on the highway.

'It is fundamental that an act of the legislature commands judicial approval if on any reasonable view such act is designed and intended to protect the public health, safety and morals.' State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, R.I., 241 A.2d 625.

Although its highest Court has not yet passed on the question, lower New York courts have also held the statute of that State constitutional under the State's police power. People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc.2d 702, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290; People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, (reversing 53...