State v. Sommerville, 53040-8
| Decision Date | 08 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 53040-8,53040-8 |
| Citation | 760 P.2d 932,111 Wn.2d 524 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Timothy SOMMERVILLE, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Prediletto, Halpin, Cannon, Sharnikow & Bothwell, Thomas Bothwell, Yakima, for appellant.
Jeffrey C. Sullivan, Yakima County Prosecutor, Robert N. Hackett, Jr., Deputy County Prosecutor, Yakima, for respondent.
We hold that a court considering a motion for acquittal by reason of insanity under RCW 10.77.080 should analyze the merits of the question and determine whether the defendant has proved insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must do more than merely determine whether a jury question is presented. In addition, we hold that a defendant acquitted of murder by reason of insanity and convicted of the rape of a separate victim should be committed to the custody of the Department of Social and Health Services and should serve his prison time on his rape conviction only after the Secretary of DSHS has released him from criminal commitment.
Timothy Sommerville awoke early on the morning of November 24, 1985, got out of bed, dressed, went to the next room, picked up a baseball bat, returned to his bedroom and struck his wife Crystal three times in the head, killing her instantly. Sommerville described his state of mind during the course of these actions as if he "was watching TV". He testified that it was as if " 'I was watching me do it' ", and that " 'It didn't feel like anything I could stop.' " Clerk's Papers, at 25.
Immediately after the murder, Sommerville went upstairs to the bedroom of his stepdaughter. He raised the bat to strike her, but put the bat down. Instead he woke the stepdaughter and instructed her to undress. He then demanded that she have sex with him. She refused and he Sommerville testified that at that moment he came to his senses. He sat down on the edge of his stepdaughter's bed, saying that he had killed Crystal. He then called the Yakima Sheriff's Department and Crystal's mother. He was arrested as soon as a deputy arrived.
produced a folding knife and repeated his demands. She performed oral sex on him, but when he demanded intercourse protested that she was a virgin. As a result, he attempted anal intercourse instead, but was unable to penetrate. Sommerville and his stepdaughter then walked downstairs to a bathroom and obtained a lubricant. As they passed the bedroom in which Crystal lay dead, Sommerville told his stepdaughter to be quiet because she might wake her mother up. After returning to the girl's bedroom, Sommerville again attempted anal intercourse, penetrated and ejaculated. Report of Proceedings, at 254-61
At the hearing on Sommerville's motion for acquittal by reason of insanity, psychologists for the State and the defense agreed that at the time of the murder, Sommerville was in a "depersonalized state" and that as a result he was unable to appreciate the nature of his actions. The State's expert, Dr. Duthie, testified:
Q All right. And, first of all, what is your opinion concerning the defendant's legal responsibility at the time of the murder of his wife?
A Well, my opinion--in technical terms--at that point in time, he did not really appreciate the nature and quality of the act he was committing.
Q Why do you state that?
A Because of his description of how he was perceiving of his wife, his detached state, the almost affectless way he described his thinking at the time which was very much a contrast to--to the way I perceived him in the jail.
He was extremely upset about what he did, cried on at least two separate occasions.
So there was a real discrepancy there.
Report of Proceedings vol. 5, at 510-11.
As to Sommerville's state at the time of the rape, the experts disagreed. The defense's expert testified that Sommerville's depersonalized state continued throughout the murder and the rape, and that he was not responsible for either act.
Q Dr. White, do you have an opinion concerning whether Tim was sane or insane at the time that he hit Crystal with the bat and had sexual relations with [the stepdaughter]?
A In the state I understand sane is defined as able to perceive right and wrong. It's a cognitive explanation, able to act with intent.
What it sounds like to me in this situation was that the intellectual faculties were essentially suspended. He was acting; he was aware that he was acting. But his description is as if it was not he that was acting, it was as if he was watching somebody act. Therefore the conclusion in our letter that he was unable to define or to differentiate right from wrong at that specific instant or act with intent or premeditation or planning ...
* * *
He was unable to differentiate and in my opinion, he was unable to perceive the nature and the awesome impact of the acts which had taken place at that moment in time.
Report of Proceedings vol. 1, at 66-67.
The State's expert, on the other hand, concluded that the depersonalized state had significantly lapsed by the time of the rape.
A I believe he--it's my professional opinion that he was sane at the time that he raped the stepdaughter, that he was aware of those acts to a significant degree to be held responsible for those.
Q All right.
Why do you think--why does your opinion change for events that occurred within seconds or minutes of each other?
A First of all, depersonalized states like that in some cases can wear off; they can gradually wear off so there is a time.
There was also decision making, very--in my opinion, very complex decision making happening. I still think he was in a depersonalized state, but I think he did have control over what his actions were even though he was in that state.
He made choices--he made a choice not to hit her with a baseball bat. He made choices about the kind of sexual activity that they would have and did some rather complex verbal interacting with [the stepdaughter] at that time.
And while he's still in some sort of a trance or disassociative [sic ] state at the time, that dialogue would indicate to me that he was able to make some decisions and he knew what he was doing.
Report of Proceedings vol. 5, at 515-16.
Sommerville moved for a verdict of acquittal on both counts by reason of insanity under RCW 10.77.080. The trial court found Sommerville insane at the time of the murder, but with regard to the rape held:
The defendant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the commission of the crime of First Degree Rape as to his stepdaughter ... that he was not criminally responsible for those acts which constitute Rape in the First Degree.
Clerk's Papers, at 26-27. The trial court therefore left the question of insanity with regard to the rape to a jury, in accordance with RCW 10.77.080. Following a jury trial, a verdict of guilty was returned on the rape charge.
The trial court sentenced Sommerville to 68 months on the first degree rape charge, which is within the standard range of 51 to 68 months. In its order of commitment on the murder charge, the trial court found that Sommerville presented a substantial danger to other persons and presented a substantial likelihood of committing further felonious acts. Sommerville was therefore committed to the custody of DSHS for a period "not to exceed the maximum sentence for First Degree Murder, which is Life Imprisonment." However, the trial court's order specified that:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this commitment shall not commence until the defendant completes all terms of Clerk's Papers, at 12.
imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for First Degree Rape under this cause.
The parties have raised three principal issues. First, in deciding a motion for acquittal by reason of insanity under RCW 10.77.080, should the trial judge weigh evidence or merely determine whether a jury question is presented? Second, did the trial court err in not acquitting Sommerville on the rape charge by reason of insanity? Third, did the trial court err in sentencing Sommerville to serve his time in jail prior to his being committed to the custody of DSHS?
In considering a motion for acquittal by reason of insanity, the trial court should weigh the evidence and decide whether the defendant has proven insanity by a preponderance.
The standard to be applied in considering a motion for acquittal based on insanity is established by statute. RCW 10.77.080 provides in part:
At the hearing upon said motion the defendant shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense or offenses with which he is charged ... If the motion is denied, the question may be submitted to the trier of fact in the same manner as other issues of fact.
(Italics ours.) The plain words of the statute imply that the judge hearing the motion should weigh evidence. He would have to do so in order to determine at the hearing whether insanity had been proved by a preponderance.
However, the State argues that insanity is a jury question and that the judge should not weigh evidence. Instead, according to the State, the judge deciding the motion Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the facts of the crime provide direct evidence of defendant's sanity ... Clearly the trial judge did not err in submitting the issue to the jury. The question of sanity is one of fact and should go to the jury when there is conflicting evidence on the issue.
should treat the question like a motion for summary judgment, defer to the jury and deny the motion for acquittal if there is any conflict in the evidence. In support of this argument, the State relies on the following passage from State v. McDonald, 89 Wash.2d 256, 267, 571 P.2d 930 (1977)
From a defendant's point of view, the conflict-in-the-evidence...
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