State v. Sorenson

Decision Date26 May 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-3107.,98-3107.
Citation2000 WI 43,234 Wis.2d 648,611 N.W.2d 240
PartiesIN RE the COMMITMENT OF Ronald G. SORENSON: STATE of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Ronald G. SORENSON, Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by T. Christopher Kelly and Thomas, Kelly, Habermehl & Mays, S.C., Madison and oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly.

For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Warren D. Weinstein, attorney general with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

¶ 1. DAVID T. PROSSER, J.

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that dismissed the appeal of Ronald G. Sorenson (Sorenson).1 The court of appeals found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because Sorenson did not file a notice of appeal in a timely manner.

¶ 2. Sorenson attempted to appeal an order by the Circuit Court for Juneau County, John W. Brady, Judge, that committed Sorenson as a sexually violent person under Wis. Stat. § 980.05. Sorenson's attorney transmitted the notice of appeal via facsimile machine to the office of the clerk of the circuit court on the last calendar date permitted for filing the notice. He concurrently mailed the original copy of the notice to the clerk's office, and the clerk received that mailed document one day after the filing deadline.

¶ 3. The court of appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Sorenson's notice of appeal was not timely filed. The court found that the facsimiled transmission did not constitute a filing of a notice of appeal under Pratsch v. Pratsch, 201 Wis. 2d 491

, 548

N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1996). Pratsch held that Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) prohibits the filing of a notice of appeal by facsimile because a notice of appeal is a paper that requires a filing fee. Id. at 494-95. Under the rule, only papers that do not require a filing fee may be filed by facsimile.2

Id.

¶ 4. Sorenson contends, however, that as an indigent person, he was exempted from fee payments by Wis. Stat. § 814.29(1)(d)2.3 Therefore, he was not required to submit a filing fee to initiate his appeal. Because he was not required to submit a filing fee for his papers, he was allowed under Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) to transmit the notice of appeal by facsimile transmission. Sorenson consequently maintains that he satisfied the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a notice of appeal.

¶ 5. This court granted Sorenson's petition for review to decide one discrete issue, namely whether Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2), under which "papers that do not require a filing fee" may be filed by facsimile transmission, permits indigent parties to file a notice of appeal by facsimile. We hold that a notice of appeal may be filed by facsimile transmission because a notice of appeal is not a paper that requires a filing fee to confer jurisdiction. The court of appeals obtained jurisdiction over this appeal when the clerk of the circuit court received Sorenson's facsimiled notice of appeal within the statutorily prescribed time frame. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 6. For purposes of this review, the pertinent facts are not in dispute. On April 2, 1998, a jury found Sorenson a sexually violent person pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.05. At a July 29, 1998, disposition hearing, the Juneau County Circuit Court entered the judgment of the jury and issued a commitment order. The order required that Sorenson be committed to institutional care in a secure mental health unit or other facility.

¶ 7. Sorenson, who is indigent, sought to appeal the order of commitment. On August 7, 1998, the office of the State Public Defender appointed a Madisonbased attorney to represent Sorenson in the appeal.

¶ 8. The parties agree that the notice of appeal was due no later than October 27, 1998. On the morning of October 27, 1998, Sorenson's attorney transmitted the notice of appeal via facsimile to the office of the Clerk of Circuit Court for Juneau County. In the cover letter accompanying the facsimiled notice of appeal, Sorenson's attorney stated that he made the filing by way of facsimile "[p]ursuant to my discussion with a clerk in your office today." The cover letter also indicated that the attorney transmitted the same document via facsimile to opposing counsel: The letter noted that the attorney sent it "via facsimile & U.S. Mail" and copied both the office of the District Attorney and the office of the Attorney General.

¶ 9. The notice of appeal addressed Sorenson's intent to appeal the final judgment entered by the Juneau County Circuit Court. It specified that the judgment order committed Sorenson as a sexually violent person to the custody of the Department of Health and Social Services.4 The notice also stated that Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2) did not apply to this appeal,5 and it declared that this was not an appeal entitled to preference by statute.

¶ 10. The time stamp on the facsimile transmission reveals that the facsimile arrived at the clerk's office at 11:18 a.m. on October 27, 1998. The clerk of court stamped the facsimiled notice of appeal with the October 27, 1998, date, and the Juneau County Criminal Court Record notes that a "Notice of Appeal—Fax Copy" reached the office on that day. That same day, the clerk of court transmitted a copy of the notice of appeal to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, indicating that the notice of appeal was "filed herein on October 27, 1998."

¶ 11. Sorenson's attorney also mailed the notice of appeal on the same day he transmitted the filing by facsimile machine, and the clerk of court received the mailed document on October 28, 1998, one day after the filing deadline. The clerk's office stamped the mailed copy with the October 28, 1998, date, and the Juneau County Criminal Court Record marked the arrival of the notice of appeal on its log for October 28.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 12. The court of appeals directed the parties to prepare briefs addressing whether the filing of a notice of appeal by facsimile transmission is permitted in light of Pratsch. Sorenson, unpublished slip op. at 1. Pratsch held that Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) "plainly means that only those papers that do not require a filing fee may be filed by facsimile transmission." Pratsch, 201 Wis. 2d at 494. The Pratsch court reasoned that § 801.16(2) precludes the filing of a notice of appeal via facsimile because another procedural statute, § (Rule) 809.25(2)(a)1, requires the payment of a filing fee for a notice of appeal.6 Id. at 494-95.

¶ 13. Finding that Sorenson's appeal was not timely filed, the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Sorenson, unpublished slip op. 2. The court observed that Pratsch allows filing by facsimile transmission only of those types of papers that generically do not require a filing fee. Id. The court emphasized that its rule precluding the filing of notices of appeal by facsimile transmission applied uniformly to all notices of appeal and did not turn on whether an individual appellant is required to pay the filing fee. Id. Because a notice of appeal may be filed before the court determines that an indigent appellant can proceed without the payment of filing fees, the court declined to endorse an "unworkable situation" in which the assessment of a particular appellant's eligibility to file a notice of appeal by facsimile transmission might not be made until after the notice of appeal actually is filed. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1]

¶ 14. This court has established the rules of civil procedure that govern the manner in which parties must initiate appeals. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.84;7 Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 194, 200, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997). The issue in this case, whether Wis. Stat. § 801.16(2) allows indigent parties to file a notice of appeal by facsimile transmission, requires us to interpret a court rule.

[2-7]

¶ 15. When we interpret court rules, this court turns to the rules of statutory construction for guidance. Jadair, 209 Wis. 2d at 194. The interpretation of a court rule, like statutory interpretation, is a question of law that we review independently without deference to the lower courts. Id. The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 N.W.2d 100 (1997). Similarly, in interpreting court rules, we seek to reach a result consistent with the manifest intent of this court. County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 21-22, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). If the manifest intent of this court is clear from the plain language of a rule, we give effect to that intent and look no further. Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996)

. On the other hand, if a procedural rule is ambiguous, we are likely to construe it liberally so as to encourage a resolution of the controversy on the merits. See DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999) (citing Kyncl v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968); State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200, 204-05, 240 N.W.2d 168 (1976)).

ANALYSIS

[8-11]

¶ 16. We begin our analysis by considering how an appellate court secures jurisdiction over an appeal. A party must file a notice of appeal to initiate an effective appeal. Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(a).8 A notice of appeal is a signed paper that contains certain required pieces of information and alerts the opposing party, the circuit court, and the court of appeals of a party's intention to seek recourse from a court judgment or order.9Jadair209 Wis. 2d at 201; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 325 (1995). The timely filing of a notice of appeal...

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