State v. Soto

• Citation: 158 Ohio St.3d 44,139 N.E.3d 889,2019 Ohio 4430
• Decision Date: 31 October 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2018-0416,2018-0416
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. SOTO, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

158 Ohio St.3d 44
139 N.E.3d 889
2019 Ohio 4430

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,
v.
SOTO, Appellee.

No. 2018-0416

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 6, 2019
Decided October 31, 2019

Gary L. Lammers, Putnam County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Carly M. Edelstein, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher D. Schroeder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office.

DeWine, J.

158 Ohio St.3d 44

{¶ 1} In 2006, a two-year-old boy was killed. At the time, his father, Travis Soto, told police that he had accidentally caused the boy's death while driving an ATV. Soto was charged with child endangering and involuntary manslaughter. He entered into a plea agreement whereby he pleaded guilty to child endangering and the other charge was dismissed. He served his time in prison. That might have been the end of the story.

{¶ 2} But several years after his release, Soto told authorities that his previous account was a lie. The truth, he said, was that he had beaten his son to death. The state then charged Soto with murder and aggravated murder, among other offenses. We now must decide whether the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy bars the murder charges.

{¶ 3} We hold that because the involuntary-manslaughter charge was dismissed prior to the empaneling of a jury, jeopardy never attached to that charge. Because of this, the double-jeopardy prohibition does not prevent the state from prosecuting Soto for murder or aggravated murder. For that reason, we reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶ 4} As recounted by both parties, the relevant facts are as follows. In January 2006, Soto's son, Julio, was killed. Based on Soto's statements at the time, authorities believed that the child had died in a tragic ATV accident.

158 Ohio St.3d 45

{¶ 5} In 2006, Soto gave authorities two different stories about what had happened. Initially, Soto told investigators that he had accidentally run over Julio with an ATV after turning a corner around a building on his property. Later, Soto told authorities that Julio had been riding with Soto on the vehicle and was struck after he fell off. The Lucas County Coroner's Office conducted an autopsy and concluded that Julio's injuries were consistent with an ATV accident.

{¶ 6} After being charged with child endangering under R.C. 2919.22(A) and involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A), Soto negotiated a plea agreement. He pleaded guilty to child endangering, and the involuntary-manslaughter charge was dismissed. Soto was sentenced to five years in prison, which he served.

{¶ 7} But it turns out that Julio's death may not have been accidental. In July 2016, Soto went to the Putnam County Sheriff's Office and confessed that he had beaten the child to death and fabricated the ATV accident. A doctor specializing in pediatric abuse reviewed the 2006 autopsy report and photographs taken at the time and concluded that the child's injuries were consistent with Soto's more recent story. Specifically, the doctor pointed to

139 N.E.3d 892

the fact that there were no bone fractures, which would normally be expected in an ATV accident. Authorities then indicted Soto for aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.

{¶ 8} In October 2016, Soto filed a motion to dismiss the murder charges. The motion argued that the charges were barred by the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against a person being "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He asserted that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder and aggravated murder and that the state is therefore barred from prosecuting those charges.

{¶ 9} The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the double-jeopardy protection does not bar Soto's prosecution for murder and aggravated murder. The court reasoned that under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States , involuntary manslaughter with a child-endangering predicate is not the same offense as murder with a felonious-assault predicate. See 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

{¶ 10} Soto filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss—a procedural step that was appropriate based on this court's decision in State v. Anderson , which allowed an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds. 138 Ohio St.3d 264, 2014-Ohio-542, 6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 26 ; see also Abney v. United States , 431 U.S. 651, 659, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). Soto asserted a single assignment of error in his appeal: "The trial court erred [in] over[ruling] Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Double Jeopardy Grounds."

158 Ohio St.3d 46

{¶ 11} In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Soto's motion to dismiss. The majority concluded that "because Involuntary Manslaughter constitutes a lesser included offense of Aggravated Murder and Murder, the principles of Double Jeopardy would prevent a subsequent prosecution of Soto for Aggravated Murder and Murder in this instance." 2018-Ohio-459, 94 N.E.3d 618, ¶ 34. The majority noted that although Soto was not convicted of involuntary manslaughter, "he was in jeopardy of being tried and convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter but-for the plea agreement." Id. at ¶ 22. Writing in dissent, Judge Zimmerman argued that because the involuntary-manslaughter charge had been dismissed, jeopardy had not attached to that charge. Id. at ¶ 38 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion therefore concluded that double-jeopardy principles do not bar Soto's prosecution for murder and aggravated murder. As explained below, Judge Zimmerman was right.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Double-Jeopardy Principles Do Not Bar Soto's Prosecution

{¶ 12} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Ohio Constitution contains a similarly worded guarantee: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.¹ We have read these provisions to protect against three distinct wrongs: "(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,

139 N.E.3d 893

and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Gustafson , 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432, 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996), citing United States v. Halper , 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989).

{¶ 13} The court of appeals determined that the first protection—preventing a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal—was violated here because Soto had been indicted for involuntary manslaughter in 2006 and was now facing prosecution for murder and aggravated murder. Treating the dismissal of the involuntary-manslaughter charge as an acquittal, the court concluded that further prosecution of Soto violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses because under the test set forth in Blockburger , murder and aggravated murder constitute the same offense as involuntary manslaughter. But a dismissal is not equivalent to an acquittal. By their plain terms, the Double Jeopardy Clauses

158 Ohio St.3d 47

apply only when someone would be "twice put in jeopardy." Because Soto was never put in jeopardy for the dismissed 2006 involuntary-manslaughter charge, the Double Jeopardy Clauses do not bar his subsequent prosecution for murder and aggravated murder.

{¶ 14} Because the involuntary-manslaughter charge was dismissed under his plea agreement, Soto was never tried for involuntary manslaughter nor was he convicted of or punished for that crime. In treating the dismissal of the involuntary-manslaughter charge as an acquittal, the court of appeals ignored the principle that a dismissal entered before jeopardy attaches does not function as an acquittal and does not prevent further prosecution for the offense. See C.K. v. State , 145 Ohio St.3d 322, 2015-Ohio-3421, 49 N.E.3d 1218, ¶ 15 ; Bucolo v. Adkins , 424 U.S. 641, 642, 96 S.Ct. 1086, 47 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976).

{¶ 15} The dissent advances the novel proposition that double jeopardy attaches to a charge dismissed under a plea agreement—here, the involuntary-manslaughter charge. In support of this view, the dissent points to cases holding that jeopardy attaches when a court accepts a guilty plea. Dissenting opinion at ¶ 37-38. Of course, that's true. But what the dissent neglects to mention is that the principle applies only to the charges to which a defendant pleads guilty. See, e.g. , United States v. Soto-Alvarez , 958 F.2d 473, 482, fn. 7 (1st Cir.1992) ("jeopardy ordinarily does not attach to counts which are...