State v. Southall

• Decision Date: 14 July 1899
• Parties: STATE v. SOUTHALL.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

77 Minn. 296

79 N.W. 1007

STATE

v.SOUTHALL.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 14, 1899.

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; Hascal R. Brill, Judge.

J. H. Southall was convicted of larceny, and appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an indictment for statutory larceny (formerly designated as obtaining money, etc., by false pretenses), under subdivision 1, § 6709, Gen. St. 1894, it is not necessary to use the exact words, ‘with intent to defraud.’ Equivalent language will suffice. An allegation that the defendant unlawfully, knowingly, etc., and with an intent to deprive the true owner of his property, by means, color, and aid of certain false writings and representations, then and there known to the defendant to be false, amounts to an allegation of an intent to defraud.

2. The crime was alleged to have been committed in part by means of certain false writings called ‘time checks.’ Evidence that defendant had circulated other similar false time checks, which he knew to be false, was competent, as tending to prove guilty knowledge and criminal intent in circulating the checks, by means of which the defendant committed the crime charged.

3. The false representation need not be oral, where the crime is committed by means of false writings. Offering the paper for sale or as security for a loan of money may, of itself, amount to a false representation. Where the crime is committed by means of a false writing, it is not necessary that the writing is one which, if genuine, would be of legal validity.

4. Neither is it necessary that the false pretense or representation should be one which was calculated to deceive men of ordinary intelligence or business prudence. A false pretense or representation is to be weighed by its effect, and one calculated to deceive or defraud the weak and ignorant is as obnoxious to the law as one adapted to deceive the strong and intelligent. Nelson & Bramhall, for appellant.

W. B. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Horace E. Bigelow, Co. Atty., for the State.

MITCHELL, J.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted, under subdivision 1, § 6709, Gen. St., of grand larceny in the first degree, committed by means which, prior to the adoption of the Penal Code, was designated as obtaining money, etc., by false pretenses. This subdivision, together with the preceding and closing parts of the section, which are applicable to both subdivisions, reads, so far as here material, as follows: ‘A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person, either (1) takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person; or obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing; * * * any money,’ etc., ‘steals such property, and is guilty of larceny.’ The first clause of subdivision 1 was evidently intended to apply to common-law larceny, and the second clause to what was designated as obtaining money, etc., by false pretenses. Subdivision 2 was intended to apply to what was designated as ‘embezzlement.’ Then the definition of ‘larceny,’ as applied to this case, would be as follows: ‘A person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, obtains possession of it from the true owner by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation or pretense, or of any false token or writing, steals such property, and is guilty of larceny.’

The indictment is too long to be quoted in full, but the most important part of it reads as follows: ‘Did wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, knowingly, designedly, and with intent then and there had and entertained by him, the said J. H. Southall, to deprive the true owner of his property, by means, color, and aid of certain false writings, and false and fraudulent pretenses and representations, obtain,’ etc. The indictment also alleged that the defendant then and there well knew that, in truth and fact, said writings, pretenses, and representations were false and untrue. The objection to the indictment is that it does not allege an intent to ‘defraud,’ which is of the essence of the crime charged. It is undoubtedly true that the words, ‘with intent to deprive’ a person of his property, when standing alone, do not necessarily imply an ‘intent to defraud’ him of it; but an intent, knowingly and designedly, to deprive him of it by means, color, and aid of false writings, and false and fraudulent pretenses and representations, known at the time to be false, necessarily involves and includes an intent to defraud. It is unnecessary to use in an indictment the precise words of the statute. Words that are equivalent to, and synonymous with, them are sufficient. If the allegations of the indictment are true, the defendant must have done what he did with intent to defraud.

The word ‘defraud,’ as used in this section, applies to its second subdivision as well as the first; but in State v. Comings, 54 Minn. 359, 56 N. W. 50, we held that the word was not necessary, in an indictment...