State v. Spayde

Decision Date13 December 1899
Citation80 N.W. 1058,110 Iowa 726
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA v. J. M. SPAYDE, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Webster District Court.--HON. B. P. BIRDSALL, Judge.

INDICTMENT for forgery. From a verdict and judgment of guilty, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Wright & Nugent and Prouty, Coyle & Prouty for appellant.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, and Chas. A. Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

DEEMER J. GRANGER, J., not sitting.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

Defendant was first indicted by the grand jury of Humboldt county. A trial was commenced, a jury impaneled and sworn, the evidence of the state adduced, and the defendant had testified, in his own behalf, that he had affixed the signature to the note which it is claimed was forged in Webster county. Thereupon the court trying the case ordered the jury discharged, and held the defendant to bail to answer to a warrant from Webster county. This action of the court was objected to by the defendant, who insisted that, as there was evidence tending to show that the crime was committed in Humboldt county, he was entitled to a verdict of the jury thereon. The objection was overruled, and from the ruling the defendant appealed to this court. This appeal has not, however, been presented as yet, and with that we have nothing to do, except in so far as it may affect the further proceedings. Thereafter the grand jury of Webster county returned an indictment against defendant, charging him with the same forgery covered by the indictment in Humboldt county. The trial from which this appeal was taken was held in Webster county upon this second indictment. To that indictment the defendant pleaded not guilty and a former acquittal in the district court of Humboldt county. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and by a special interrogatory found that the blanks in the note which it is claimed was forged were filled out by defendant in Webster county.

Several matters are presented on appeal, but, as we view the case, it is not necessary to consider all of them. The first point argued is that defendant was placed in jeopardy in Humboldt county, and that the discharge of the jury operated as an acquittal of the offense charged. There is no doubt that this position is correct, if the district court of that county had jurisdiction of the offense. If it did not have jurisdiction then the discharge of the jury, and the order holding the defendant to answer to whatever indictment might be presented by the grand jury of Webster county, was authorized by sections 5389 and 5391 of the Code, which provide, in substance, that, if the offense was committed within the exclusive jurisdiction of another county of the state, the court may discharge the jury, and direct the defendant to be committed for such time as shall be reasonable to await a warrant from the proper county, or, if the offense be bailable, he may be admitted to bail, etc. The pivotal questions, then, are: (1) Did the district court of Humboldt county have jurisdiction of the offense? (2) Was the offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court of Webster county?

At the trial in Humboldt county the state adduced evidence to show that the offense was committed in that county, and the trial court was evidently satisfied when the state rested its case that it had jurisdiction. Defendant then went on the stand and testified that he did not sign the name in Humboldt county. Thereupon, on motion of the county attorney, and against the objections of defendant, the court made the order to which we have referred. If the evidence as to venue is undisputed, and that evidence shows that the court does not have jurisdiction, then it is clearly the duty of the court to discharge the defendant, and it may make the order authorized by the sections of the statute to which we have referred. But if the evidence is in dispute, or if the state has adduced evidence tending to show venue, then the question is for the jury, and the defendant is entitled to their verdict. That rule is peculiarly applicable to the facts disclosed by the record before us. Here, as we have said, there was evidence on the part of the state tending to show jurisdiction in the Humboldt district court and the only evidence to the contrary on which the court assumed to act was the bare statement of defend and that he did not sign the name "Franklin Rowe" in Humboldt county. That statement may have been absolutely true, and yet the defendant may have been guilty of forging the note in Humboldt county. The evidence shows that the note which it is claimed was forged was partly printed and partly in writing. It had no legal efficacy until the blanks were filled, and the promise given apparent legal effect. Had the defendant signed the name to the printed blank in Webster county, and afterwards filled up the blanks in Humboldt county, there can be no doubt, we think, that he would have been guilty of forgery, and...

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2 cases
  • State v. Spayde
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1899
  • McEnery v. McEnery
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1899
    ... ... his home and farm, executed a writing as follows: "For ... value received, I, Mathew McEnery, of Monroe county, state of ... Iowa, do hereby sell unto my son William J. McEnery, of said ... county, all the horses, mares, colts, cattle, hogs, wagons, ... vehicles ... ...

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