State v. Spies, 02-1991.
Citation | 672 N.W.2d 792 |
Decision Date | 17 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-1991.,02-1991. |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Samuel John SPIES, Appellant. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Robert DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Samuel John Spies appeals his convictions for possession and delivery of methamphetamine. Spies claims there was insufficient evidence presented at his bench trial to sustain the delivery conviction. He also alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel, because his attorney failed to ensure he adequately waived his right to a jury trial. We reject Spies' sufficiency claim, find his trial attorney did not fail to perform an essential duty, and affirm his convictions.
Last June, an anonymous informant told Ankeny police a man in the parking lot of Loco Joe's (a local pool hall and arcade) tried to sell him "crank." The tipster gave police the man's license plate number. The police investigated and discovered the plate was registered to Spies.
The police dispatched Officer Curtis Pote to Loco Joe's. Officer Pote had training and experience in the investigation of the illegal narcotics trade. He recognized "crank" as the street-name for methamphetamine, a controlled substance. See Iowa Code § 124.401 (2001) ( ).
Pote found Spies' vehicle, but not the man himself. Working undercover, Pote went into Loco Joe's and found Spies playing pool. Biding his time, Pote waited for Spies to leave. When Spies left, Pote followed him to his car and asked him if he could give him "any stuff." Spies said he didn't know what Pote was talking about.
Pote told Spies a man inside Loco Joe's had told him Spies could "hook [him] up with some crank." Spies asked Pote who the man was, and Pote replied he didn't know. Spies told Pote to go back into Loco Joe's and point him out.
Once inside, Pote briefly looked around, and then told Spies he couldn't find the man who had directed him to Spies. Spies asked Pote what he wanted. Pote said he "was looking for a teener."1 Spies said he "might be able to help" Pote, but he didn't know Pote. Spies asked Pote if he was a "narc," which the latter denied.
Pote asked Spies how much a "teener" would cost. Spies told Pote it would cost him $100. At trial, Pote testified that in his training and experience, a "teener" generally costs $100 in the illegal narcotics business.
Spies then told Pote Pote attempted to confirm the deal: "You're getting me a teener for one hundred dollars?" Spies confirmed the deal, and agreed to meet Pote back in the parking lot in a half-hour.
Once Spies left, Pote radioed his fellow officers and instructed them not to stop Spies. Pote wanted to be able to follow Spies, presumably to his supplier. Another officer misunderstood Pote's request, however, and arrested Spies on an unrelated warrant.
At the police station, Spies asked Pote if he could make a call. Spies did not ask Pote to leave the room, however, and Pote overheard Spies ask someone "to go get the stuff out of the middle drawer of [Spies'] dresser." Spies said, "You'll know what it is when you see it."
Pote confronted Spies, and asked him if he had drugs or drug paraphernalia in his dresser. Spies admitted he did, and consented to a search of his residence. Spies and Pote went to Spies' place, and Spies showed Pote drug paraphernalia and .25 grams of methamphetamine.
Spies was charged with three offenses: conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6), 124.401(5) (2001). Spies filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial, which both he and his attorney signed. The trial transcript reveals the court also mentioned this waiver to counsel just before trial, although the court did not conduct a colloquy with Spies. After a bench trial, the district court convicted Spies of the delivery and possession charges. The court acquitted Spies of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.
On appeal, we are presented with two issues: (1) Did the State present sufficient evidence to sustain Spies' conviction for delivery of a controlled substance? and (2) Was Spies denied effective assistance of counsel, because of an inadequate jury trial waiver?
Spies contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, he delivered a controlled substance. In order to convict Spies, the State needed to prove (1) Spies delivered methamphetamine and (2) Spies knew the substance he was delivering was a controlled substance. Iowa Code § 124.401; State v. Moore, 529 N.W.2d 264, 265 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Osmundson, 241 N.W.2d 892, 893 (Iowa 1976)). The Code defines "deliver" and "delivery" as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship." Iowa Code § 124.101(7) (emphasis added).
We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for errors at law. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 569 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2003)). A finding of guilt is binding upon us so long as there is substantial evidence to support it. State v. Lambert, 612 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 2000). "If a rational finder of fact could conceivably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is substantial." Id. "We review the record in the `light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and assumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record.'" Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 569 (quoting State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002)).
Spies contends that, in order to sustain the delivery conviction, the State needed to prove the existence of the contraband to be sold, i.e., a teener, or the identity of a supplier. Spies points out the State failed to prove either. In the absence of these two facts, Spies alleges the record is barren of any criminality. There is, Spies posits, insufficient evidence to show he intended to keep his promise to Pote. Moreover, Spies' uncorroborated admissions, standing alone, are insufficient to sustain his conviction. See State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d 462, 466 n. 1 (Iowa 2003)
(citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89, 75 S.Ct. 158, 162, 99 L.Ed. 101, 106 (1954)) ("admissions made after the crime must also be supported with sufficient corroborating evidence").
We reject Spies' sufficiency challenge. We have previously held proof of possession is not necessary for proof of delivery. State v. Welch, 507 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Iowa 1993) (); State v. Grady, 215 N.W.2d 213, 214 (1974) (); accord State v. Miller, 535 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa Ct.App.1995)
(. ) Nor must the State prove the identity of the defendant's supplier. Iowa Code chapter 124 does not expressly mandate that proof of delivery requires proof of either possession or the identity of a supplier from which possession may be secured. Because "deliver" and "delivery" are defined as "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance," and transfer is defined as "the conveyance of right, title or interest in either real or personal property from one person to another by sale, gift, or other process" it is sufficient if the defendant attempted to transfer contraband from one person to another. Iowa Code § 124.101(7); Grady, 215 N.W.2d at 214 (citations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find there is substantial evidence, which does not solely consist of uncorroborated admissions, to show Spies attempted to transfer methamphetamine to Pote. In proving an attempt, the State need only show a rational trier of could find
(1) an intent to do an act or bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and
(2) an act in furtherance of that intent which ... goes beyond mere preparation.
4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice, Criminal Law § 10.3, at 232 (2003) (footnote omitted); accord State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 1040-45, 188 N.W. 709, 712-15 (1922); see also Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1982)
().
The record shows a rational trier of fact could find Spies (1) intended to transfer methamphetamine to Pote and (2) committed an overt act furthering that intent. Shortly after meeting Pote, Spies participated in a conversation which is consistent with someone attempting to transfer methamphetamine: Spies asked Pote what he needed. When asked how much a teener of crank would cost, Spies said $100, the going-rate for such an amount of methamphetamine. Because Spies did not have the drugs with him, he asked Pote if he could use his cell phone in order to arrange the sale. In addition to the mere fact of the call, Spies' side of the conversation clearly shows he was attempting to sell drugs...
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