State v. Springmann

• Decision Date: 30 April 2002
• Docket Number: (AC 20316)
• Citation: 69 Conn. App. 400,794 A.2d 1071
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN SPRINGMANN, JR.

69 Conn. App. 400

794 A.2d 1071

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN SPRINGMANN, JR.

(AC 20316)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 11, 2001.

Officially released April 30, 2002.

Landau, Schaller and Dupont, Js. Cameron Dorman, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul E. Murray, state's attorney, and Elizabeth C. Learning, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, John Springmann, Jr., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53-21, as amended by Public Acts 1995, No. 95-142, § 1.¹ The defendant claims that (1) § 53-21 is unconstitutionally vague because providing alcohol to a minor under certain circumstances may be permitted under General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 30-86,² (2) § 53-21 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad with respect to the display of pornographic material to minors, (3) the court improperly admitted pornographic videos and (4) the defendant's right to due process was violated when the trial court improperly failed to disclose exculpatory material after an in camera review of a victim's confidential records. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 1993, one of the minor victims, C, was removed from her home, following allegations that her father had sexually assaulted her. C's father committed suicide in 1993 following the allegations. Her mother had abandoned the family several years earlier. C was placed by the department of children and families (department) under the care of her aunt and uncle in late 1993. In November, 1995, the relationship between C and the aunt and uncle became intolerable, and the aunt and uncle requested that she be placed immediately in another home.

In November, 1995, C was placed by the department in the care of the defendant. C was fifteen years old at the time of her placement with the defendant. The defendant resided in a house owned by D. The defendant and D had an especially close relationship, similar to that of a mother and son. When C moved into the home, the defendant's girlfriend and their baby were also living at D's residence. The defendant's girlfriend and their baby moved out shortly after C moved into the home.

The defendant and C had a tumultuous relationship due to disciplinary issues such as curfew. C enrolled in high school when she moved into the defendant's residence. Several days prior to beginning school, C and the defendant were sitting on the defendant's bed, and the defendant asked her if she had been a willing participant when she was sexually abused by her father. C responded that she was not, grew uncomfortable with the conversation and pretended to fall asleep. Later that evening, the defendant showed C episodes one and two of an animated Japanese pornographic movie entitled "Return of the Overfiend" on the videocassette recorder and television in the defendant's bedroom.

Two or three days later, C missed the school bus and returned to bed. When she arose around noon, C entered the defendant's bedroom and found the defendant playing a video game on his computer. The defendant gave C a fifth of whiskey to drink. C had not eaten that day and she drank half of the bottle quickly. C became intoxicated and tired. She passed in and out of consciousness several times. When C awoke, she and the defendant watched parts one, two and three of a liveaction, pornographic videotape entitled "Taboo" in the defendant's bedroom.

In November, 1995, the defendant and C drove to Massachusetts to pick up two of C's friends for a weekend visit at the defendant's residence. One of the friends who visited that weekend was the other victim, E. E was fourteen years old at the time of the incident. Shortly after they arrived at the defendant's residence, the defendant gave the three girls some beer and they watched a horror movie. E had two to three beers and C consumed five to six beers. This was the first time that C had consumed beer and she became intoxicated. The third girl, M, also consumed five to six beers.³

The next day, the defendant and the three girls were in the defendant's room. The defendant, C and M began playing a game of truth or dare, which involves daring a player to perform some act or to answer truthfully a question. Prior to the game, C drank two or three beers. During the game, the defendant dared C to dance in a sexual way and she refused. The defendant then dared C to simulate oral sex on a Coke bottle, and C performed that act. The defendant also dared C to lick something while blindfolded, and C also performed that act. C then took the blindfold off and learned that she had licked a picture of a nude woman's genitals.

At some point during the weekend, the three girls were in the defendant's bedroom watching a movie with the defendant. The defendant then played an animated Japanese pornographic videotape. The defendant told the girls that he would take M and E back to Massachusetts if they did not watch the movie. M and C were drinking while they watched the movie. E thought that the movie was strange and it made her feel uncomfortable.

In June, 1996, C started drinking heavily and at times the defendant supplied her with alcohol. On one occasion, C testified that she came home drunk and entered the bedroom of the defendant. He was playing a game on his computer and told C that she should not go upstairs because she might awaken D. The defendant warned that if D woke up and learned that C was drunk, she would be upset. After C turned on the defendant's television, the defendant began to play a pornographic movie.

In June, 1996, the defendant furnished beer and other alcohol to C while she had friends visit the defendant's residence. C became intoxicated on that occasion. Also, in June, 1996, the defendant went to National Guard training in Texas, and C continued to drink heavily.

In October, 1996, an argument ensued between the defendant, D and C. C called the police and made allegations to the police and department representatives involving the defendant's behavior. As a result of these allegations, on October 17, 1996, C was removed from the defendant's residence.

On November 14, 1996, the police executed a search warrant and seized among other items, forty-five videotapes from the defendant's bedroom. Subsequently, C identified fourteen videotapes that were shown to her by the defendant. Eleven of these videotapes were pornographic in nature, and C testified at trial that she had seen them in their entirety or portions of them in the defendant's bedroom during various activities.

The defendant was found guilty by a jury of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 with respect to E.⁴ The defendant was also found guilty of three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 with respect to C.⁵

The jury found the defendant not guilty of four counts of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1), one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1), one count of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70a (a) (1), five counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 and one count of threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62.

The defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of fifteen years imprisonment, execution suspended after seven years and five years probation. Additional facts will be set forth where necessary to address the issues on appeal.

I

The defendant first claims that § 53-21 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his conduct of permitting a minor under his supervision to consume alcohol. The defendant was convicted of one count of wilfully providing alcoholic beverages to C in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) during the period from November 3, 1995, to October 18, 1996. The defendant was also convicted of wilfully providing alcoholic beverages to E in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1) during the period from November 24, 1995, to November 26, 1995.

"The void for vagueness doctrine accords due process protection in that it requires statutes (1) to provide fair notice of the conduct governed by them and (2) to prescribe minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.... The defendant must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute, as applied to him, deprived him of adequate notice of what conduct the statute proscribed or that he fell victim to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (Citation omitted.) State v. Hopkins, 62 Conn. App. 665, 675-76, 772 A.2d 657 (2001).

The defendant claims that § 53-21 is unconstitutionally vague because the alleged conduct of providing alcohol to a minor is permissible under § 30-86⁶ and, therefore, he did not have adequate notice that the delivery of alcohol to the minors was prohibited. We do not agree.

The defendant argues that the present case is similar to State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 471 A.2d 632, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 801, 105 S. Ct. 55, 83 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1984). The Perruccio court found that § 53-21 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant because consensual sexual relations were permissible under General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) at the time that the events occurred. State v. Perruccio, supra, 163-65. The Perruccio court concluded that fair notice of the statutory requirements of § 53-21 was not afforded to the defendant because the activity was permitted under another statute. Perruccio is not applicable here because the defendant's activities were not permitted under § 30-86.

Section 30-86 prohibits the sale or delivery of alcohol to any minor, but provides an exception for delivery...