State v. Hopkins

• Decision Date: 10 April 2001
• Docket Number: (AC 19884)
• Citation: 772 A.2d 657,62 Conn. App. 665
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HOWARD E. HOPKINS
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

62 Conn. App. 665

772 A.2d 657

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HOWARD E. HOPKINS

(AC 19884)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued January 25, 2001.

Officially released April 10, 2001.

Foti, Schaller and Dupont, JS. Vicki H. Hutchinson, for the appellant (defendant).

Christopher T. Godialis, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Walter D. Flanagan, state's attorney, and Patricia M. Froehlich, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

DUPONT, J.

The defendant, Howard E. Hopkins, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 and threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62. The defendant claims that (1) the evidence of threatening was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the admission of certain letters he sent to the victim violated his first amendment rights, (3) § 53a-183 (a) (2) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a nonfinancial condition of the defendant's pretrial release on bond and (5) a condition of his pretrial release on bond and of his probation impinges on his religious freedom. We affirm the judgment of the court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The victim and the defendant attended the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Newtown. In addition to being a member of the church, the victim also taught religious education there. The defendant's son was a student in the victim's class at the church. The victim and the defendant exchanged brief pleasantries when they passed one another. A few passing "hellos" was the extent of their contact until the events that are the subject of the criminal charges in this case took place.

Beginning in January, 1995, the defendant mailed the victim unwanted letters and other items. The defendant mailed at least twenty-one letters,¹ varying in length and content, a scarf, a teddy bear and poems. The letters, amounting to no fewer than 139 pages, were replete with declarations of love, marriage proposals, hundreds of pleas for forgiveness, religious teachings, employment discussions and other topics.

The victim repeatedly expressed to the defendant that she wanted him to stop mailing her letters, and the defendant was well aware of her wishes. The victim complained to the church bishop several times after she received the initial letters. The defendant testified that the bishop had yelled at him after the victim had complained about the first letter. The third letter frightened the victim, and she spoke again to church officials. The bishop, the victim, two counselors and the defendant subsequently attended a meeting to address his behavior. According to the victim's testimony, at that meeting she explained to the defendant in clear, simple language and in short sentences to avoid confusion or misunderstanding that she wanted no contact with him. She told him that she had no interest in him, that what he was doing was wrong, that his letters and actions offended her, and that he was to leave her alone. The defendant's letters reveal that he also understood that his actions were offensive, unwelcome and blatantly inappropriate, that the victim had no interest in him, that he had received repeated warnings and that future contact with her could result in his excommunication from the church. The defendant remained undeterred and continued to send letters despite the victim's unequivocal demands to leave her alone.

The victim received a letter dated July 9, 1998, that caused her to contact the police. In that letter, the defendant informed the victim that it was the fourth letter in twenty-three days since a church official had advised against further contact with her. The letter states: "When I spoke with [the church president], he counseled me that it would not be wise to contact you. His advice did not induce even a moment's hesitation. This is my fourth letter in the twenty-three days since then." The police advised the victim that they could arrest the defendant immediately or warn him that further contact would result in his arrest. The victim opted for the latter, and the police subsequently telephoned the defendant to warn him that his actions violated the law, and told him to cease sending letters.

Several weeks later, the victim received a five page, single-spaced typewritten letter from the defendant dated August 5, 1998. The defendant also enclosed a scarf on which he had silk screened one of his poems. The letter, unlike the previous twenty-two, bore an invented return address and the writing on the envelope did not resemble the defendant's handwriting. The victim did not know that the defendant was the sender until she opened the letter because of the masked handwriting and fictitious return address. In that letter, the defendant referenced his encounter with the police. He wrote: "I got a call from an officer of the Danbury Police Department.... He advised me against writing you any more letters, making any phone calls, or driving by your house. He told me that if you made another complaint, he would have no choice but to arrest me." Later in that letter, the defendant explained that he dismissed the officer's warning because he believed the officer was simply one of the victim's friends and, therefore, not acting in an official capacity.

The August 5, 1998 letter provided the basis for the threatening charge. It states in relevant part: "[U]nderstand that I have been awake for a long time, and I am starting to suffer from it. Sadly, due to the extremity of the current situation, the intent of my method is to tear your heart out so you can take a look at it. I am sorrowful beyond words at this."

The police arrested the defendant, and the state charged him with harassment in the second degree and threatening. On April 14, 1999, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges. On July 15, 1999, the court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of fifteen months incarceration, execution suspended, three years probation and a $250 fine. This appeal followed. We will supply additional facts where the discussions warrant.

I

The defendant first claims that the state did not produce sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the threatening charge. The defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim has two prongs. The first is that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that he threatened the victim, and the second is that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that he ever placed the victim in fear of imminent serious physical injury. We disagree.

Our standard of review is well settled. A defendant who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears an arduous burden. We first review the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and then must decide whether the jury reasonably could have concluded as it did. State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 622, 678 A.2d 473 (1996).

Pursuant to § 53a-62 (a), "[a] person is guilty of threatening when: (1) By physical threat, he intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury...." The defendant claims that the evidence did not support the jury's conclusion that he threatened the victim. The August 5, 1998 letter formed the basis for the threatening charge. The state relied principally on the following language from that letter: "the intent of my method is to tear your heart out."

A

The defendant maintains that he intended the words only figuratively and not as a physical threat. He argues that his language is comparable to phrases such as "eat your heart out" or "tug at one's heartstrings." The defendant testified at trial that his intention was always "twofold, to obtain her forgiveness and to encourage her continuing relationship with the church." The defendant's argument as to the intent of his words was a question of fact uniquely for the jury to resolve. State v. Torwich, 38 Conn. App. 306, 314, 661 A.2d 113, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 905, 665 A.2d 906 (1995). "Intent may be, and usually is, inferred from conduct.... and whether such an inference should be drawn was properly a question for the jury to decide." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sober, 166 Conn. 81, 92-93, 347 A.2d 61 (1974).

The jury reasonably could have rejected the defendant's proclamations as to his intent. The defendant sent the threatening letter immediately following a police warning not to contact the victim again. The defendant, for the first time, disguised his handwriting on the envelope. The defendant also falsified the return address for the first time. The letter reveals a sense of frustration that the victim had contacted the police.² In the several months preceding the August 5, 1998 letter, the frequency of the letters and poems increased. Indeed, during the four months preceding the threatening letter, the defendant wrote letters and poems dated April 15, May 2, May 3, May 19, May 25, June 17, June 25, July 1, July 9 and August 5, 1998. We cannot conclude that the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict indicates any infirmity in the jury's conclusion. The jury had before it sufficient evidence to conclude that the words at issue revealed the defendant's intent to threaten the victim and not merely to convey a figurative expression.

B

The defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the element of "fear of imminent serious physical injury." He argues that the victim's delay in both contacting and actually speaking with the police negates the possibility that she feared for her physical safety. We disagree.

As previously discussed, we evaluate the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn...