State v. Springs

• Docket Number: COA23-9
• Decision Date: 16 January 2024
• Parties: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTONIO DEMONT SPRINGS
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ANTONIO DEMONT SPRINGS

No. COA23-9

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

January 16, 2024

Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 August 2023.

Appeal by State from Order rendered 23 August 2022 by Judge Jesse B Caldwell, IV in Mecklenburg County Superior Court Nos. 21 CRS 215042-43, 45.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden W. Hayes, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Michele A. Goldman, for Defendant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State appeals from an orally rendered Order granting a Motion to Suppress filed by Antonio Demont Springs (Defendant) and suppressing evidence seized during a traffic stop. The Record before us tends to reflect the following:

On 17 May 2021, an Officer with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department initiated a stop of Defendant's vehicle on suspicion of a fictitious tag. When the Officer pulled over Defendant and approached the car, he observed Defendant "fumbling through to get some paperwork" with his hands "shaking," and noted Defendant appeared "very nervous." Defendant was the only person in the car. Defendant gave the Officer his identification card and the car's paperwork. The Officer determined the car was not stolen, but Defendant was driving on a revoked license. The Officer returned to Defendant's vehicle and asked him "about the odor of marijuana in the vehicle." Defendant denied smoking marijuana in the car, prompting the following exchange:

Officer: You didn't have a blunt earlier or anything?

Defendant: No. I just got the car from my homeboy. That's probably why.

Officer: Is that why it smells like weed in here?

Defendant: Yeah-

Officer: -because he might have smoked a blunt or something earlier?

Defendant: Yeah.

The Officer then asked Defendant to get out of the car. Defendant did so and took some belongings with him, including a cellphone, cigarettes, and a Crown Royal bag. The Officer took Defendant's items and put them in the driver's seat of the car to pat down Defendant for weapons. After the search and finding no weapons, the Officer returned Defendant's cellphone and cigarettes, but opened and searched the Crown Royal bag. In the bag, the Officer found a digital scale, a green leafy substance, two baggies of white powder, and "numerous baggies of colorful pills[.]"

On 24 May 2021, Defendant was subsequently indicted for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Trafficking in Drugs, and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver a Controlled Substance based on this evidence. On 17 August 2022, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence from the Crown Royal bag, arguing the Officer lacked probable cause to search the car, and consequently, lacked probable cause to search the bag.

Specifically, at the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on 23 August 2022, Defendant contended that because hemp, which Defendant argued is indistinguishable from marijuana in odor and appearance, is legal in North Carolina, the odor of marijuana alone was no longer sufficient to establish probable cause for the ensuing searches. The State argued that binding precedent in this state holds that marijuana odor alone per se supports a finding of probable cause to support a search. Further, the State asserted even presuming odor alone was insufficient, the Officer had additional evidence supporting probable cause, including Defendant's "fidgety" behavior, the fact Defendant was driving with a fictitious tag and without a valid license, and Defendant's agreement marijuana may have been smoked in the car earlier, which the trial court characterized as "an acknowledgment, if not an admission" marijuana had been smoked in the car.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally granted Defendant's Motion. In rendering its ruling, the trial court stated: "So I think that the standards set forth in Parker^[1] which is abbreviated odor plus is certainly the appropriate standard to use here." The trial court acknowledged "the odor of something that could be marijuana but might be CBD or hemp or a legal hemp-related product is certainly an issue or a consideration for law enforcement to make note of when evaluating or trying to reach probable cause." The trial court further acknowledged, "[a]nd in this circumstance arguably there were additional factors to consider" including the traffic violations and the acknowledgment "that weed, bud, the colloquial for marijuana, was smoked in the vehicle previously." The trial court, however, concluded: "I just think in the totality here and given the new world that we live in, that odor plus is the standard and we didn't get the plus here. There was no probable cause."

The State filed written Notice of Appeal on 29 August 2022. The Notice of Appeal, however, stated the appeal was from an order "grant[ing] the defendant's motion to dismiss[.]" Two days later, on 31 August 2022, the State filed a Certification, certifying that the appeal was not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence suppressed is essential to the case.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The parties do not address appellate jurisdiction in their briefing to this Court. However, the State's Notice of Appeal, the later Certification of its interlocutory appeal failure to include a Statement of Grounds for Appellate Review in its brief, failure to address our authority to review an orally-rendered order granting a Motion to Suppress, and overall failure to provide this Court with any jurisdictional basis to review this matter requires this Court examine the basis for our appellate jurisdiction. See State v. Webber, 190 N.C.App. 649, 650, 660 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2008) ("It is well-established that the issue of a court's jurisdiction over a matter may be raised at any time, even . . . by a court sua sponte.").

First, "when a [party] has not properly given notice of appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal." State v. McCoy, 171 N.C.App. 636, 638, 615 S.E.2d 319, 320 (2005). Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure sets out the requirements for a notice of appeal in criminal cases. See N.C. R. App. P. 4 (2023). Relevant to this case, Rule 4(b) provides the requisite contents of a written notice of appeal:

The notice of appeal required to be filed and served . . . shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken; and shall be signed by counsel of record for the party or parties taking the appeal, or by any such party not represented by counsel of record.

N.C. R. App. P 4(b) (emphasis added). "Our Supreme Court has said that a jurisdictional default, such as a failure to comply with Rule 4, 'precludes the appellate court from acting in any manner other than to dismiss the appeal.'" State v. Hammonds, 218 N.C.App. 158, 162, 720 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2012) (quoting Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 197, 657 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2008)).

Here, the State's Notice of Appeal indicates it is from an order granting "the defendant's motion to dismiss[.]" No such order appears in the Record. Rather, the State's arguments focus entirely on the grant of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. We acknowledge, however," 'a mistake in designating the judgment . . . should not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appeal is not misled by the mistake[.]'" Stephenson v. Bartlett, 177 N.C.App. 239, 241, 628 S.E.2d 442, 443 (2006) (quoting Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C.App. 153, 156-57, 392 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1990)).

Our Court has observed that granting a motion to suppress-even of evidence which is essential to the State's case-is not synonymous with dismissal of the case. See State v. Romano, 268 N.C.App. 440, 447, 836 S.E.2d 760, 768 (2019) (affirming denial of a motion to dismiss at trial because "[e]ven though this Court and our Supreme Court agreed the trial court properly suppressed the evidence, that did not impede the State from proceeding to trial without the suppressed evidence since our appellate courts' decisions on the motion to suppress were made prior to trial."); see also State v. Fowler, 197 N.C.App. 1, 28-29, 676 S.E.2d 523, 545 (2009) ("A trial court's decision to grant a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 'does not mandate a pretrial dismissal of the underlying indictments' because '[t]he district attorney may elect to dismiss or proceed to trial without the suppressed evidence and attempt to establish a prima facie case.'" (quoting State v. Edwards, 185 N.C.App. 701, 706, 649 S.E.2d 646, 650 (2007))).

Indeed this highlights a second jurisdictional issue: the State's appeal is from an interlocutory order. See Romano, 268 N.C.App. at 445, 836 S.E.2d at 767 (an order granting a motion to suppress is an interlocutory-not final-decision). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) provides the State a statutory right of appeal from an Order denying a motion to suppress prior to trial "upon certificate by the prosecutor to the judge who granted the motion that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is essential to the case." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(c) (2021). This Court has recognized Section 15A-979(c) "not only requires the State to raise its right to appeal according to the statutory mandate, but also places the burden on the State to demonstrate that it had done so." State v. Dobson, 51 N.C.App. 445, 447, 276 S.E.2d 480, 482 (1981). Similarly, Rule 28(b)(4) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requires: "An appellant's brief shall contain . . . [a] statement of the...