State v. Stakenburg
| Decision Date | 20 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 56267,56267 |
| Citation | 215 N.W.2d 265 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Leonard John STAKENBURG, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
C. J. Matthiessen, Monticello, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Dennis E. Jontz, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David Remley, Jones County Atty., for appellee.
Submitted to MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ.
This appeal involves a sentence imposed on a plea of guilty to a charge of escape under Code 1973, § 745.1:
'If any person committed to . . . the men's . . . reformatory shall . . . leave without due authority any . . . place whatsoever in which . . . he is allowed to be by the warden or any officer or employee of the prison whether inside or outside of the prison walls, he shall be deemed guilty of an escape from said . . . reformatory and shall be punished by imprisonment in said . . . reformatory for a term not to exceed five years, to commence from and after the expiration of the term of his previous sentence.
The indeterminate sentence statute does not apply to this crime. § 789.13.
Defendant Leonard John Stakenburg was serving a ten-year sentence in the Iowa reformatory for robbery. With the warden's permission, he and some other prisoners attended an athletic event outside the reformatory in the company of officers. During the event, defendant departed without authority from the officers. While at large, he committed the crime of kidnapping. He was convicted of that crime in a federal court and was sentenced to Fort Leavenworth penitentiary.
The county attorney of Jones County, Iowa, charged defendant with escape. After defendant demanded immediate trial on that charge, the county attorney obtained a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and secured defendant's presence for trial.
Defendant appeared before the trial court on the escape charge, and the court appointed an attorney for him. After consulting with his attorney, defendant pleaded guilty. The trial court held hearing, accepted the plea, and sentenced defendant to five years in the reformatory, to commence on expiration of the robbery sentence. Defendant appealed, assigning several errors. His basic complaint is that the sentence is too severe.
I. Defendant first asserts that the trial court may have seen him manacled in the custody of two federal marshals, causing the trial court to think he is a dangerous man and should receive the maximum sentence. But the record contains no support for the claim that the trial court did so see defendant. See State v. Lynch, 200 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa). We do not intimate that this assigned error would be valid if the record gave factual support to defendant's assertion.
II. Defendant next asserts that the trial court should not have admitted testimony about defendant's post-escape conviction of kidnapping. The record does not show the trial court did admit such testimony, but the court unquestionably knew about that matter. Defendant's attorney contended then, as he does now, that the trial court should not have considered that matter in connection with the sentence for escape.
Assuming the trial court considered the kidnapping conviction on the question of the appropriate sentence for the escape, we find no error. To pass sentence intelligently, a trial court needs full information about the accused, whether that information derives from events prior or subsequent to the crime presently charged. As stated in State v. DeRaad, 164 N.W.2d 108, 112--113 (Iowa):
The trial court had the right, within the limits provided by this statute, to fix such punishment for the crime as it thought defendant deserved. Unless there is error in the sentence by reason of failure to follow a specific statutory provision or there is abuse of discretion, we do not interfere with the sentence. . . .
State v. Cupples, supra (260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280).
This court dealt with the problem of an offense committed after the one presently charged in the case of State v. Myers, 241 Iowa 670, 672, 42 N.W.2d 79, 80. At time of sentence, the prosecutor called the subsequent conviction to the sentencing court's attention. This...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Reaves
...State v. York, 211 N.W.2d 314 (1973); State v. Goodwin, 212 N.W.2d 399 (1973); State v. Kobrock, 213 N.W.2d 481 (1973); State v. Stakenburg, 215 N.W.2d 265 (1974); State v. Reppert, 215 N.W.2d 302 (1974); Ogden v. State, 215 N.W.2d 335 (1974); Allen v. State, 217 N.W.2d 528 (1974); State v.......
-
State v. Remmers
...is left to the trial court's discretion. Such discretion involves consideration of a wide range of factors. See State v. Stakenburg, 215 N.W.2d 265, 266-267 (Iowa 1974) and State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967). The ultimate responsibility of the trial judge is t......
-
State v. Drake
...606, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 1210, 18 L.Ed.2d 326, 328-329 (1967). A sentencing court may consider facts outside of the record, State v. Stakenberg, 215 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1974), including events subsequent to the crime for which sentence is to be pronounced. State v. Summers, 219 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa......
-
State v. Guise
...recidivating, his amenability to supervision in the community, and thus his "propensities and chances of his reform." State v. Stakenburg , 215 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Iowa 1974) ; see Malenchik , 928 N.E.2d at 566 (holding "legitimate offender assessment instruments do not replace but may inform ......