State v. Stallman
| Decision Date | 26 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. C6-93-2156,C6-93-2156 |
| Citation | 519 N.W.2d 903 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jason Edward STALLMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. This city ordinance prohibiting a vehicle from passing a floating, undefined traffic control point in a larger "no-cruising zone" three or more times within a five-hour period with no exceptions for legitimate personal use or business purposes except "delivery service" is an unconstitutional violation of the right to travel because it is not narrowly tailored to significant government objectives.
2. This city ordinance prohibiting a vehicle from passing a floating, undefined traffic control point in a larger, "no-cruising zone" three or more times within a five-hour period is unconstitutionally vague where drivers are not informed of the boundaries of the zone, nor the location of the traffic control points, and the term "cruising" is not in such common usage that a citizen would know what is prohibited.
Carl J. Newquist, Newquist & Ekstrum, Chtd., Fridley, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Robert A. Hoard, Michael J. Scott, Jensen, Hicken, Gedde & Scott, P.A., Anoka City Prosecutor, Anoka, for respondent.
Considered and decided by RANDALL, P.J., and NORTON and KLAPHAKE, JJ.
Appellant Jason Edward Stallman was convicted after a court trial of violating Anoka's "cruising" ordinance, Anoka, Minn., Code of Ordinances Sec. 20-4.5 (1992). We reverse.
On May 6, 1993, at approximately 9:00 p.m., an officer of the Anoka police department selected a "traffic control point" within the city's "cruising zone" and began monitoring traffic at the intersection of Main Street and Branch in the City of Anoka. About 30 minutes later, the officer for the first time observed a red Mercury driven by appellant drive past this now established traffic control point. The officer observed the vehicle travel past him a total of four times within approximately ten minutes. The vehicle was stopped and appellant was issued a petty misdemeanor citation for "cruising" in violation of Anoka's city ordinance Section 20-4.5. Appellant challenged the legality and constitutionality of Anoka's cruising ordinance. After a bench trial, the trial court released an order finding the ordinance constitutional and appellant guilty.
In 1988, Anoka's cruising ordinance was passed in response to an increasing problem with car traffic and loitering on and around Main Street in Anoka. The Anoka police department claims it observed increases in fighting, underage drinking, vandalism, traffic violations, more serious criminal and drug trafficking, and argued that traffic congestion around Main Street was the cause. In addition, the police department claimed emergency vehicles had difficulty getting through the congestion, and had to use alternate, less direct routes to respond to emergency calls, delaying their response time.
Initially, Anoka's mayor appointed a task force to study the problem and recommend solutions. The first recommendation was to eliminate parking on Main Street between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. This action decreased the number of pedestrians, but appeared to increase the cruising. The second recommendation was to barricade Main Street traffic, which only resulted in creating two cruising zones. Finally, the city enacted a cruising ordinance.
Under the first enactment of the ordinance, a warning had to be issued for the first violation. A second violation within six months could result in a citation. This ordinance was ineffective, and costly for the city in terms of police overtime. In 1991, the city amended the ordinance, deleting the warning requirement.
Section 20-4.5 currently provides:
A. Definitions
1. Cruising means the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in Minnesota Statutes 169.01, subd. 3, past a traffic control point three or more times, between the hours of 9:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M. in a "No Cruising Zone."
2. Traffic Control Point means any point or points within a "No Cruising Zone" where cruising is monitored.
3. No Cruising Zone means any street, highway or area so designated by resolution of the Anoka City Council where cruising is prohibited and posted as such.
B. Cruising Prohibited. No person shall operate or permit a motor vehicle under his care, custody or control, to be driven in such a manner so as to constitute cruising.
C. Penalties. A violation of this section shall constitute a petty misdemeanor.
D. Exceptions. This section shall not apply to taxi cabs for hire, buses, authorized emergency vehicles, vehicles used under contract with the City of Anoka, or other vehicles being driven solely for business purposes while engaged in delivery services.
Large signs leading into Anoka state: "Cruising and Loitering Ordinances Are Enforced." On Main Street, signs say "No Cruising 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m." The signs do not indicate the boundaries of the zone. The signs do not indicate that a "traffic control point" is any intersection or any other point the police select to set up temporary monitoring. The police department has the discretion to choose its own traffic control points, stay as little or as long as they want at those points, and then move on. The signs do not state that a driver can pass a traffic control point two or less times without any justification, and the signs do not state the limited exceptions set out in Section 20-4.5.
As established by the city council, the "No Cruising Zone" includes Main Street and one block on each side of Main Street, from a park at one end, to the Anoka city limits.
1. Does Anoka's cruising ordinance violate state law?
2. Is Anoka's cruising ordinance unconstitutional?
Unreasonable regulation of traffic on a state highway by a municipality.
Appellant first argues that Anoka's cruising ordinance conflicts with state traffic law and does not come under one of the enumerated six exceptions where a municipality may regulate driving activities in conflict with state law. See Minn.Stat. Secs. 169.022 and 169.04 (1992). Appellant argues that because cruising is not one of the six exceptions, Anoka does not have the authority to regulate this area.
Respondent argues that state law does not regulate cruising behavior and it need not be listed as one of the six exceptions before a municipality can regulate it. Because of our analysis on the constitutional issue, we do not rest our decision on whether this ordinance conflicts or is in accord with State of Minnesota traffic control law. We agree, however, that it probably does not conflict with state law. Traffic regulations are governed by Minn.Stat. ch. 169 (1992). Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985).
Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.022 provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may adopt traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter; provided, that when any local ordinance regulating traffic covers the same subject for which a penalty is provided for in this chapter, then the penalty provided for violation of said local ordinance shall be identical with the penalty provided for in this chapter for the same offense.
Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.04 provides a list of six exceptions where a municipality may regulate driving activities in conflict with state law.
Appellant argues that because cruising is not one of the six exceptions, Anoka does not have the authority to regulate this area. This argument, however, ignores the language in Minn.Stat. Sec. 169.022 which allows local authorities to "adopt traffic regulations which are not in conflict" with state law. State law does not regulate cruising behavior. Anoka's ordinance probably does not conflict with state law. See Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis.2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163, 168 (App.1993) (), pet. for rev. denied 513 N.W.2d 406 (Wis.1993).
Constitutionality and the void for vagueness test
Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court. See Hibbing Educ. Ass'n, 369 N.W.2d at 529. Where no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the challenged statute or ordinance is presumed constitutional, and the challenger must prove it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn.1983); State v. Hyland, 431 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn.App.1988).
Appellant claims the ordinance violates a fundamental right to intrastate travel. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the fundamental right to interstate travel includes the right to intrastate travel. A federal circuit court, however, found a fundamental right to intrastate travel under substantive due process in a case challenging a local cruising ordinance in York, Pennsylvania. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3rd Cir.1990). The Lutz court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the cruising ordinance and found that the ordinance met that level of scrutiny:
Not every governmental burden on fundamental rights must survive strict scrutiny, however. We believe that reviewing all infringements on the right to travel under strict scrutiny is just as inappropriate as applying no heightened scrutiny to any infringement on the right to travel...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Wicklund
...construction of a state constitutional provision, a question of law that this court may review de novo. See generally State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn.App.1994) (constitutionality of statute is legal issue reviewed de novo by appellate court). Although respondents attempt to fra......
-
State v. Otterstad, No. A05-178 (MN 12/27/2005)
...of Ordinance The constitutionality of an ordinance is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn. App. 1994). Ordinarily, ordinances are "afforded a presumption of constitutionality, [but] ordinances restricting First Amendment rights a......
-
State v. Savitski
...fair warning that the ordinance prohibited the conduct in which she engaged. Id. This court distinguished Reha in State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn. App. 1994). Stallman challenged Anoka's cruising ordinance, where the city prohibitedcars from repeatedly driving up and down Main ......
-
State v. Hunt
...Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759, 86 S. Ct. 1170, 1179 (1966). Minnesota also recognizes the right to intrastate travel. State v. Stallman, 519 N.W.2d 903, 906-07 (Minn. App. 1994). For a statute to impermissibly burden the right to travel, it must affect one of the three components of the right to......