State v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 03 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 921,921
• Citation: 367 A.2d 27,34 Md.App. 393
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Albert Louis STANLEY.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 393

34 Md.App. 393

367 A.2d 27

STATE of Maryland v. Albert Louis STANLEY.

No. 921.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 3, 1977.

Bruce C. Spizler, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom was Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., on the memorandum in behalf of appellant.

James A. Gede, Owings Mills, for appellee.

Argued before GILBERT, C. J., and MORTON and MELVIN, JJ.

GILBERT, Chief Judge.

At the conclusion of a two-day non-jury murder trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the trial judge said:

'There is no question in my mind that under the evidence that is now in front of me, that the State has not made out a case, not even a prima facie case. Therefore, the charges are dismissed against the Defendant.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Ordinarily, those words would have terminated the case of State of Maryland v. Albert Louis Stanley, but this matter the State views as being of a different species. Not content to accept Judge William R. Buchanan's judgment, the State noted an appeal to this Court from 'the Dismissal of (the) Indictment.'

When the record reached us, we requested the State and Stanley to submit memoranda as to the appealability vel non by the State, and we simultaneously scheduled oral argument on the question.

The State grounds its appeal on the basis of Lohss v. State, 272 Md. 113, 321 A.2d 534 (1974), Rev'g, 19 Md.App. 489, 313 A.2d 87 (1973). In that case, Lohss and one Sprenkle were indicted for violating the controlled dangerous substance laws of Maryland. The crux of the State's case before the trial court was eroded beyond repair by the trial judge's suppression of certain inculpatory evidence. Lohss then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The prosecutor had 'no objection' thereto, and the hearing judge dismissed the indictment as to Lohss. The State then moved to dismiss as to Sprenkle, who interposed no objection, so that the indictment was also dismissed as to him. The State then appealed. The Court of Appeals perceived the appeal as a vehicle to obtain review of the trial judge's rulings on the motion to suppress. Pointing out that there was no objection in the trial court to the dismissal of the indictment, the Court invoked Md.Rule 885 and ordered us to dismiss the State's appeal.

In the case sub judice, the Assistant State's Attorney commented after Judge Buchanan's 'dismissal' of the charges, 'The State would make an objection; for the record, the State objects.' That objection, the State reasons, raised the issue in the trial court and preserved the matter for appellate review. If what was involved here was a dismissal of the indictment, the State might well be correct; but, as we see it, that is not the issue.

Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 12-302(c)(1) provides:

'(c) In a criminal case, the State may appeal:

(1) From a final judgment granting a motion to dismiss or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment, or inquisition . . ..'

A review of the record in the instant case discloses that Stanley, through his counsel, moved during the trial to suppress certain '. . . crucial evidence presented by the prosecuting attorney . . ..' After the trial judge frustrated the State's efforts to introduce the challenged evidence by suppressing it, the Assistant State's Attorney said, 'That would be the State's case because of your rulings . . ..' That defense counsel promptly made a motion for judgment of acquittal. Stating that during a recess he had an opportunity 'to again look at the law concerning . . . (his) rulings' on the evidence, the judge declared:

'I am reasserting exactly what I held before-that it is the fruit of the poisonous tree under . . . (Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 337 A.2d 100 (1975)), that the evidence was illegally obtained, and the mention of the van in the statement the Defendant gave the police, and therefore, since it arose out of that, and the original statements were . . . without Miranda, ¹ that being illegal, . . . the subsequent consent to search is illegal the Everhardt (sic) v. State.

You asked (sic) for a motion, Mr. Gede?'

Counsel responded in the affirmative, and the judge then made the remarks concerning the dismissal of the charges, as quoted at the outset of this opinion.

We think it perfectly clear that Judge Buchanan granted the motion for judgment of acquittal and did not, as the State strongy suggests, dismiss the indictment. While the judge could have more artfully articulated his granting of the motion, we believe common sense dictates that he, nevertheless, did grant it. 'That seems to us to be the common sense of the matter; and common sense often makes good law.' Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46, 77 S.Ct. 613, 615, 1 L.Ed.2d 631, 635 (1957).

A misused word may cause one to pause, but it will not defeat the true intention when that intention may be gleaned from a review of the total circumstances. Every lawyer who has at some time in his or her career represented clients in police station courts, particularly under the now defunct trial magistrate system, will immediately recognize that the trial judge, in the case now before us, employed a 'stationhouse' synonym for 'not guilty' when he uttered, 'the charges are dismissed.'

It has been the established common law of this State, even before Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), made the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the several states through the Fourteenth Amendment, that a person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. See, e. g., Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 442-42, 330 A.2d 169, 173 (1975); Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 327, 322 A.2d 887, 889 (1974); Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 316 n.2, 322 A.2d 880, 883 n.2 (1974); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 619, 220 A.2d 304, 306 (1966); State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341, 344, 76 A.2d 575, 576 (1950); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878). In Shields, the Court observed:

'It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward, on the application of the prosecutor, in any form of proceeding, be set aside and a new trial granted, and it matters not whether such verdict be the result of a misdirection of the judge on a question of law, or of a misconception of fact on the part of the jury. 2 Hale's P.C. 310; 2 Hawk's P.C. Book 2, ch. 47, sec. 12; 3 Whart.Cr.Law, sec. 3221; 1 Bishop's Cr.Law, secs. 992, 993. This cardinal rule has been clearly and opines that 'Mariana . . ., while not endangering never been modified by legislation there, nor in any other State in this Union, nor indeed, so far as we are aware, in any other country where trial by jury under the common law prevails.' ² 49 Md. at 303.

Notwithstanding Shields, in State v. Mariana, 174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938), over the State's objection, a motion to suppress evidence was granted prior to trial. In the trial, the State was unable to prove its case, as it lacked evidence, so the defendant was acquitted. On appeal by the State, the Court reversed and awarded a new trial. The question of double jeopardy does not appear to have been raised or considered. ³

The Court was confronted by Mariana in two subsequent cases, State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167, 28 A.2d 829 (19...