State v. Steele, s. 2011–2075

• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: 2011–2178.,Nos. 2011–2075,s. 2011–2075
• Citation: 138 Ohio St.3d 1,3 N.E.3d 135
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross–Appellee, v. STEELE, Appellee and Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

138 Ohio St.3d 1

3 N.E.3d 135

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant and Cross–Appellee,

v.STEELE, Appellee and Cross–Appellant.

Nos. 2011–2075, 2011–2178.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 12, 2013.

Decided June 18, 2013.

Daniel J. Breyer, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Byron L. Potts & Co., L.P.A., and Gloria L. Smith, Dublin, for appellee and cross-appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Francisco E. Lüttecke, Assistant Public Defender, in support of neither party on behalf of amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender.

O'NEILL, J.

{¶ 1} In this appeal and cross-appeal, we are presented with two issues. First, we consider whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to interrogate. We hold that R.C. 2921.03 provides no such exemption. A police officer may be convicted of intimidation when the state presents evidence that the police officer knowingly filed a materially false complaint in order to influence or intimidate a witness.

{¶ 2} Second, we consider what instructions a trial court must provide to a jury on the definition of the “privilege” exception to the offense of abduction when the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest and detain. We hold that when a trial court's definition of “privilege” is identical to the definition provided in R.C. 2901.01(A)(12), such an instruction does not constitute plain error.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 3} On May 26, 2009, police officer Julian Steele was indicted on ten counts, including abduction, intimidation, extortion, rape, and sexual battery. The charges stemmed from Steele's investigation of a series of six robberies that occurred in the same neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio. Shortly after one of the robberies, a resident in the neighborhood saw a vehicle driving suspiciously. The resident provided the vehicle's license-plate number to police, who linked the vehicle to A.M.

{¶ 4} The state presented evidence at trial that once Steele became aware that A.M. had children, he went to their school, arrested three children, and had their lockers searched. One of those children was R.M. Steele took R.M. into custody by handcuffing him and placing him in the caged back seat of a police cruiser. Steele told the school employees not to tell A.M. that he had taken R.M. into custody. Steele also told school employees the next day that he knew that R.M. was innocent. Although R.M. did not fit the physical descriptions of the robbers, Steele took R.M. to the police station and interrogated him extensively, using threatening and coercive tactics, prior to any attempt to offer him his constitutionally guaranteed Miranda warning. Specifically, after R.M. flatly and strongly denied knowledge of or involvement in the robberies, Steele threatened R.M. by telling him that his mother would be jailed and his siblings would be taken away if R.M. did not confess to the robberies. R.M. succumbed to the coercion and made a false confession. Steele then Mirandized R.M. and taped his confession.

{¶ 5} Using R.M.'s false statement, Steele was able to formally bring charges against R.M. for the six robberies and had R.M. imprisoned in juvenile detention.

{¶ 6} While R.M. was in detention, Steele repeatedly persuaded R.M.'s mother A.M. to meet with him under the guise of talking about R.M.'s case and eventually convinced her to come to his apartment. Steele stated to A.M. that he would be able to get R.M. out of detention, but that it would involve quite a “process.” During one of A.M.'s visits to Steele's apartment, Steele asked her to engage in sexual activity with him. A.M. testified that she complied with Steele's requests because she believed that he had the power over R.M.'s release.

{¶ 7} While R.M. was spending nine days in detention, Steele repeatedly told the assistant prosecutor that he knew that R.M. had nothing to do with the robberies, but that he had locked R.M. up in order to compel A.M. to cooperate with the investigation. The prosecutor mistakenly assumed that R.M. had been sent home on the day of his arrest. When, on the ninth day, she discovered that R.M. was still in lock-up, she immediately had R.M. released and dismissed his charges. The prosecutor's office then had Steele questioned about his actions. The state submitted a recording of the questioning, during which Steele admitted that he had excluded R.M. as a suspect prior to locking him up. Steele admitted that he thought R.M. had given a false confession. Steele admitted that he had told A.M. that he did not think R.M. committed any of the robberies. Steele stated that he does not make arrests solely based on witness identification, but instead he utilizes the technique called “bullshitting,” which apparently refers to arresting people on less than probable cause in the hope that something promising will result.

{¶ 8} Steele was charged with two counts of abduction, three counts of extortion, two counts of rape, one count of sexual battery, and two counts of intimidation, all with firearm specifications. A jury trial was held, and Steele did not testify.

{¶ 9} At the close of the evidence, the parties and the court discussed alterations to the proposed jury instructions. The court provided the revised jury instructions to the parties, and counsel for Steele stated that the instructions “look fine, and they incorporate all of the changes that we discussed yesterday.” Pursuant to the agreed-upon jury instructions, the trial court provided the jury with definitions for “privilege,” “arrest,” “probable cause,” and “reasonable grounds,” as they are used in R.C. 2905.02, 2901.01(A)(12), and 2935.03.

{¶ 10} The trial court defined “privilege” as “an immunity, license, or right conferred by law or bestowed by express or implied grant or arising out of status, position, office, or relationship or growing out of necessity.” The trial court stated that when an arrest is made without probable cause, it is an illegal arrest. The trial court instructed that probable cause exists “when an officer has knowledge of existing facts and circumstances which would warrant a prudent police officer in believing that a crime was committed, and that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.” The trial court then explained that a police officer has the authority to arrest and detain a person if the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is guilty of committing a crime. Steele had no objections to the foregoing explanations.

{¶ 11} The jury found Steele guilty of abduction of R.M. in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) and (A)(2) and intimidation of R.M. in violation of R.C. 2921.03, each with an accompanying firearm specification. The jury acquitted Steele on the remaining charges. He received a prison sentence of five years and an additional five years of community control.

{¶ 12} On appeal, the First District Court of Appeals rejected Steele's arguments that his intimidation conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed the conviction. The appellate court reversed Steele's abduction convictions, however, holding that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction were fatally deficient. The appellate court held that the trial court should have explained to the jury that a police officer loses the privilege to arrest and detain a citizen only if he does not have a good-faith belief that there is probable cause for the arrest. “In essence,” the court held, “the jury was instructed that an officer loses the privilege to arrest when the arrest is made without probable cause.” Id. at ¶ 9. The appellate court concluded that because Steele's conviction hinged on whether Steele's actions were in good faith, the deficiency in the instructions rose to the level of plain error, requiring reversal despite Steele's agreement to the instruction.

{¶ 13} The appellate court dismissed Steele's sufficiency and manifest-weight arguments regarding the abduction convictions as moot. Finally, the appellate court reversed all of the gun specifications, as no evidence had been presented at trial that Steele had a firearm on or about his personwhen he committed the offenses. The appellate court thus partially reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on the charges of abduction.

{¶ 14} Both the state and Steele sought this court's discretionary review. In case No. 2011–2075, we accepted the state's appeal regarding the appellate court's reversal on the issue of jury instructions on the offense of abduction. 131 Ohio St.3d 1472, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 803. In case No. 2011–2178, we accepted Steele's delayed appeal regarding his intimidation conviction. 132 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 270. The two cases were consolidated, and the state's appeal was designated a cross-appeal. Id.

Analysis

Intimidation and Police Officers

{¶ 15} R.C. 2921.03(A) provides:

No person, knowingly and by force, by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, or by filing, recording, or otherwise using a materially false or fraudulent writing with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a public servant, party official, or witness in the discharge of the person's duty.

{¶ 16} Steele proposes that a police officer cannot be prosecuted for the offense of intimidation, in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A), based on actions taken by the police officer while conducting an interrogation. We disagree.

{¶ 17} In our examination of R.C. 2921.03, we begin by noting that our “paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.” State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 589 N.E.2d 1319 (1992). We must give effect to the plain meaning of the words used in a statute, and we must not modify an...