State v. Steen
| Decision Date | 22 October 1904 |
| Citation | 125 Iowa 307,101 N.W. 96 |
| Parties | STATE v. STEEN. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Mahaska County; John T. Scott, Judge.
Indictment for keeping a house of ill fame. The defendant was convicted and appeals. Affirmed.Davis & Orvis, for appellant.
C. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., L. De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jas. A. Devitt, Co. Atty., for the State.
1. The first proposition advanced by counsel for appellant is that the verdict of guilty is not warranted by the evidence. A reading of the record brings us to a different conclusion. We shall not rehearse the testimony. It is sufficient to say that, if believed by the jury, the case made by the witnesses for the state affords abundant ground for the appellant's conviction. The credibility of the witnesses on either side was a matter for the jury alone to pass upon, and we find nothing to indicate that in so doing they were influenced by passion or prejudice.
2. A witness--Cora Sinclair--testifying in defendant's behalf was asked if she knew the general reputation of the defendant's house at the time in question “as to whether it was a house of ill fame or not.” She replied with the inquiry, “Do I know whether it was what you say?” and defendant's counsel responded, “Just answer whether it was.” At this point the court interrupted, saying to the witness, “The question does not call for your knowledge as to what the place really was, but as to what people say about it; it simply calls for the reputation.” To this remark the defendant took exception, and urges it upon our attention as prejudicial error. The objection is not well founded. The witness was evidently uncertain whether counsel was asking in regard to the reputation of the place or for her knowledge of its actual character, and it was entirely proper for the court, even though the question was not objected to by the other party, to instruct the witness concerning the nature of the information asked for. We assume that counsel did not desire their witness to swear to the ultimate fact which the jury were to determine, and we cannot conceive how the appellant could have been prejudiced by a pertinent and correct direction to the witness as to her duty in the premises. The witness, having testified that she had not heard the house spoken of as a house of prostitution, was asked by the prosecuting attorney on cross-examination if she “ever heard any talk of any kind about the place” and over the objection of appellant she answered, “Yes, sir.” We can readily see that this question might have been answered in a manner to prejudice the appellant, and think it would have been better had the objection been sustained. But the question did not necessarily call for any report or talk derogatory to the good name or fame of the house, or of its owners or occupants; and certainly, the answer disclosed nothing of that kind. To give it a damaging significance, we should have to extract from the language a meaning which is neither apparent nor fairly inferable.
3. But one witness testified to personal knowledge of an act of prostitution in defendant's house, and it is said that this is not sufficient to sustain a conviction. That a single act of prostitution, of itself, is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty, may be conceded for the purposes of the argument; but certainly it cannot be the law that to successfully prosecute an indictment for keeping a house of ill fame the state must produce witnesses who have personally seen or participated in acts of sexual debauchery on the premises. Like other crimes of darkness and secrecy, it can, as a rule, be established only by proof of facts and circumstances from which the inference of guilt is so strong as to exclude reasonable doubt. State v. Schaffer, 74 Iowa, 704, 39 N. W. 89. In cases of this nature also, the statute permits a species of evidence not usually admissible, in criminal cases--evidence of the general reputation of the house; and such reputation is a circumstance of importance which may justify the jury in convicting a defendant in a case which is otherwise doubtful. Other objections are made to rulings upon the admission of testimony. They are so numerous that to attempt a detailed examination of them would unduly extend this opinion, and we have to say that, after examining each of such rulings, we find no prejudicial error.
4. Complaint is also made that the court during the course of the trial indulged in remarks having a tendency to influence the jury against the defendant. Many of the remarks to which exceptions are taken were entirely legitimate suggestions and directions concerning the business before the court, while others were perhaps not strictly called for; but none, so far as we are able to observe, was of a kind or character calculated to impress the jury with the private opinion or inclination of the judge upon the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
5. The defendant was jointly indicted with her husband, but was granted a separate trial. It was inevitable, and to a certain extent...
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