State v. Steigelman

• Decision Date: 06 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. DA 12–0275.,DA 12–0275.
• Citation: 302 P.3d 396,370 Mont. 352
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael James STEIGELMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

370 Mont. 352

302 P.3d 396

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Michael James STEIGELMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 12–0275.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 20, 2013.

Decided June 6, 2013.

For Appellant: Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Kristen L. Larson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana.

For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney; Victoria Callender, Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana.

Justice BRIAN MORRIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[370 Mont. 352]¶ 1 The State of Montana (State) charged Michael James Steigelman (Steigelman) with felony DUI and two misdemeanors on July 29, 2009. Steigelman filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial on June 1, 2010, in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court denied Steigelman's motion. Steigelman later entered a guilty plea to DUI pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. In return, the State agreed to drop the two misdemeanor charges. Steigelman appeals the District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss on the speedy trial grounds. We affirm.

¶ 2 We address on appeal whether the State violated Steigelman's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A Billings, Montana police officer heard a loud crash at an intersection on the evening of July 29, 2009. The officer saw a vehicle, driven by Steigelman, drive onto the road's center cement median. Steigelman had struck a road sign and broke it off its mount. The officer observed Steigelman then swerve back onto the road. The officer stopped Steigelman. The officer approached him and immediately noticed that Steigelman's eyes were bloodshot, that Steigelman's speech was slurred, and that Steigelman smelled of alcohol. Steigelman admitted to having hit the sign and told the officer he had consumed “about eight to ten beers.” Steigelman failed to complete the standard field sobriety tests. He also refused to provide a breath sample.

¶ 4 The State charged Steigelman with felony DUI and two misdemeanors. Steigelman appeared for his arraignment on August 3, 2009. The court released Steigelman on bail on August 6, 2009, after he had spent eight days in jail.

¶ 5 The District Court originally set Steigelman's omnibus hearing for November 9, 2009, and his trial for January 19, 2010. Steigelman did not appear at the November 9, 2009, omnibus hearing. Steigelman's appointed counsel advised the court at the hearing that Steigelman and he had not been in contact. Steigelman's counsel indicated that he planned to seek a continuance of the trial.

¶ 6 The District Court designated a triple homicide case as the number one trial setting for January 19, 2010. This conflict required the court to reschedule Steigelman's trial. The District Court reset the omnibus hearing for March 29, 2010, and the trial for June 8, 2010. Steigelman attended the omnibus hearing with counsel from the Office of the Public Defender. The District Court granted a motion to substitute Jeffrey Michael as Steigelman's counsel on May 18, 2010. The court's order included a notation of the June 8, 2010, trial date. Steigelman filed a motion to continue the trial on May 27, 2010. Steigelman waived his right to speedy trial as part of his motion. The District Court set a new trial date of September 28, 2010.

¶ 7 Steigelman filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on June 1, 2010, based on the State's alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The parties briefed the motion and the court conducted a hearing on October 4, 2010. The court heard testimony from Steigelman, the arresting officer, and the State's counsel in the triple homicide case that had prompted the court to reset Steigelman's first trial date.

¶ 8 The court agreed with Steigelman that the duration of the pretrial delay justified further review. The court attributed most of the delay to the State due to institutional causes. The court observed that Steigelman had made efforts to proceed to trial, but that he had not complained about previous delays. The court further observed that Steigelman had served only eight days in jail and that he had been unable to articulate any anxiety or concern beyond that normally associated with a person accused of a crime.

¶ 9 The court opined that pretrial delay likely had not caused prejudice to Steigelman's defense, despite Steigelman's claim of being unable to locate two potential witnesses. The court noted that Steigelman's admission to having consumed eight to ten beers on the night of his arrest raised questions as to how those two potential witnesses—a former girlfriend and a bartender who had observed Steigelman earlier that evening—could have assisted his defense. The court noted further that the State's only witness, the arresting officer, had been available for questioning and remained able to testify at trial.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 We review a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial to determine whether the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, ¶ 119, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. Whether the factual circumstances establish a speedy trial violation presents a question of law. Ariegwe, ¶ 119 We review de novo a district court's conclusion of law. Ariegwe, ¶ 119

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 Whether the State violated Steigelman's constitutional right to a speedy trial?

¶ 12 The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. We revised our framework to analyze speedy trial claims in Ariegwe to track the balancing approach outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). A court must balance four factors in considering a claim of denial of the right to speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused's responses to the delay; and (4) prejudice to the accused. State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, ¶ 11, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58;Ariegwe, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 None of the four speedy trial factors, on its own, is dispositive. We must consider the related factors together with other relevant circumstances. Ariegwe, ¶ 153 Moreover,each factor's significance depends on the unique facts and circumstances of the case. Ariegwe, ¶ 105. We now proceed to review and balance the four speedy trial factors.

¶ 14 Length of the delay. We consider the length of delay from the date that the State files the charges until the defendant's trial date. Here 426 days elapsed between the time that the State charged Steigelman on August 3, 2009, and his September 28, 2010, trial date. We have established 200 days, regardless of fault for that delay, as the length of time that triggers further speedy trial analysis. Ariegwe, ¶ 62. No one contests that Steigelman's delay exceeded the 200–day trigger. Thus, we must analyze the other speedy trial factors

¶ 15 Reasons for the delay. Under this factor, the court identifies and attributes responsibility for each period of delay in bringing the accused to trial. The weight assigned to a period of delay depends on the type of delay and possible motive, if any, behind the delay. Ariegwe, ¶ 67. We characterize as institutional that delay due to the inherent nature of the criminal justice system. Institutional delay weighs less heavily than intentional attempts by the State to delay the trial. State v. Stops, 2013 MT 131, ¶ 27, 370 Mont. 226, 301 P.3d 811;Ariegwe, ¶ 108

¶ 16 The District Court did not issue findings as to each period of delay. The court attributed the bulk of the total delay, however, to the State as institutional delay. For example, the 174 days between Steigelman's arrest and the first trial date represents institutional delay attributable to the State. The court also attributed to the State the 140 days between the first trial date and the second trial date. This 140–day delay occurred as a result of a scheduling conflict between Steigelman's first trial date and a deliberate homicide trial also set for that same date. We agree with the District Court that institutional delay properly attributed to the State constituted 314 days of the delay.

[370 Mont. 356]¶ 17 The third period of delay consisted of 112 days between Steigelman's second trial setting on June 8, 2010, and his third trial setting on September 28, 2010. The court attributed this 112–day period to Steigelman due to his request for more time to investigate and develop his speedy trial claim. We agree. The 314 days that the District Court attributed to the State, on its own, however, exceeds the 200–day trigger for further speedy trial analysis. Ariegwe, ¶ 62.

¶ 18 The accused's responses to the delay. Under the third speedy trial factor, the court evaluates the totality of the accused's responses to the delay to ascertain “whether the accused actually wanted a speedy trial.” Ariegwe, ¶ 79. An accused certainly has “ ‘no duty to bring himself to trial.’ ” Ariegwe, ¶ 82 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190). The defendant's responses to the delay nevertheless represent “an ‘important’ consideration” in determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. Ariegwe, ¶ 76, (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. at 2194).

¶ 19 We consider the totality of a defendant's responses to the delay to ascertain whether the defendant “actually wanted a speedy trial” and what weight is to be given to the other three factors in our analysis. Ariegwe, ¶ 79. We consider circumstances such as the “timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the...