State v. Stephenson

• Decision Date: 18 November 2014
• Docket Number: 31,273.,No. 35,035.,35,035.
• Citation: 346 P.3d 409
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jennifer STEPHENSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

346 P.3d 409

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Jennifer STEPHENSON, Defendant–Appellant.

31,273.

No. 35,035.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nov. 18, 2014.

Certiorari Granted, Jan. 26, 2015,

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Law Offices of the Public Defender, Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

GARCIA, Judge.

{1} A jury found Jennifer Stephenson (Defendant) guilty of criminal child abandonment pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30–6–1(B) (2009). Defendant alleges multiple errors on appeal, including a contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. Specifically, she argues that her conduct in putting her two-year-old son (Child) to bed in his bedroom and ignoring his cries during the night does not constitute “leaving” or “abandoning” Child under Section 30–6–1(B). We agree and reverse Defendant's conviction. Because we reverse Defendant's conviction, we need not address the remaining issues raised on appeal.

BACKGROUND

{2} On the evening in question, Defendant put her Child to bed in his bedroom and locked the bedroom door. Defendant eventually went to sleep in her own bedroom in the same apartment. Sometime during the night, Child climbed from his toddler bed up onto a dresser that was standing next to his bed. The 112–pound dresser tipped over and fell onto Child, pinning his legs between the toddler bed railing and the dresser.

{3} Defendant told a detective that she did not hear any cries coming from Child's bedroom. And Child's father, who returned to the apartment from work at 2:00 a.m. that night, also said that he did not hear any cries that night. At about 7:00 a.m., the father woke and heard “whimpering” from Child's bedroom. He unlocked Child's bedroom door with a “butter knife” and discovered that Child was pinned between the dresser and the bed railing. He removed the dresser from Child and brought him to Defendant.

{4} Defendant, still in her pajamas, left to take Child to the hospital emergency room. On the way to the hospital, Defendant stopped at her parent's apartment to pick up her father. Defendant checked in to the emergency room by 7:58 a.m. Defendant told the emergency room doctor that a dresser had fallen on Child.

{5} The emergency room doctor testified that Child's injuries were not consistent with being “hit” by a dresser. He said that instead of bruises, there were pressure sores on both sides of Child's legs. Child had also developed “compartment syndrome,” a condition in which the cells of the leg muscles begin to die from “pressure [to the legs] over time.” The doctor confirmed that he initially thought that the pressure sores and the compartment syndrome may have been caused by Child being bound by a “belt” or a “strap.” Because the nature of Child's injuries did not fit with the cause of the injury reported by Defendant, the doctor suspected child abuse and called the police. The State charged Defendant with negligent child abuse under Section 30–6–1(D). However, after further investigation, the doctors changed their conclusion regarding the cause of Child's injury. At trial, the emergency room doctor testified that his “ultimate diagnosis” was that Child had sustained “a crush injury” that was “consistent with a very large piece of furniture pinning a child down over a period of hours.” Additionally, the detective assigned to the case came to “believe [that] the dresser did, in fact, fall on [Child]” and that Child “was left there.”

{6} All of the doctors who testified at trial said that Child, in order to develop pressure sores and compartment syndrome, would have been trapped between the dresser and the bed railing for hours. The emergency room doctor testified that it would take “several” hours for Child's injuries to form. The orthopedic surgeon who treated Child testified that he thought Child was trapped for at least “eight to twelve hours” and that “this type of injury usually takes [twelve] to [twenty-four] hours to develop.” The pediatric intensive care doctor who treated Child testified that she thought Child was trapped for “a minimum of six to twelve hours.” All of these doctors agreed that Child would have been in extreme pain and that he would have been “crying” and “screaming.” And a pediatric psychologist testified that a child's cry from being “hurt” is different than his cry from being “tired” or “uncomfortable” and that “every mommy knows that.”

{7} During its closing argument, the State told the jury that this case was about whether it is “okay to leave your child confined or pinned or trapped for [six] to [twelve] hours.” It told the jury that its “theory of the case” was that Child “didn't like going to bed”; that Defendant “put[ ] him in [his bed]room” and “locked the door”; that Child “climb[ed] up on th[e] dresser ... and the chest f[ell]”; that Child was “in pain” and “crying”; and that “[Defendant] chose to ignore him.” It said that “the crux of this case” was Defendant's “failure to act.... her nonaction.... it's about negligence.”

{8} The district court instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of negligent child abuse under Section 30–6–1(D)(1). And at defense counsel's request, the district court also instructed the jury on the elements of the crime of child abandonment. The jury acquitted Defendant of negligent child abuse, but it convicted her of child abandonment. On appeal, Defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the child abandonment conviction.

DISCUSSION

{9} Our Supreme Court has observed that the Legislature “[r]ecogniz[ed] the wide variety of ways that a child can be harmed by abuse and neglect” and has adopted a “spectrum” of civil and criminal remedies to address child abuse. See State v. Chavez, 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. On the “benign” end of this spectrum, the Legislature can “ensur[e] that children receive nutritious meals[.]” Id. More “intrusive[ly],” children may be placed in foster care or parental rights may be terminated all together. Id. And “[o]n the far end of this spectrum lies the sanction for criminal child abuse, ... punishable by ... imprisonment” and potential loss of parental rights. Id. The statutory construction of various statutes within this spectrum of the criminal child abuse array is the first issue we must address in this case.

Standard of Review

{10} Interpretation of a criminal statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. ¶ 10. Our “principal command” in construing a statute is to “effectuate the intent of the [L]egislature” by “using the plain language of the statute.” State v. Ogden, 1994–NMSC–029, ¶ 24, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845. When interpreting “the plain meaning of the words at issue,” the appellate courts “often us[e] the dictionary for guidance.” State v. Boyse, 2013–NMSC–024, ¶ 9, 303 P.3d 830.

{11} We must “strictly” construe statutes that define criminal conduct. Chavez, 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 10, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. And we will not read a criminal statute as applying to particular conduct “unless the legislative proscription is plain.” State v. Bybee, 1989–NMCA–071, ¶ 12, 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (citing United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 52 S.Ct. 416, 76 L.Ed. 917 (1932) ).

{12} Once an appellate court interprets the language set forth in the relevant statutes, it “appl[ies] a substantial evidence standard to review the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.” Chavez, 2009–NMSC–035, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891. We must review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In doing so, we “indulg[e] all reasonable inferences and resolv[e] all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are not permitted to “weigh the evidence or substitute [our] judgment for that of the fact finder”; we determine only whether “there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Civil Child Abuse and Neglect Processes

{13} The civil child abuse and neglect process “addresses situations in which the child has suffered or who is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child's parent[.]” Id. ¶ 13 (emphasis, internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting NMSA 1978, § 32A–4–2(B)(1) ).

When parental conduct or the home environment places a child at risk, the State can use its civil powers to remove the danger to the child, either by allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to their compliance with court-ordered conditions, by removing the child from the home, or by transferring legal custody to another. Importantly, this process contemplates that parents will be afforded ... an opportunity to comply with a treatment plan before the State proceeds to more drastic remedies[,] ... the ultimate goal [is] to preserve and reunify the family.

Id. ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

The Criminal Child Abandonment Component

{14} In 1973, the Legislature enacted a statute criminalizing “abandonment or abuse of a child.” 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 360, § 10; see § 30–6–1. Although the statute has since been amended and re-codified, its abandonment provision remains substantially the same.

In pertinent part, the abandonment provision states:

Abandonment of a child consists of the parent, guardian[,] or custodian of a child intentionally leaving or abandoning the child under circumstances whereby the child may or does suffer neglect.

Section 30–6–1(B). “Neglect” is defined to mean that:

a child is without proper parental care and control of subsistence, education,

...