State v. Stevens, 87-150
| Decision Date | 12 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-150,87-150 |
| Citation | 552 A.2d 410,150 Vt. 251 |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Mark STEVENS. |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Theresa St. Helaire, Bennington County Deputy State's Atty., Bennington, for plaintiff-appellee.
Stephen L. Saltonstall of Witten & Carter, P.C., Bennington, for defendant-appellant.
Before ALLEN, C.J., PECK, GIBSON and DOOLEY, JJ., and KEYSER, J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving to endanger, in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(a). The only evidence of such a violation was the fact that defendant was driving at a speed of 103 miles per hour on Route 7 in Manchester, Vermont. Defendant argues that speed alone can never be sufficient to convict an operator of driving to endanger and, further, in this case there were factors that reduced the risks associated with high speed operation. We affirm.
The statute in question provides: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public highway in a careless or negligent manner ... or in any manner to endanger or jeopardize the safety, life or property of a person." 23 V.S.A. § 1091(a). The requisite level of culpability under the section is "ordinary negligence such as would impose civil liability and ... to support a conviction ... there is no necessity for the State to produce evidence tending to show criminal negligence...." State v. LaBonte, 120 Vt. 465, 468-69, 144 A.2d 792, 794-95 (1958). 1 In LaBonte, this Court stressed that the predecessor statute to 23 V.S.A. § 1091(a) was not a reckless driving statute and did not even contain the word "reckless." Id. Thus, under § 1091(a), a conviction will be supported if defendant's conduct is unreasonable; it need not be proven reckless. 2
The analysis of the statute in the LaBonte case provides the center of the answer to defendant's main legal argument. Defendant argues that speed alone can never be enough to convict an operator under a statute like Vermont's, citing a number of cases from other jurisdictions. See Virgin Islands v. Caines, 512 F.2d 311, 315 (3d Cir.1975); State v. Stevens, 37 Conn.Supp. 661, 663, 433 A.2d 1022, 1023 (Conn.Super.Ct.1981); State v. Hanson, 92 Idaho 665, 666, 448 P.2d 758, 759 (1968). The cases from other jurisdictions involve variations of reckless driving statutes where the conduct proscribed must be more egregious than that proscribed by an ordinary negligence standard. See Caines, 512 F.2d at 315; Stevens, 37 Conn.Supp. at 663, 433 A.2d at 1023; Hanson, 92 Idaho at 666, 448 P.2d at 759. Even if we were inclined to follow these precedents, it is one theory to say that very high speed alone cannot equal recklessness; it is quite another thing to say, as defendant argues here, that very high speed alone can never equal negligence.
Even if the precedents cited by appellant were not distinguishable, we are not persuaded by them. The stronger reasoning seems to be that adopted by the California courts in Fisher v. Zimmerman, 23 Cal.App.2d 696, 73 P.2d 1243 (1937), and People v. Nowell, 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. 811, 114 P.2d 81 (1941), and subsequently by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Norfolk v. State, 360 P.2d 605 (Wyo.1961). In those cases, the courts recognized that while driving in excess of the speed limit alone may not, as a general rule, suffice to demonstrate driving to endanger, it is possible that "the rate of speed at which a car is driven may of itself be so great that injury to persons and property is a distinct possibility...." Nowell, 45 Cal.App.2d Supp. at 816, 114 P.2d at 84; see Fisher, 23 Cal.App.2d at 701-02, 73 P.2d at 1246; Norfolk, 360 P.2d at 608. To hold otherwise suggests that traveling at the highest rates of speed imaginable can never be careless, negligent, or dangerous to life, limb, or property unless it is coupled with other conduct--such as, one might speculate, being involved in an accident.
Thus, we hold that where the rate of speed of a vehicle is so great that there is a reasonable likelihood of injury to persons or property, the trier of fact may find a violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1091(a). We believe that this construction is the most consistent with the statutory language as analyzed in LaBonte. It also provides an adequate deterrent against negligent operation of vehicles by those who can afford to pay the relatively inexpensive premium for such activity in terms of a lower fine and lower assessment of points associated with speeding violations as opposed to the more substantial penalties for driving to endanger violations. 3
Defendant also argues that he could not be convicted of driving to endanger under the facts of this case, pointing out that he had experience driving at high speeds, that his BMW automobile was built to operate safely at high speeds and that road conditions at the time he was stopped were good with only light traffic. "The test for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial is 'whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Neale, 145 Vt. 423, 428-29, 491 A.2d 1025, 1029 (1985) (quoting State v. Derouchie, 140 Vt. 437, 445, 440 A.2d 146, 150 (1981)). Certainly, the facts highlighted by defendant must be weighed in his favor in determining whether he was guilty of violating § 1091(a). We are not prepared to say, however, that these facts particularly when they are viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would prevent the fact finder from concluding that defendant drove to endanger. Accordingly, we must affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
I cannot agree with the result or the holding.
The only evidence to support the charge was the fact that defendant had been driving at a speed of 103 miles per hour on Route 7, south of Manchester, as measured by a state trooper using radar. There was no evidence of the presence or potential presence of people or animals on the raod, of access roads or hills or curves on the highway, or of cars within radar range when the trooper stopped defendant; it was 1:00 p.m. on a "beautiful" day, and the road was dry. Even accepting the proposition that speed alone can constitute a violation of the offense charged, there was absolutely no evidence introduced at trial that defendant operated his vehicle...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Ritchie
...statute which provides for criminal penalties, several courts from other states have interpreted similar language. In State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410 (Vt.1988), the Supreme Court of Vermont construed the following statute: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public hig......
-
State v. Roberge, 87-111
...§ 1091(a), a conviction will be supported if defendant's conduct is unreasonable; it need not be proven reckless." State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 252, 552 A.2d 410, 411 (1988). The jury found that defendant attempted to elude the police officer, and heard testimony that the chase exceeded 5......
-
Bullis v. Town of Grand Isle
... ... The Town of Grand Isle appeals from a decision of the State Board of Appraisers, which concluded that taxpayers' four parcels should be assessed as a single ... ...
-
State v. Parenteau, 89-041
...argues that his conduct evinced no more mental culpability than the conduct taken as evidence of carelessness in State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 252-53, 552 A.2d 410, 411 (1988). In that case, the defendant had travelled 103 m.p.h., and we concluded that excessive speed alone was sufficient ......