State v. Stigen

• Decision Date: 25 September 2017
• Docket Number: A16-1583
• Parties: State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Zane Robert Stigen, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Zane Robert Stigen, Appellant.

A16-1583

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

September 25, 2017

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Rodenberg, Judge

Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Kirk, Judge

Polk County District Court

File No. 60-CR-15-1713

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Greg Widseth, Polk County Attorney, Scott A. Buhler, Assistant County Attorney, Crookston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Florey, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant challenges both his conviction of first-degree sale of a controlled substance and his 322-month prison sentence for that conviction. Because the district court erroneously admitted evidence of appellant's prior convictions under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), and because it is reasonably possible that the error significantly affected the verdict, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. In the interest of judicial economy on remand, we affirm the district court's denial of appellant's request for a jury instruction concerning accomplice testimony.

FACTS

On September 22, 2015, police officers discovered about 1.8 grams of methamphetamine in the possession of T.N. T.N. told investigators that he had purchased the methamphetamine from K.F. on September 21, and believed that K.F. had obtained the methamphetamine from a person named "Zane." At the request of law enforcement, T.N. called K.F. and asked to buy more methamphetamine. K.F. told T.N. that he would need to go get the methamphetamine before he could deliver it. Officers observed K.F. drive to appellant Zane Stigen's home, enter, and then leave. Officers arrested K.F. and discovered 13.449 grams of methamphetamine in his vehicle. K.F. told investigators that appellant had supplied methamphetamine to him on September 21 and 22. Appellant was charged with first-degree sale of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2014), for his sale of the methamphetamine to K.F. on September 21 and 22, 2015.

Before trial, the state moved to admit five of appellant's prior convictions under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove knowledge, intent, identity, motive, and common scheme or plan. Appellant argued that the convictions should be excluded because they were remote in time, were not similar to the charged offense, and the potential for unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value of the convictions. The district courtruled that three convictions were admissible to prove intent, knowledge, and identity: (1) a 1997 conviction of conspiracy to manufacture or sell 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, (2) a 2005 conviction of attempted fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine, and (3) a 2010 conviction of third-degree possession of methamphetamine.¹ The convictions were introduced at trial through an exhibit to which appellant stipulated. The exhibit identifies the three convictions, the offense year and general location of each offense, whether appellant pleaded guilty or was found guilty by a jury, and that appellant was sentenced to prison for each crime. The district court instructed the jury that the convictions were admitted for the limited purpose of establishing the identity of the seller, appellant's intent to sell methamphetamine, and appellant's knowledge of the presence and nature of the drug.

At the close of the evidence, the district court ruled that K.F. was not an accomplice to appellant and therefore an accomplice-corroboration instruction was not included in the final jury instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial on the question of whether he was a dangerous or repeat felony offender. The district court found that appellant qualified for an aggravated sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subds. 2, 4 (2014). Appellant was sentenced to 322 months in prison.

This appeal followed.

DECISION

I. The district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of appellant's prior convictions under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), and the wrongful admission of those convictions prejudiced appellant.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence at trial three of his prior convictions under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). He argues that the convictions were not relevant to prove knowledge, intent, or identity, and that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value the evidence may have had.

We review a district court's decision to admit evidence under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Minn. 2016). A district court "abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011). Appellant bears the burden of proving that the district court erred in admitting the evidence and that the error resulted in prejudice. State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006). If evidence was admitted in error, we must determine whether "there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict." Id. at 691. "[I]f there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the evidence had not been admitted, then the error in admitting the evidence was prejudicial error." State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994).

"Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Suchevidence, also known as Spreigl evidence, is generally excluded because "it might . . . suggest[] that the defendant has a propensity to commit the crime or that the defendant is a proper candidate for punishment for his or her past acts." State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 315 (Minn. 2009) (quotations omitted); see State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 490, 139 N.W.2d 167, 169 (1965) (stating the common law exclusionary rule). However, evidence of another crime may be admitted under rule 404(b) to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Minn. R. Evid. 404(b).

There are five requirements that must be satisfied before evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is admitted at trial:

(1) the state must give notice of its intent to admit the evidence; (2) the state must clearly indicate what the evidence will be offered to prove; (3) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the defendant participated in the prior act; (4) the evidence must be relevant and material to the state's case; and (5) the probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant.

Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 686 (restating the five requirements outlined in Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)). As part of its analysis of whether to admit the evidence, a district court must conduct a thorough examination of the purpose for which the evidence is offered. Id. After the district court is satisfied that the purpose is one of the permitted exceptions to rule 404(b)'s general exclusion of other-acts evidence, the court must then determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the potential to be unfairly prejudicial. Id.

Appellant's opposition to admission of his prior convictions at trial was limited to the fourth and fifth requirements; he did not dispute the adequacy of notice or of the state's intended use of the convictions, and he similarly did not dispute the fact of the convictions. His arguments on appeal are, likewise, limited to the fourth and fifth Ness requirements. Id.

The district court identified intent, knowledge, and identity as the reasons it admitted the three prior convictions. "In assessing the probative value and need for the evidence, the district court must identify the precise disputed fact to which the Spreigl evidence would be relevant." Id. (quotation omitted). This requires the district court to "isolat[e] the consequential fact for which the evidence is offered, and then determin[e] the relationship of the offered evidence to that fact and the relationship of the consequential fact to the disputed issues in the case." Id. A district court's consideration of relevance and materiality should include "the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a time, place, or modus operandi nexus." State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 612 (Minn. 2004). That prior crimes are of the same generic type as the charged offense is insufficient to warrant admission. State v. Wright, 719 N.W.2d 910, 917-18 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Shannon, 583 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Minn. 1998)). Once it is determined that the evidence is relevant to the disputed issue, we balance the relevance of the evidence, "the State's need to strengthen weak or inadequate proof," and the risk that the evidence will be used by the jury as propensity evidence. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 319. "If the admission of evidence of other crimes or misconduct is a close call, it should be excluded." Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 685.

The state argues that the prior-crimes evidence was admissible to prove appellant's knowledge or belief that the substance at issue was methamphetamine, noting that knowledge is a required element that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556-58 (Minn. 2001) (reversing conviction of conspiracy to commit a first-degree sale where the instruction on first-degree sale did not include the knowledge element); see also 10 Minnesota...