State v. Stockling

• Decision Date: 17 October 1977
• Citation: 379 A.2d 866,153 N.J.Super. 362
• Parties: The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Marvin E. STOCKLING, Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 362

153 N.J.Super. 362

379 A.2d 866

The STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. Marvin E. STOCKLING, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Oct. 17, 1977.

Francis W. Gasiorowski, Asst. Prosecutor of Union County, for the state.

Veronica C. Leonard, Linden, for County of Union.

John M. Cannel, Paterson, for State of N. J., Office Of The Public Defender.

Albert G. Fredericks, Princeton, for the Attorney General's Office.

Alfred M. Wolin, Elizabeth, for defendant.

CALLAHAN, J. D. C., Temporarily Assigned.

An indigent defendant charged with first degree murder ¹ moved that certain services required to adequately prepare his defense, a psychiatrist evaluation and a pathologist consultation, be provided at public expense. Since defendant is represented by private counsel paid for by his parents, his right to any such services was questioned. This court held on initial return date of the motion that defendant's eligibility as an indigent ² adult is not affected by his parents' voluntary decision to provide legal representation. State v. Morganstein, 147 N.J.Super. 234, 238-40, 371 A.2d 96 (App.Div.1977). The court further held that the requested services were both necessary and reasonable, and directed defendant to procure same. He has since done so. The only issue remaining for decision is which public body must pay for these services: the county or the State through the Office of the Public Defender.

The court was faced with this issue in several reported cases; in none, however, was the court compelled to decide it. Typically, a court could "assume" the county to be the proper body to bear the expense. See, e. g., State v. Ryan, 133 N.J.Super. 1, 12, 334 A.2d 402 (Cty.Ct.1975). See also, State v. Lippincott, 124 N.J.Super. 498, 501, 307 A.2d 657 (Munic.Ct.1973), in which the court held that the county rather than the City of Trenton should pay for such services. Unquestionably, had this issue arisen prior to the enactment of the Public Defender Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-1 et seq., this obligation would have fallen upon the county. In State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 414, 217 A.2d 441, 449 (1966), the court held: "That the county must meet the cost of criminal prosecutions is clear. * * * Within that category must fall the expense of providing counsel for an indigent accused, without which a prosecution would halt and inevitably fail under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799." The county contends here, however, that this rule was altered by the Public Defender Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-1 et seq., so that all services must now be provided to indigent defendants through the Public Defender's Office, regardless of whether the particular defendant is represented by the Public Defender or by counsel paid for by a third party.

The question is one of pure statutory interpretation whether the Legislature intended that the Office of the Public Defender should pay for all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of an indigent defendant not represented by that office. Two sections of the Public Defender Act are pertinent to the issues raised herein. N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-5 (§ 5) provides in part:

It shall be the duty of the Public Defender to provide for the legal representation of any indigent defendant who is formally charged with the commission of an indictable offense.

All necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation and other preparation) shall be provided in every case.

In addition, N.J.S.A. 2A:158A-14 (§ 14) defines eligibility as follows:

Eligibility for the services of the Office of the Public Defender shall be determined on the basis of the need of the defendant. Need shall be measured according to the financial ability of the defendant to engage and compensate competent private counsel and to provide all other necessary expenses of representation.

I find the sections quoted reasonably free from ambiguity. Section 5 clearly directs the Public Defender to provide not only counsel, but also whatever supplementary services may be required. No condition is stated, and none can be reasonably implied, which would necessitate counsel being provided before the Public Defender can supply supplementary services. Nor does the eligibility provision, § 14, require the use of a Public Defender attorney before other services can be provided. Indeed, by basing eligibility "for the services of the Office of the Public Defender" solely upon "the need of the defendant," the wording of the statute appears to lead to the opposite conclusion. Certainly the Legislature could have easily included language directing that such supplementary services would be available through the Public Defender's Office only when that office also supplied counsel. The Legislature having failed to do so, this court is bound to follow what it finds to be the reasonable meaning of the words used.

The court having found the statutory language unambiguous, the inquiry could end here. However, the court recognizes that reasonable persons could differ with its interpretation of the bald statutory language, requiring an examination of whatever extrinsic information is available.

As with any question of statutory interpretation, the primary issue is legislative intent.

The inquiry in construing statutes is to determine the purpose and intent of the Legislature. Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82, 89, 71 A.2d 633 (1950). Legislation must be accorded a rational interpretation consistent with its manifest purpose. "The true meaning of any clause or provision of a statute ordinarily is that which best comports with the subject and general object of the statute." Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. Director, Division of Tax Appeals, 8 N.J. 15, 28, 83 A.2d 527 (1951) (Markey v. City of Bayonne, 24 N.J.Super. 105, 112, 93 A.2d 589, 593 (App.Div.1952)).

See also, State v. Fearick, 69 N.J. 32, 37, 350 A.2d 227 (1976); Wollen v. Fort Lee, 27 N.J. 408, 418, 142 A.2d 88 (1958); Sperry and Hutchinsen Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 209, 104 A.2d 310 (1954). Simply put, the courts "are concerned with the internal sense of the law. The intent of the lawgivers and the spirit of their legislation must prevail." State v. Gill, 89 N.J.Super. 104, 108, 213 A.2d 871, 873 (App.Div.1965). See also, State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 390, 313 A.2d 216 (1974).

A primary source for determining this intent is legislative history. Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174, 249 A.2d 388 (1969); Gudgeon v. Ocean Cty., 135 N.J.Super. 13, 16, 342 A.2d 553 (App.Div.1975). An examination of the legislative history of the Public Defender Act discloses that little or no consideration was given to the precise issue involved herein. Relevant information exists, however, regarding the overall purposes of the act, and its financing in particular. Discussing whether the State should carry the entire financial burden of a Public Defender's Office, or if it should be shared with the counties, the New Jersey Commission on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime (the Commission) said The Commission has concluded that the...