State v. Strickland

• Decision Date: 17 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: 290 N.C. 169,225 S.E.2d 531
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Thurman Lee STRICKLAND.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 531

225 S.E.2d 531

290 N.C. 169

STATE of North Carolina v. Thurman Lee STRICKLAND.

No. 60.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 17, 1976.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by James E. Magner, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Roland C. Braswell, Goldsboro, for defendant.

EXUM, Justice.

I

Defendant by assignment of error number 9 argues that there was insufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury on the issues of premeditation and deliberation and that the trial court erred in not allowing his motion for nonsuit on the two first degree murder charges.

In considering this assignment 'we consider all of the evidence actually admitted, whether from the State or defendant, in the light most favorable to the State, resolve any contradictions and discrepancies therein in the State's favor, and give the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence.' State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 636, 220 S.E.2d 575, 580 (1975); State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 382, 156 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1967). The elements of premeditation and deliberation in a first degree murder case 'are not usually susceptible to direct proof, but must be established, if at all, from the circumstances surrounding the homicide.' State v. Paterson, 288 N.C. 553, 559, 220 S.E.2d 600, 606 (1975).

Leaving aside the interesting question whether defendant's version of the facts would, even if true, have constituted a defense to the murder charges, we hold there was ample evidence from which the jury could find that defendant not only killed his mother and his grandmother but did so with premeditation and deliberation.

With regard to significant facts there were enough inconsistencies between defendant's pre-trial statements to investigating Deputy Woodward and his aunt and his testimony at trial, and even between portions of his trial testimony for the jury to conclude that defendant's bizarre tale of being under the influence of two unknown abductors was an utter fabrication designed solely to cover up his complicity in the crimes. With regard to the purchase of the handcuffs and other restraining devices, defendant first told Woodward that these devices were given to him by his abductors. In a second statement to Woodward he said he bought them the day before at a police supply store in Kinston and that both the handcuffs and the straps were purchased for the purpose of locking a chain link fence gate at his home in Goldsboro. On direct examination at trial defendant did not state clearly how he acquired these devices but left the unmistakable impression that he had been given them by his abductors. He said, 'I related (to his mother, grandmother, and Chappell) that the two men had come to my house and what they had told me, what they told me I had to do. I showed them the instruments that I had been given, at that point Shorty turned and the handcuffs were placed on him and he went into the bedroom and laid down.' This was defendant's only reference to his acquisition of these instruments in a lengthy direct examination which covered in great detail other aspects of the case. On cross-examination, however, he conceded that he purchased the devices in Kinston on the afternoon of February 19--the handcuffs for the purpose of locking his gate and the straps to use in securing certain camping equipment.

Despite Chappell's testimony that defendant had called the Letson home on the afternoon of February 19 to advise that he and his boss would come in late that night, defendant omitted any discussion of this fact during his direct testimony. It was not until cross-examination on the point that he conceded that he called the house that afternoon, talked with his mother, and told her only that he would possibly be coming over between 12:00 midnight and 1:00 a.m.

Defendant's direct examination purports to cover the crucial events of February 19 before arrival at his girl friend's home with this statement: 'On February 19 I worked that day. The first part of the morning I worked in the community where I lived and in the afternoon I worked over in Lenoir County. Between six and seven o'clock that evening I had gone over to (his girl friend's home).'

In defendant's first statement to Woodward he said that his masked abductors carried him directly from his home in Goldsboro to his grandmother's home in Onslow County where they instructed him to go in, bind the occupants of the home, and to await their return at 6:00 a.m. In his second statement to Woodward he said he went first to his trailer on Emerald Isle with the masked men and then from Emerald Isle to Mrs. Letson's home, apparently alone.

In his direct testimony defendant stated that his abductors indicated en route from Goldsboro to Emerald Isle that they were going to rob Him and that it was not until the threesome arrived at Emerald Isle that he was instructed to go to his grandmother's home in Onslow County where the robbery would take place. On cross-examination, however, his testimony was that the masked men told him en route from Goldsboro to Emerald Isle that they were going to rob the occupants of his grandmother's home and what he was to do there.

In the context of other evidence already referred to the jury could well have inferred from defendant's statement to his mother, 'Ma, I've done and gone too far', and from the note he left his girl friend that he was premeditating and deliberating at that time upon the killings. The jury could also have inferred that defendant began premeditating and deliberating the killings when he purchased the restraining devices on the afternoon of February 19. Neither the state nor the jury were bound to accept defendant's explanation of their purchase given either at trial or in his pretrial statements whih the state offered against him. The state is not bound by exculpatory portions of a defendant's pretrial statement offered against him at trial if there is 'other evidence tending to throw a different light on the circumstances of the homicide.' State v. Bright, 237 N.C. 475, 477, 75 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1953); Accord, State v. Hankerson,supra. The state's evidence as to what occurred in the early morning hours at the Letson home, given by the victim Chappell and investigating officers who arrived at the scene, together with defendant's inconsistent statements and evasiveness about the purchase itself tend to throw a different light on the circumstances of the homicide from that suggested at times by the defendant.

In short the evidence of defendant's guilt of two murders in the first degree is plenary. This assignment of error is overruled.

By assignment of error number 10 defendant complains of the refusal of the trial court to allow his motion for nonsuit as to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill William Chappell. The indictment alleges that defendant:

'did feloniously assault William Kenneth Chappell with a deadly weapon, to wit: a plastic bag, with the felonious intent to kill and murder the said William Kenneth Chappell, the said plastic bag being a deadly weapon by the manner of its use in that the Defendant placed the plastic bag over the head and face of William Kenneth Chappell and closed the open end of said plastic bag tightly with tape around the neck of William Kenneth Chappell, all the while the said William Kenneth Chappell's hands were handcuffed behind him.'

These allegations are precisely what the evidence of the state tended to show. Chappell testified that defendant:

'put a piece of tape each way across my mouth and he then rolled out some tape and then he put the bag over my head, and then he put the tape around the bag on my neck and he pulled up the left part of the bag and asked me if I could breathe and I said yes Thurman I can breathe, and with that he clapped it down around my neck and he went out and turned the lights off and closed the door. At that point I was still handcuffed and laying on my back.

* * *

* * *

'At that point I was not in a position to breathe.'

In light of the fact that Mrs. Letson died by suffocation this is substantial evidence from which a jury might find that defendant placed the bag over Chappell's head and 'clapped it down around (his) neck' with intent to suffocate him to death. This evidence also permits the jury to find that the bag was a deadly weapon. A deadly weapon is not one which must kill but one which under the circumstances of its use is likely to cause death or great bodily harm. State v. Smith, 187 N.C. 469, 121 S.E. 737 (1924). This assignment is overruled.

Defendant's assignment of error number 11 refers to the trial court's 'failure to grant the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.' This motion is not recognized in our criminal practice. Even if it were, we suppose it would raise the same legal question as presented by defendant's motions for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of all the evidence upon which, as we have said, the trial court properly ruled against defendant. This assignment is overruled.

II

During the jury selection process the following colloquy between the district attorney and prospective juror Harvey A. Lewis occurred 'Q. Could you sit as a juror in these cases and listen to the evidence of the witnesses and the law that the court will charge to the jury and render a fair and impartial verdict based solely and entirely upon that?

'A. I think I can. I have to qualify that statement. Since you did say that this is one that there is a possibility of capital punishment, then I feel, although I do believe in capital punishment, but under the manner in which it has been administered, I don't think it has been fair, that would be my only qualification.

'Q. You mean the manner in which it has been administered is not fair.

'A. From the statistics that those people that have been tried say for a capital crime, it seems as though the black, poor is the ones that it...