State v. Strobel

Decision Date14 August 2019
Docket NumberA18-0057
Citation932 N.W.2d 303
Parties STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Donald Albert STROBEL, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; Karen Kelly, Wabasha County Attorney, Wabasha, Minnesota; and Thomas Ragatz, Special Assistant Wabasha County Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

This case presents the question of whether, under section 2.B.7.a of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the classification of a prior offense as a gross misdemeanor or felony is determined by reference to the statute setting forth the elements of the crime, or by reference to Minn. Stat. § 609.02 (2018) (defining "felony" and "gross misdemeanor"). Appellant Donald Albert Strobel was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced Strobel using a criminal-history score of five. Strobel appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that his criminal-history score was improperly calculated. Specifically, he argued that the district court had misapplied Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B.7.a and improperly assigned one-half of a felony point for one of his prior convictions. The court of appeals agreed with Strobel’s interpretation of the Guidelines and concluded that the State did not carry its burden to prove Strobel’s criminal-history score. The court therefore reversed Strobel’s sentence, and remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Because the court of appeals properly determined that the classification of a prior offense is determined by reference to the statute setting forth the elements of the crime, we affirm.

FACTS

This appeal involves two of Strobel’s controlled-substance-crime convictions: one in 2012 (the "prior offense") and the current offense, which Strobel committed in 2016. The prior offense is relevant here because it was used to calculate Strobel’s criminal-history score in sentencing for his current offense.

In 2012, Strobel was convicted of the prior offense: fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a)(1) (2014). That statute prohibited the possession of "one or more mixtures containing a controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II, III, or IV, except a small amount of marijuana."1 The statutory maximum sentence for the offense was 5 years in prison, Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(a), but the presumptive guideline sentence for the offense, given Strobel’s criminal-history score, was a stayed 15-month sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4–5 (2011). The district court stayed execution of a 15-month sentence and placed Strobel on probation for 5 years.

Four years later, the Legislature enacted the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA). See Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, 2016 Minn. Laws 576. As we explained in State v. Scovel , "under section 7 of the DSRA, fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance remains a felony, but some first-time fifth-degree possession offenses are now classified as gross misdemeanors." 916 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Minn. 2018) ; see also Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, § 7, 2016 Minn. Laws 576, 583–85 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2016) ). Section 7 of the DSRA became effective on August 1, 2016, and "applies to crimes committed on or after that date." Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, § 7, 2016 Minn. Laws 576, 585.

Strobel committed the current offense in 2016. Police arrested him in December for selling methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Police also found methamphetamine in the police car where Strobel had been placed following his arrest. Strobel was charged with first-degree sale under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(2)(ii) (2018), found guilty following a jury trial, and convicted.2 The district court sentenced Strobel to 115 months in prison, the presumptive guideline sentence for a defendant with a criminal-history score of five. Strobel’s criminal-history score included one-half of a felony point for the 2012 prior offense.3

Strobel did not challenge the criminal-history-score calculation in the district court. But he did challenge it on appeal to the court of appeals. See Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 553 n.5 ("A defendant cannot forfeit appellate review of his criminal history score."); State v. Maurstad , 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007) (noting that a defendant can neither waive nor forfeit appellate review of his criminal-history score "because a sentence based on an incorrect criminal history score is an illegal sentence"); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 ("The court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.").4

Specifically, Strobel argued that the district court improperly assigned one-half of a felony point for the 2012 prior offense. Strobel contended that, under Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines § 2.B.7.a, the district court must apply the element-based "offense definitions" that were in effect when he committed the 2016 offense in order to determine the point value for the prior offense. Strobel relied on the DSRA, which changed the classification of certain fifth-degree drug offenses from felonies to gross misdemeanors. Strobel argued that, because his prior offense would be a gross misdemeanor after the effective date of the DSRA, the district court erred in classifying it as a felony. Compare Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2018) (providing that "[a] person convicted under the provisions of subdivision 2, clause (1) ... is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if: (1) the amount of the controlled substance possessed, other than heroin, is less than 0.25 grams or one dosage unit or less if the controlled substance was possessed in dosage units"), with Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2 (2012) (providing no gross-misdemeanor exception for possession).5

The court of appeals agreed with Strobel’s interpretation of the Guidelines. Concluding that "the [S]tate failed to prove that Strobel’s 2012 fifth-degree controlled-substance-possession offense should be classified as a felony for purposes of his criminal-history-score calculation," the court of appeals remanded to the district court for resentencing. State v. Strobel , 921 N.W.2d 563, 577 (Minn. App. 2018). On remand, the court of appeals instructed the district court to permit the State "to develop the record regarding the type and amount of controlled substance underlying Strobel’s 2012 conviction." Id. (citing State v. Outlaw , 748 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2008) (remanding with similar instructions where the defendant "did not object to the district court’s determination that his out-of-state convictions were felonies")).

We granted the State’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the parties debate the proper interpretation of Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B.7.a, titled "Classification of Prior Offense." Interpretation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines is a question of law that we review de novo. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 554 ; State v. Washington , 908 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Minn. 2018). We apply the same principles of interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes, including the canons of statutory interpretation set forth in Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2018). Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 554 ; Washington , 908 N.W.2d at 608. We read the Guidelines "as a whole and interpret each section in light of the surrounding sections." State v. Kirby , 899 N.W.2d 485, 493 (Minn. 2017). If the language of the Guidelines "is plain and unambiguous, it is presumed to manifest the intent of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission." Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 554–55 ; State v. Campbell , 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012). We consider other factors to determine the Commission’s intent only if the language of the Guidelines is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." Campbell , 814 N.W.2d at 4 ; see Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 555.

A.

Section 2.B.7.a provides that, when calculating a criminal-history score, "[t]he classification of a prior offense as a petty misdemeanor, misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor, or felony is determined by current Minnesota offense definitions (see Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subds. 2-4a ) and sentencing policies." Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.B.7.a.6 Each party contends that the plain language of section 2.B.7.a unambiguously supports its position.

The State contends that "offense definitions" is synonymous with the parenthetical citation in section 2.B.7.a to Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 2, which provides that a felony is any "crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for more than one year may be imposed." Because Strobel received a sentence for the 2012 prior offense that was still a felony sentence under Minn. Stat. § 609.02 in 2016, the State contends that Strobel’s prior offense may be classified as a felony under the Guidelines. Accordingly, the State argues that one-half of a felony point was properly added to Strobel’s criminal-history score for the prior offense. The State also argues that because, hypothetically, a felony sentence could still be imposed for Strobel’s 2012 conduct as of 2016, Strobel’s prior offense may be classified as a felony under the Guidelines.7

For his part, Strobel contends that "offense definitions" means the element-based definition of a crime under the statute setting forth a particular offense. Here, that statute would be Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2018). Because he committed the 2016 offense after the DSRA’s modification of the elements of possession crimes went into effect, Strobel contends that his 2012 prior offense should be classified for criminal-history-score purposes by applying the DSRA-revised elements of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2018). Under those revised elements, the type and amount of the controlled substance the defendant possesses determines whether the crime was a felony or gross...

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