State v. Campbell

• Decision Date: 09 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. A10–0512.,A10–0512.
• Citation: 814 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Appellant/Cross–Respondent, v. Tito Fonzio CAMPBELL, Respondent/Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

814 N.W.2d 1

STATE of Minnesota, Appellant/Cross–Respondent,

v.Tito Fonzio CAMPBELL, Respondent/Cross–Appellant.

No. A10–0512.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 9, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The phrase “another offense” as used in Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. means felony offense.

2. The purpose of Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. is to count an offender's criminal history score once and only once.

3. When sentencing a felony offense permissively consecutive to a gross misdemeanor offense, a district court should not reduce the offender's criminal history score to zero before calculating the presumptive sentence for the felony offense.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John J. Choi, Ramsey

County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine how to calculate an offender's criminal history score when the court permissively imposes a felony sentence consecutive to a gross misdemeanor sentence. Respondent Tito Fonzio Campbell was convicted of six offenses, including gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm and felony fleeing a police officer resulting in death. The district court imposed a 12–month sentence for the gross misdemeanor and a consecutive 234–month sentence for the felony fleeing offense, using a criminal history score of three. The court of appeals reversed Campbell's sentence, concluding that zero criminal history points should have been used to calculate the duration of the felony sentence under Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.¹ We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the district court's sentence.

On April 18, 2009, Campbell drove after drinking alcohol and despite his cancelled driver's license. Campbell saw police and fled with his 10–year–old son in the car. After driving at a high rate of speed, Campbell ran a red light and crashed into another car, injuring the driver, and killing the driver's wife. Within two hours of the accident, a test of Campbell's blood revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.15. After a jury trial, Campbell was found guilty of gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation, Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2010); felony first-degree driving while impaired, Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2010); gross misdemeanor endangerment of a child, Minn.Stat. § 609.378, subd. 1(b)(1) (2010); gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation resulting in bodily harm, Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subds. 1(4), 1a(d) (2010); and felony fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle resulting in death, Minn.Stat. § 609.487, subd. 4(a) (2010).

On January 12, 2010, the district court imposed five sentences in the order in which the offenses occurred.² The court imposed a 12–month sentence on the gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation conviction. Based on a criminal history score of three and a severity level of ten, the court imposed a permissive consecutive sentence of 234 months on the felony fleeingconviction, to be served consecutive to the 12–month gross misdemeanor sentence.³ The court justified the consecutive sentence based on the multiple victim exception, Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.f. and Minn.Stat. §§ 609.035, subd. 5 and 609.15, subd. 1(b) (2010).

Campbell appealed to the court of appeals on multiple issues and asserted that the district court erred by failing to use a criminal history score of zero to calculate the duration of the permissive consecutive felony fleeing sentence. The court of appeals determined that the duration of Campbell's permissive consecutive felony fleeing sentence must be calculated using a criminal history score of zero, and reversed and remanded for resentencing. State v. Campbell, No. A10–0512, 2011 WL 1833013, at *5–6 (Minn.App. May 16, 2011). The State filed a petition for review, Campbell filed a cross-petition for review, and we granted both petitions.⁴

I.

The principal question presented by this appeal is whether, when a district court permissively imposes a felony sentence consecutive to a gross misdemeanor sentence, the court is required under Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. to reduce the offender's criminal history score to zero before calculating the presumptive sentence for the felony offense.

Statutory construction and interpretation of the sentencing guidelines are subject to de novo review. State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn.2009). We apply the rules of statutory construction to our interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 523. When interpreting a statute, our role is to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010). If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is presumed to manifest legislative intent and we must give it effect. Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn.2001). Only if a statute is ambiguous will we engage in statutory construction. State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn.2009). A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000).

Section 2.F.2. of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines states, “For each offense sentenced consecutive to another offense(s), other than those that are presumptive, a zero criminal history score, or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is greater, shall be used in determining the presumptive duration.” (Emphasis added.) Campbell argues that Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. dictates that a zero criminal history score be used to calculate the duration of his permissive consecutive sentence for his felony fleeing conviction. The district court did not reduce Campbell's criminal history score to zero, and instead used Campbell's three criminal history points to calculate the duration of the felony fleeing sentence. The court of appeals concluded that the duration of Campbell's felony fleeing sentence should have been determined using a zero criminal history score.

To resolve this case, we must determine the meaning of the phrase “another offense” in Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. The term “offense” is not defined in the definition section of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines Appendix. Section 2.F. does not indicate whether the term “offense,” as used in that section, is limited to felonies or includes gross misdemeanors and misdemeanors as well.

Campbell argues that “another offense” means “any offense,” because the Sentencing Guidelines Commission could have easily used the phrase “felony offense” to require that an offender's criminal history is reduced to zero only when felony sentences are permissively imposed consecutive to other felony sentences. The Commission uses the phrase “felony offense” in other places in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The State asserts that “another offense” means “felony offense” and that the phrase must be considered in light of the context of section 2.F.2. and of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as a whole, both of which focus on felony offenses. Because the phrase “another offense” in section 2.F.2. can reasonably be interpreted to mean “another felony offense” or to mean “any other offense,” we conclude that Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. is ambiguous. We now look to other factors to determine the intent of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.

Our interpretation of Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. is guided by the context of that section and the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as a whole. Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943) (explaining that we construe statutes in light of their context); see State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.2011) (“When interpreting statutes, we do not examine different provisions in isolation.”). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines state at the outset that they apply only to felonies. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1 (stating that one purpose of the guidelines is to ensure proportionality of sentences “following the conviction of a felony ”) (emphasis added). Additionally, section 2.F.2. is narrowly focused on felony offenses. Section 2.F.2., “Permissive Consecutive Sentences,” contains a list of situations where consecutive sentencing is permissive, all of which involve felony offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2.a-g.

Our interpretation of Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. is also guided by the need for the law, the circumstances of its enactment, the purpose of the statute, and the consequences of a certain interpretation. See Kersten v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 874–75 (Minn.2000) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16). Additionally, when interpreting an ambiguous provision of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, we look to “commission policy and official commission interpretation.” State v. McGee, 347 N.W.2d 802, 806 (Minn.1984). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines clearly express the purpose and policy behind a reduction of an offender's criminal history score to zero in permissive consecutive sentencing:

For each offense sentenced consecutive to another offense(s), other than those that are presumptive, a zero criminal history score, or the mandatory minimum for the offense, whichever is greater, shall be used in determining the presumptive duration. The purpose of this procedure is to count an individual's criminal history score only one time in the computation of consecutive sentence durations.

Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.F.2. Recognizing that consecutive sentences are particularly severe punishment, the Commission intended that an offender's criminal history is counted once, and only once, in consecutive sentencing.

Campbell's sentence for felony fleeing was imposed consecutive to a gross misdemeanor sentence. Criminal history does...